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ABSTRACT

TRADITIONAL APOLOGETICS IN A POSTCONCILIAR CHURCH: FROM
SCHOLASTICISM TO COMBINATIONALISM AND BEYOND

By
Glenn B. Siniscalchi
May 2013

George S. Worgul, Jr., S.T.D., PhD, Dissertation Director
Recognizing that Christians cannot adequately understand the mysteries of faith
from a single vantage point, Catholic theologians have been keen on emphasizing the
multidimensional nature of theological understanding since Vatican II. The advantage of
such a method has helped believers to understand the rich, in-depth quality of Catholic
faith.
One of the fields of theology which has not been discussed in the models
approach, however, is apologetics―which includes as one of its aspects the art and
science of defending the doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church. When all of the
relevant passages in the documents of Vatican II are taken into consideration, a unique
apologetical approach emerges that incorporates key advances as they emerged
historically from the Church‘s apologists. Each of the individual apologetic systems
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from the past will be shown to have its own particular strengths and weaknesses. By way
of contrast, I will argue that the best way to ―make a defense for‖ the Gospel in a
postconciliar church is to advance the integrated model of the Council. This integrated
model of Catholic defense is called combinationalism. The interests and views of the
apologists are proven to be complementary rather than competing.
This integrated model helps apologists and evangelists to recognize that although
one approach might be needed in a certain context, it would be an egregious mistake to
take that one system and use it as the exclusive means to reach persons situated within
different circumstances and cultural contexts. This essay will not only exploit the
different apologetic models in the post-Vatican II period, it will also serve as a serious
work of apologetics in its own right by focusing on certain challenges as test cases to
highlight the pertinence and livelihood of each model.
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INTRODUCTION
Today apologetics has a questionable reputation among Catholic scholars. So
strong is this suspicion within the Church that even outsiders begin to question whether
―arguments for faith‖ are constitutive of what it means to be a Christian. Because
Christianity is a matter of faith, they say, apologetics must be taken as a curious example
of modern day fundamentalism.
It is not difficult to see how the anti-apologetical mindset plays itself out in a
myriad of ways. Cheap slogans such as: ―Only the Holy Spirit can draw unbelievers to
faith, not arguments!‖ are well known in many Christian circles. Other half-truths, such
as ―Lead by example and not words!‖ are often taken in a way that undercuts the
apologetic mandate (1 Pet. 3:15). What enthusiastic Catholic has not felt awkward in the
company of lukewarm believers (let alone in the presence of unbelievers), knowing that
our culture has relegated religious expression to Sunday worship alone? And even when
Catholics go to Church, who has not seen the lack of reverence in outward gestures that
are supposed to be indicative of what is going on in the heart?
Yet another problem for apologetics is that of postmodern relativism (see chapter
2 of this dissertation). The issue of perspectivalism sometimes leaves the apologist
reeling—hesitant to swish a spiritual sword in the dialogue with a potential convert lest
she loses a friend or even family member ―to the other side of the fence.‖
And if all this was not enough, theologians and apologists must face the problem
of relevance (see chapter 4 of this dissertation). For, apologetics is often seen by
Catholics as something for intellectuals, not the ordinary person in the pew who wants
something that applies directly to their life. Before we embark on the relevance of
1

apologetics for the greater purposes of developing this dissertation, it would be profitable
for us to reintroduce some of the reasons for anyone to engage in apologetics.
First, Scripture commands that Christians do apologetics. In Jude 3, Christians
are told to ―contend for the faith.‖ In Colossians 4:5, 6, Paul warns the Church: ―Conduct
yourselves wisely toward outsiders, making the most of the opportunity. Let your speech
always be gracious, seasoned with salt, so that you know how you should respond to each
one.‖ Paul saw his own role as that of an apologist. In Phillipians 1:16, he wrote, ―I am
here for the defense of the Gospel.‖ ―Consequently,‖ says Walter Kasper, ―faith, as
understood in the Bible, is not a blind venture, not an irrational feeling, not an
uncalculated option and certainly not a sacrificium intellectus (sacrifice of the intellect).
Rather, faith can and must give a rational account of itself.‖ 1 1 Peter 3:15 says we are to
always be ready to give a reason for our hope. Notice that the passage says that believers
are to always be ready to give a reason for faith, not just sometimes.
Second, the Magisterium urges theologians to do apologetics (see chapter 1 of this
dissertation). In Fides et ratio, John Paul II reiterated the traditional teaching of the
Church:
Recalling the teaching of Saint Paul (cf. Rom. 1:19-20), the First Vatican Council pointed
to the existence of truths which are naturally, and thus philosophically, knowable; and an
acceptance of God‘s Revelation necessarily presupposes knowledge of these truths. In
studying Revelation and its credibility, as well as the corresponding act of faith,
fundamental theology should show how, in the light of the knowledge conferred by faith,
there emerge certain truths which reason, from its own independent enquiry, already
provides. Revelation endows these truths with their fullest meaning, directing them
towards the richness of the revealed mystery in which they find their ultimate purpose.
Consider, for example, the natural knowledge of God, the possibility of distinguishing
divine Revelation from other phenomena or the recognition of its credibility, the capacity
of human language to speak in a true and meaningful way even of things which transcend
all human experience. From all these truths, the mind is led to acknowledge the existence

1

W alter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O‘Connell, (New York: Crossroad
Publishing, 1984), 67.
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of a truly propaedeutic path to faith, one that can lead to the acceptance of Revelation
without in any way compromising the principles and autonomy of the mind itself.2

―Theological science,‖ says Pope Benedict XVI, ―responds to the invitation of truth as it
seeks to understand the faith. It thereby aids the People of God in fulfilling the Apostle‘s
command (cf. 1 Pet 3:15) to give an accounting for their hope to those who ask it.‖ 3 An
apologetical mind is one that coincides with a heart for Christ. Hiding the truth is not a
sign of love, but of fear. If intellectually engaged Christians truly believe that Jesus is
Lord, then they will express their faith in every way that is humanly possible, not just in
ways that exclude the mind and verbal persuasion. Arguments can and must be given for
faith. However, being argumentative is an abuse of apologetics and should always be
avoided in every circumstance.
Arguments, moreover, are not exclusively directed to unbelievers, but are
designed to motivate believers within the context of the faith community. 4 Indeed,
apologetics is needed for believers to become confident about what they believe in order
to explain and defend their faith.
Third, common sense suggests that apologetics is needed. God created human
beings with the ability to reason. God therefore expects us to use reason. It also helps
people to determine what is true, and how to justify one‘s beliefs. Without reason, there
is no justification for holding to any one set of certain beliefs over and against another set
of beliefs. Socrates once said that ―the unexamined life is not worth living.‖ The same
goes for Christian faith: the unexamined faith is not worth believing. Since God did not

2

John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, N. 67.
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the
Theologian,
(May 24, 1990): N. 6. Cf. 1, 5, 7, 10.
4
John C. Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science (New Haven: Yale University, 2010),
123-149.
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create anyone without a mind, it is normal for all people to have questions and even
objections to the truth.
Fourth, apologetics helps to inculturate the Gospel. Christians must be able to
understand the wider cultural context where they live in order for evangelization to take
place. The intellectual zeitgeist of West can be traced back to the secular philosophies of
the Enlightenment. The hallmark of this movement was to free humanity from the
―shackles of organized religion‖ (especially Catholic Christianity). The impact of this
movement is still felt in the academy today. The upshot of these philosophies is that faith
is equivalent to an opinion or personal taste; only that which is observable is worthy of
public discussion and debate.
Kasper elaborates on the cultural malaise, offering a solution in the process:
―Especially in a situation like ours today, when everything depends on the Christian faith
making the transition to new cultural horizons and a new epoch, there can be no question
of the Christian retreating into the realm of private experience. Today, as hardly ever
before in the history of Christianity it is essential that the Christian faith emphasize its
reasonableness which is accessible to all human beings.‖ 5 If the very concept of truth has
come under fire in our culture, then it only makes sense to explain and defend the very
fact of truth before one can explain what is true.
Fifth, the results of apologetics confirm the apologetic effort. Sometimes
Christians and unbelievers complain that apologetics never accompanies conversions to
Christ. But this is a serious misreading of Christian history. After trying to debunk the
historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection, for instance, Frank Morrison became a Catholic after
recognizing the historical evidence for the resurrection (for more on evidential
5
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approaches to apologetics, see chapter 4).6 C.S. Lewis came to believe in Christ under
the influence of apologetics. In fact, Lewis was convinced that many of the people that
he knew in England at the time who believed in God did so because of arguments for
God‘s existence (thus chapter 3): ―nearly everyone I know who has embraced
Christianity in adult life has been influenced by what seemed to him to be at least a
probable argument for Theism.‖ 7 Augustine embraced Catholicism after hearing a
thoughtful Catholic debate with a Manichean. 8 Although many more examples could be
given, the point is that the Christian defense has accompanied conversions in the past.
When believers engage in the apologetic task, it creates an atmosphere that makes
the Christian faith reasonable for outsiders to believe in (or at least judge it to be
reasonable). So the question is not whether there are reasons for faith, but what kind of
reasons we have. No one believes in anything unless they know that it is first believable.
This would not mean everyone is able to articulate those reasons, but those reasons
certainly do exist.
No matter what the circumstances, Christians must never make it their goal to win
arguments with their dialogue partner. The apologist must develop the skill of making
the Christian faith attractive, being respectful to their dialogue partner in the process.
Ideas need to be presented and challenged, not persons as such. 9 One of the most basic
components of apologetic work is to love and care for our partners. This would not mean
that Christians should refuse to make hard truth claims. Rather, the focus in the
postconciliar period must remain on how our defense is made. As John Paul II argued in
6

Frank Morison, Who Moved the Stone? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1987).
C.S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays in Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids:
Eerdman, 1970), 173.
8
See Augustine‘s The Confessions.
9
Gaudium et Spes, 28, 92.
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Redemptoris Missio, the Church always proposes, she never imposes anything on
anyone. 10
True, apologetics can make people feel uncomfortable. But perhaps this stems
from apprehending the truth of Christ in the discussion. 11 Let us remember the words of
John‘s Gospel (3:19-21): ―And this is the verdict, that the light came into the world, but
people preferred darkness to light, because their works were evil. For everyone who does
wicked things hates the light and does not come toward the light, so that his works might
not be exposed. But whoever lives the truth comes to the light, so that his works may be
clearly seen as done in God.‖
Whether it is the past or the future, the message of the cross and resurrection will
always be countercultural, demanding a radical change of lifestyle. And this encounter
will be uncomfortable to face at times. As Dulles explains, in defense of apologetics: ―If
they [accusations made against the validity of apologetics] come from a mentality that. . .
shrinks from any kind of confrontation, the criticisms should probably be discounted.
Apologetics has to be somewhat controversial; it should be forthrightly defend the settled
teaching of the Church.‖12 Not only should we always be ready to give a reason for our
hope, we should also be ready for rejection, if not persecution.
Lastly, a blind faith can lead to self-destruction. Alternatively, a reasoned faith
can lead to sanctity. Atheist Richard Dawkins once noted that faith ―leads people to
believe in whatever it is so strongly that in extreme cases they are prepared to kill and die
for it without the need for further justification.‖13 Dawkins is partially correct: blind faith

10

John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio, N. 39.
Avery Dulles, ―The Rebirth of Apologetics,‖ First Things, No. 143, (May 2004): 19, 20.
12
Ibid., 20.
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Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University, 2006), 198.
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can lead one down the path of violence (see the second half of chapter 6). But a healthy
faith will seek to understand the object in which their faith is placed. Indeed, healthy
faith does not forget to reason. When Christians limit the intellectual engagement of
faith, it can literally steer them down the path of extreme forms of violence. Faith that is
based on experience and subjective religious experience at the expense of reason leads
one to embrace heresy. At other times it leads one to be violent against others. Reason
reinforces faith and makes it come alive (see chapter 3); fideism ruins the very impetus
for faith itself. Apologetics and practice are on two different sides of the same coin.
Thus there should be different ways in which this relationship works itself out. Let us
now turn to some of these reasons.

Apologetics and Practice
Apologetics can enhance believers‘ awareness and confidence to proclaim Christ.
Because the truth element of theology tends to be overlooked nowadays, it is more
important than ever to focus on the truth of Catholic faith. 14 Indeed, the Church is the
very place of truth. In this respect apologetics safeguards believers from becoming
indifferent about discipleship. As Avery Dulles puts it: ―If we do not consider that it is
important for others to hear the Christian proclamation, we inevitably begin to question
its importance for ourselves.‖15
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For a theological and philosophical definition and defense of Catholic truth, see Ignace de la
Potterie, ―Truth,‖ in Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, ed. René Latourelle and Rino Fisichella (New
York: Crossroad, 2000), 1133. He writes: ―In tradition, in addition to the use of the notion of truth derived
from Greek philosophy [i.e., truth as correspondence], we find in some of the fathers and in the liturgy a
resumption and development of the biblical conception of truth, but sometimes with a stronger emphasis on
its doctrinal aspect. Generally speaking, truth designates the Christian faith, i.e., the divine revelation as it
has been handed down in the church.‖ I speak about ―truth‖ at length in this dissertation in chapter 3.
15
Avery Dulles, ―The Rebirth of Apologetics,‖ First Things, No. 143, (May 2004): 20.
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Apologetics plays an important role in facilitating the process of conversion—one
of the primary tasks of the Church community. Authentic discipleship begins with
authentic conversion. One of the values of engaging in the apologetic task is that it
deepens and enriches an understanding of the truth. Since authentic parish unity is
impossible to achieve without interior conversion, apologetics helps to facilitate the
process of the Church becoming dynamic, evangelical, and one. As Christians become
more and more confident that Jesus is the way, the truth, and the life, they inevitably
become who they were meant to be, together in Christ
A ministry that neglects apologetics can destroy the driving impetus underlying
missions. If dialogue is understood in the erroneous sense that faith in Jesus is
unnecessary or unimportant, and that Christians only have to dialogue to understand one
another for mere mutual enrichment, then the missionary mandate loses its underlying
rationale. But evangelization is essential to the Church‘s life. As John Paul II writes, ―In
the Church‘s history, missionary drive has always been a sign of vitality, just as its
lessoning is a sign of a crisis of faith.‖ 16 Part of the reason for this lessoning is due to a
reductive understanding of ministry that forgets the importance of apologetics. A
Catholic Church is not just inclusive, it is expansive. Conversely, if the Church is not
expansive, then one must seriously question whether the Church is fulfilling its mission.
Apologetics is needed for theologians to understand the inner-rationale of beliefs
or viewpoints that are different or even contrary from the Church‘s doctrines. The
evangelical endeavor (one of the main purposes of the Church) demands that Christians
familiarize themselves with different viewpoints. Repressing disagreement is not healthy
for authentic faith, and certainly not with full Catholic faith. In recognizing differences
16

John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio, N. 2.
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one makes the first step to understand the problems that need to be addressed for
reunification and/or evangelization to take place. Although the full reunification of
Christendom is a complicated endeavor, the apologetic enterprise enables Catholics to
apprehend and appreciate the credibility of beliefs and practices that are different or
contrary.
Apologetics is actually a form of compassion expressed by believers. In this
sense apologetics must be incorporated into theology and the ministry. Disagreements
within the Church (and other Christian communities and religions) do not have to be
completely incompatible for pastors and theologians to become more apologetical in
scope. It only requires that believers at least think that their beliefs are apparently
different from other viewpoints. The apologetic element to dialogue will help to reveal
whether these differences are real or only apparent. The same theme works in reverse. If
I hold to beliefs that are wrong or misguided, then I certainly would want other persons to
point out where I might have gone wrong. Good apologetic arguments, which are
favorable to views that are contrary from my own, can help me to see my own theological
errors.
It is strange that apologetics would be so lowly esteemed in so many Christian
circles. Apologetics is needed more now than ever. The New Testament writers and
early Church Fathers had to be heavily apologetical, for there was no Christian influence
in culture yet. In a post-Christian context, it seems reasonable that we should have the
same approach. An apologetical outlook might make greater inroads into the wider
world. If we understand what apologetics is in its most basic sense (the positive and/or
negative defense of the Gospel in both theoretical and practical forms), then obviously

9

apologetics is relevant at any time. Even though our culture and theology continues to
change, Christians still live in an era where people need to be convinced that Jesus is
Lord. Obviously this entails that Christians will have to make a defense of the Gospel.
Again, there will always be objections to the Gospel, whether they are sub-consciously or
openly stated by outsiders and those within the Church. And this is precisely the reason
why apologetics will always remain a significant part of theology and ministry.
Even though there is real warfare going on between the Reign of God and the
powers of this world (see Eph. 6:10-20), the believer‘s interaction with other believers
and the outside world should be more diplomatic than combative. Although Christianity
is already philosophically well positioned to deal with most objections, the more tactical
concern of the apologist has to do with the engagement. Defending the faith requires
more than knowledge. It requires an artful method. Often a clever apologist can
outmaneuver someone who is more intelligent or has better arguments on the table at the
moment. Let us look at some tactics that might help ambassadors for Christ to use
apologetics to advance the Reign of God.

Previewing this Dissertation
The first chapter of this essay is dedicated to inculcating the Vatican II‘s vision of
Catholic defense. Many scholars seem to think that ecumenical theology and/or
interreligious dialogue have trumped the use of apologetics in the Catholic Church since
Vatican II. But nothing could be further from the truth. Soon to be shown, the Council

10

endorses at least four different models of Catholic defense. This models approach will be
discussed in the first chapter.
Before turning to the different approaches, however, it is imperative to discuss the
problem of faith and reason in a postmodern context (chapter 2). This discussion needs
to be mentioned because it would be useless to defend Christian claims unless they are
first construed as universally true. The title of the second chapter, ―Does Postmodern
Relativism Defeat Apologetics?,‖ is not meant to be a refutation of postmodernism.
Many good things have come from the demise of the modern age for the purposes of
religious faith. But there is an element of postmodernism that needs to be addressed if
the apologetic enterprise is to make sense to theologians and potential converts.
Postmodernism serves as a construct of truth, and it also serves as a corrective to the
errors of modernism.
The first model is called ―scholastic apologetics‖ (chapter 3). Vatican II also
called for a reasoned faith, and, at times, reiterates and defends the teaching of Dei Filius
on the natural knowability of the existence of God. The Jesuit theologian John Hardon
writes:
Among the satisfying features of the Catholic faith is seeing how providentially,
sometimes prophetically, the Church‘s magisterium anticipates the needs of the future.
Who would have thought, as early as 1870, that by 1970 almost one-third of the human
race would be under the political domination of an ideology that professedly excludes the
existence of a personal God? Yet in 1870 the same Council that elaborated the divine
attributes to strengthen the faith of believing Christians also evaluated the position of
those who, only vaguely then, were devising to supplant the divine majesty … By the
second half the twentieth century, loss of faith in God or indifference to his existence had
assumed global proportions. Vatican II took stock of the situation in the longest and most
elaborate analysis of atheism in the sixteen hundred years of conciliar history. This fact
alone gives some indication of how different are the issues facing the Church today from
those that threatened its integrity during the days of Arius, Nestorius, and Pelagius.17

17

John A. Hardon, The Catholic Catechism (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 58, 60.
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Vatican II displayed more historical consciousness and cultural awareness than Vatican I,
but the former also emphasized the validity of permanent truths.18 Guadium et Spes
reaffirmed the twofold order of faith and reason and praised Aquinas‘s theology as a
model for understanding this relationship.19 This apologetic concern of the Council
seems appropriate in a post-Vatican II context. Regardless if one is Catholic, Protestant,
Anglican, or Eastern Orthodox, believers can empathize with the deleterious effects that
atheism and unbelief is having on Christendom and society.
A second model focuses on evidence (thus chapter 4). Because the Council
coincided with the third quest for the historical Jesus, I will focus on the importance of
evidence for Christ‘s resurrection. The newest quest for the historical Jesus has ushered
in a strong wave of apologetic writings defending the historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection.
According to I. Howard Marshall:
Why, then, should it be thought odd to offer to twentieth century audiences the historical
backing that they need in order to know whether they should commit themselves in faith
to the Jesus who is subject of Christian preaching? Modern people want to know if Jesus
really existed. They want to know if he was the kind of person that the Gospels make
him out to be. They want to know if he died and rose from the dead. They want to know
whether his general manner of life supports the claims made on his behalf by Christians.
And they are entitled to receive answers to these questions.20

The main evidence considered usually consists of the post-mortem appearances of Jesus
to individuals, groups, and enemies, the discovery of an open and empty tomb by a group
of Jesus‘ women followers, and the origin of the earliest disciples‘ belief in the
resurrection despite their predispositions to the contrary.
For the most part skeptics have taken these reported facts seriously but have tried
to account for them in naturalistic terms. Another salient component of earliest

18

Gaudium et Spes, 10; Dignitatis Humanae, 3.
Gaudium et Spes, 10, 59.
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19
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Christianity is the Church‘s worship and devotional life. This phenomenon has been
outlined and explained by brilliant scholars such as Larry Hurtado, Richard Bauckham,
and James Dunn. And yet, most apologists in the newest quest have neglected to interact
with their pioneering work. I will also survey the most salient criticisms of the
resurrection hypothesis and address them as well.
The third model focuses on human experience (chapter 5). Echoing the theology
of the Council, for instance, John Paul II wrote: ―This universal presence of the Saints is
in fact a proof of the transcendent power of the Spirit. It is the sign and proof of God‘s
victory over the forces and evil which divide humanity.‖ 21 The four ecclesial attributes
of the Church (one, holy, catholic, and apostolic) exert a special attraction for evangelists,
ecumenists, and apologists today. Indeed, so strong is the encounter with vibrant
Christian communities that it can bring about conversions.22 By their fruits we will know
God. The ordinary person is not usually persuaded to believe in Christ through
arguments as much as they are concerned to see God‘s work in people. 23 As John Henry
Newman said, ―as ‗the heavens declare the glory of God‘ as Creator, so are the saints the
proper and true evidence of the God of Christianity, and tell out into all lands the power
and grace of Him who made them. . . They are the popular evidence of Christianity.‖24
Although the argument of this chapter is not based upon a phenomenological
encounter with holiness, it tries to elucidate some of the positive changes that Christian
cultures have left upon the world for the better. This chapter tries to make sense out of
the objection: ―Does Christian belief make a difference in the lives of believers?‖ These

21

John Paul II, Ut Unum Sint, N. 84.
Vatican II, Lumen Gentium, N. 50.
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Avery Dulles, ―Seven Essentials of Evangelization,‖ Origins, 25.23, (November 23, 1995): 400.
24
V.F. Blehl, The Essential Newman (New York: Mentor Omega, 1963): 334.
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changes can be highlighted to reinvigorate an almost forgotten argument in the Catholic
Church known as the via empirica. Notwithstanding the positive changes found in
cultures that are unaffected by institutional Christianity, the via empirica can be defended
in a postconciliar church on behalf of the Divine Founder. Given the basic truth of
Christina faith (see chapters 1 and 2), it is imperative that we show its practical relevance
in this chapter.
Here I have briefly explained each of the models and what will be discussed in
this dissertation. In the conclusion I will explain how they all resonate together given the
Council‘s endorsement of the multi-models approach. I will show how the different
models are complementary given the different problems that have been highlighted in
each of these cases.

14

CONCILIAR APOLOGETICS: AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF CATHOLIC
DEFENSE
Recognizing that Christians cannot adequately understand the mysteries of faith
from a single vantage point, Catholic theologians have been keen on emphasizing the
multidimensional nature of theological understanding since Vatican II. Avery Dulles, for
instance, convincingly argued that many of the debated conceptions of the Church
proposed by different theologians throughout Church history were complementary rather
than contradictory. 25 Many theologians followed Dulles‘ multiple-models approach since
the early 1970‘s when the book was first published.26 The advantage of such a method
has helped believers to understand the rich, in-depth quality of Catholic faith.
One of the fields of theology which has not been discussed in the models
approach, however, is apologetics―the art and science of defending the doctrines and
practices of the Catholic Church. When all of the relevant passages in the documents of
Vatican II are taken into consideration, a unique apologetical approach emerges that
incorporates key advances as they emerged historically from the Church‘s apologists.
Each of the individual apologetic systems from the past will be shown to have its own
particular strengths and weaknesses.
By way of contrast, I will demonstrate that an important way to express the
Gospel in a post-conciliar church is to advance the integrated model of the Council. This
model will be called ―combinationalism.‖ The interests and views of the apologists are
25

Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Doubleday, 1974).
Some other examples would include Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (Maryknoll: Orbis,
1992); Sallie McFague, Models of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1987); Kevin W. Erwin, Models of the
Eucharist (Mahwah: Paulist, 2005); Stephen B. Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, rev. exp. ed.
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002).
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therefore proven to be complementary rather than competing according to conciliar
teaching.
As the Catholic Church became increasingly aware of the plurality of thought
patterns and the various ways in which inculturation takes place, the Catholic bishops
recognized that different needs and personality types will demand different approaches to
evangelization. All believers come to faith through different means. The integrated
model of Vatican II helps apologists and evangelists to recognize that although one
approach to Catholic defense might be needed in a certain context, it would be a foolish
mistake to take that one system and use it as the exclusive means to reach persons
situated within different circumstances and cultural contexts. Similarly, no single
personality type will carry that same measure of credibility or effectiveness in all
environments.

An Apologetics of Decline and Renewal
Many Catholics have a difficult time with anything that resembles a defense of
the faith. These critics seem to recast the same arguments that were repeatedly lashed out
against the manualist approach to apologetics which prevailed prior to Vatican II. This
approach was merely one way to defend the faith. Since these generalizations are still
heard today, the discipline as a whole tends to gets a bad name. As Paul Griffiths rightly
observes:
‗Apologetics‘ has itself become a term laden with negative connotations: to be an
apologist for the truth of one religious claim or set of claims over against another is, in
certain circles, seen as not far short of being a racist. And the term has passed into
popular currency, to the extent that it has, as a simple label for argument in the service of
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a predetermined orthodoxy, argument concerned not to demonstrate but to convince, and,
if conviction should fail, to browbeat into submission.27

Surely the ―fighting words‖ of the apologist seem out of touch with Vatican II‘s more
inclusive, dialogical stance. The result of this anti-apologetical mindset is played out in
theology curriculums in Catholic colleges across the United States. Apologist Peter
Kreeft of Boston College writes: ―My own college, the nation‘s second largest Catholic
university―and, I think, in most ways a very fine one―has a theology department that
offers about fifty different courses each year; but for over a decade not one of them has
been in apologetics.‖28
There are many other reasons for the decline in Catholic apologetics. Imitating
the Enlightenment philosophers‘ search for indubitable certainty in what is known as
classical foundationalism, apologists from the time of the Reformation until Vatican II
generally sought to rationally demonstrate the truth of the Catholic Church through a
cumulative, step-by-step method. ―Its presentation,‖ Benedict Ashley explains, ―often
suffered from two grave defects. First, it was developed in a rationalistic manner as if
faith were the conclusion of a syllogism rather than a gift of God surpassing the mode of
all human reason and involving not only the human intelligence but also the totality of
the human person.
Second, it was presented in a manner which neglected our pluralistic culture and
contradicted our commitment to ecumenism.‖29 Although the more narrowly-conceived
pre-Vatican II apologetical approach proved fecund in for a time, it bore epistemological
weaknesses that would render it ill equipped for a ―post-Christian‖ age, to wit, an age in
27
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which the Church no longer holds the same authority or power over worldly affairs that it
once had, and one in which there was a multiplexity of spiritualities or spiritual
―options.‖
Third, the rise of biblical studies in Catholicism also turned theologians away
from the general defense of dogma. Scriptural theology almost became the norm for
doing all of theology. Third, Thomistic philosophy—a staple of Catholic apologetical
methodology—became increasingly fragmented in the middle of the twentieth century. 30
There were existential Thomists (J. Maritain, E. Gilson), transcendental Thomists (K.
Rahner, J. Maréchal, B. Lonergan), orthodox or strict observance Thomists (A. Gardeil,
R. Labourdette, R. Garrigou-Lagrange), eclectic Thomists, and Aristotelian Thomists (R.
McInerney). To be a ‗Thomist‘ could mean a variety of things.
Fourth, if the rise of biblical studies and the intramural debates within Thomism
were not enough, the burgeoning need to become more aware, concerned, and
appreciative of historical and cultural contexts seemed to drive a stake through the
classical apologist‘s heart. Apologists naively thought they could defend the faith
without considering the contingencies of time and place. Fifth, the emergence of the
nouvelle theologie made strident headway into Catholic intellectual circles. This
movement called for a resourcement to the theologies and spiritualities of the early
Church Fathers. Some of the pioneering theologians of the nouvelle theologie included
Jean Danielou, Henri De Lubac, Aloys Grillmeier, Yves Congar, and Louis Bouyer.
Lastly, the liturgical movement, which began at the beginning of the twentieth
century, also detracted from the longstanding emphasis on defending the faith.
30
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Each of these factors led to a serious reevaluation of apologetical method and, for
a time, fomented a radical decline of active, apologetical praxis. But, as Avery Dulles
espies, we are now witnessing ―the rebirth of apologetics.‖31 He is encouraged to observe
that, while many Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, and other Protestants depreciate
the discipline of apologetics, Evangelicals have been taking the lead in presenting firstrate arguments in reputable journals and other publications in defense of the faith. But he
is not completely in favor of the style of apologetics that Evangelicals have generally
upheld, for it seems to resemble the one-sided approach that prevailed before Vatican II
in Catholic circles―the approach that Catholics should reject as ineffective for deeply
inculcating the faith in a more holistic manner. Dulles cautions that the discipline needs
to be shaped under the broader theological vision of the Council.
Although the revival of Catholic apologetics is still young and maybe even
uncertain, it needs to be nurtured by scholars now working in the mainstream. Arguing
against popular level Catholic apologists, Richard Gaillardetz is one of few Catholic
theologians who has described what a postconciliar apologetics might look like.32
William Cardinal Levada―the current Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith―has defended the use of classical apologetics, but wants to see it mended from its
earlier epistemological shortcomings. For Levada, it can be reformulated in a way that is
consistent with Catholic theology.33

31

Avery Dulles, ―The Rebirth of Apologetics,‖ First Things 143 (May 2004), 18-23.
Richard Gaillardetz, ―Do We Need a New(er) Apologetics?,‖ America (February 2, 2004).
http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=3390. See also Richard Gaillardetz,
―Apologetics, Evangelization, and Ecumenism Today,‖ Origins 35.1 (May 19, 2005), 9-15. See also
Thomas P. Rausch, Reconciling Faith and Reason: Apologists, Evangelists, and Theologians in a Divided
Church (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2000), 35-52.
33
For the full speech by the Cardinal, see http://www.zenit.org/article-29086?l=english
32

19

What is sorely lacking in most of these discussions is reference to the salient
passages of the Council that speak about Catholic defense. An analysis of the Council
might help to alleviate the tension that anti-apologists have with defending the faith, and
it might also help popular level apologists to round out an approach that is more in line
with earlier Catholic traditions.

In Defense of Conciliar Apologetics
Pope John XXIII originally called for the Second Vatican Council to let some
fresh air into the life of the Church. His intention was not to break off from Sacred
Tradition. As theologian Francis Martin writes: ―It is, after all, not a council‘s role to
embark on new speculative teaching but rather to clarify and substantiate the Church‘s
traditional teaching and to elucidate the way in which it is a light to the pilgrim Church of
the present and the future.‖34 Correct readings of Vatican II will therefore include the
older methods of Catholic apologetics, but will correct the mistakes within these
approaches.
According to the Vatican I document on faith and reason, Dei Filius, for instance,
God reveals himself supernaturally, 35 conveying truths that go beyond the reach of
human reason. This message is accompanied by the outward signs of miracles and
prophecies which show the credibility of God‘s revelation. Once this revelation is given
to humanity, it is capable of being penetrated rationally in order for people to gain a
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greater understanding of it. This apologetical method resembles the method of classical
(scholastic) apologetics.
So although Vatican II did not elaborate on any method of apologetics in detail,
this does not mean the Council Fathers did not see classical apologetics as unimportant or
irrelevant. As Catholic theologian M. John Farrelly rightly points out: ―Vatican II gave
primacy to the meaning of God and Jesus Christ but also insisted that reason, common
human experience, and the historical value of the Gospels support our faith in the
existence of God and his revelation through Jesus Christ.‖36 One could mention many
other themes which did not have a prominent role in the Council: trinity, incarnation,
pneumatology, protology, harmartiology, angelology, etc.. Yet all of these disciplines
still play a significant role in contemporary Catholic theology.
There can be no denying the official conciliar endorsement of apologetics.
Appealing to the central apologetics passage of the New Testament (1 Pet. 3:15), the
bishops urge that ―all the disciples of Christ, persevering in prayer and praising God,
should present themselves as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God. Everywhere on
earth they must bear witness to Christ and give an answer to those who seek an account
of that hope of eternal life which is in them.‖37
In the Declaration on Religious Liberty, the Fathers state that ―The disciple has a
grave obligation to Christ, his Master, to grow daily in his knowledge of the truth he has
received from him, to be faithful in announcing it, and vigorous in defending it without
having recourse to methods which are contrary to the spirit of the Gospel.‖38 Though
Catholics can persuade unbelievers over to faith in Jesus by their lifestyle, this would not
36
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mean that words, and, by implication, argumentation should not be included in the
attempt to evangelize others.39
The task of defending the faith is commanded by the Church, especially as
believers become more accountable to God‘s standards of Christian discipleship.
Christians ―are more perfectly bound to the Church by the sacrament of Confirmation,
and the Holy Spirit endows them with special strength so that they are more strictly
obliged to spread and defend the faith, both by word and by deed, as true witnesses of
Christ.‖40
Catholics are not merely called to dialogue with non-Christians, but must seek to
convert them to the Risen Christ.41 The Constitution on Divine Revelation goes so far as
to say that we must ―fight in defense of the faith.‖ Of course, this rhetorical phrase is
stressing the great lengths that Catholics must go in order to preserve the Church‘s
doctrine against the multitude of challenges that confront us:
And so the apostolic preaching, which is expressed in a special way in the inspired books,
was to be preserved by an unending succession of preachers until the end of time.
Therefore the Apostles, handing on what they themselves had received, warn the faithful
to hold fast to the traditions which they have learned either by word of mouth or by letter
(see 2 Thess. 2:15), and to fight in defense of the faith handed on once and for all (see
Jude 1:3).42

Believers have the duty to defend the faith, but the task of ―safeguarding‖ the
Gospel is officially entrusted to the Magisterium: ―. . . the task of authentically
interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, has been entrusted
exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church, whose authority is exercised in the
name of Jesus Christ.‖ Moreover, ―This teaching office is not above the word of God,
39
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but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it
scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the
help of the Holy Spirit, it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it
presents for belief as divinely revealed.‖43 Bishops are called to be both practical and
theoretical defenders of the Church. 44
One of the great themes of Gaudium et Spes has to do with reading the signs of
the times in order to effectively answer persons‘ deepest questions about God and
humanity. 45 Hence, ―The Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the
times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel. Thus, in language intelligible to
each generation, she can respond to the perennial questions which men ask about this
present life and the life to come, and about the relationship of the one to the other.‖46 In
reading the culture, Catholics are not only called to engage outsiders with arguments,
they must learn effective ways to do it. Method and context must therefore be taken into
consideration for effective evangelization to take place: 47 ―within the requirements and
methods proper to theology, [men and women] are invited to seek continually for more
suitable ways of communicating doctrine to the men of their times; for the deposit of
Faith or the truths are one thing and the manner in which they are enunciated, in the same
meaning and understanding, is another.‖48 In Christus Dominus, we read that the bishops
should be presenting the Gospel in a way that is conducive to the modern mindset.49
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Some preliminary conclusions about the conciliar vision of apologetics can now
be drawn. First, Vatican II is unambiguously concerned about defending the faith.
Arguments and evidence can be used for the sake of evangelization if the appropriate
circumstances allow for it. However, we are to never force our dialogue partners into a
win-lose situation. What is more, interreligious dialogue is not a substitute for
apologetics. Conciliar apologetics has a practical and theoretical component for purposes
of the evangelization.
We turn now, then, to the different ways the Council utilizes each apologetic
model. Unlike the individual advocates of each system, Vatican II does not challenge the
other viewpoints but includes them all within the broad range of her teaching. By
implication, this means that at least certain versions of each model are compatible with
one another.

Vatican II and Classical Apologetics (Scholastic Apologetics)
Even though the Council does not use the term ―classical apologetics‖ in any of
its documents, it endorses some of the key elements of this method. In the first place, the
use of verbal argument is necessary for the purposes of evangelization: ―Christ, the great
Prophet, who proclaimed the Kingdom of His Father both by the testimony of His life
and the power of His words…does this not only through the hierarchy who teach in His
name and with His authority, but also through the laity whom He made His witnesses and
to whom He gave understanding of the faith (sensu fidei) and an attractiveness in speech
so that the power of the Gospel might shine forth in their daily social and family life.‖50
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Verbal discourse (and, by implication, friendly debate) is therefore encouraged for the
sake of evangelization.
There are many places in Dei Verbum where the Council Fathers insist that the
faith must be preached in words (and not just in deeds). The direct implication is that by
preaching one must give reasons for the things that are said. Because Christ taught with
words, the faith must be taught and thus defended in the same way. 51 Appealing to this
common sense approach to evangelization, Gaudium et Spes affirms that the more one
loves in action, the more one will speak the truth.52 Apologetics, then, can serve as a form
of compassion for evangelists:
Love and good will, . . . must in no way render us indifferent to truth and goodness.
Indeed love itself impels the disciples of Christ to speak the saving truth to all men. But it
is necessary to distinguish between error, which always merits repudiation, and the
person in error, who never loses the dignity of being a person even when he is flawed by
false or inadequate religious notions. God alone is the judge and searcher of hearts; for
that reason He forbids us to make judgments about the internal guilt of anyone. 53

Following the lead of Dei Filius, the natural knowledge of God is reaffirmed in the
Council. 54 Traditionally the Church has not held that individuals can know that God
exists only through faith. That would be fideistic and contrary to Catholic apologetics.
The way that individuals can reason about God‘s existence is by considering the things
that have been made. Hence, the move will be from effect to cause, not through an innate
awareness of the idea of God (as in the case with the ontological argument). Thus the
framers of Dei Verbum announce that: ―God, the beginning and end of all things, can be
known with certainty from created reality by the light of human reason (see Rom. 1:20);
but teaches that it is through His revelation that those religious truths which are by their
51
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nature accessible to human reason can be known by all men with ease, with solid
certitude and with no trace of error, even in this present state of the human race.‖55
Keeping in line with the Church‘s tradition apropos to natural theology, the
Church approves of the argument from desire to the truth of Christianity. 56 People
remain restless in their hearts until they experience the one true God. For example, if one
begins with a proper understanding of the human person, Christian teaching is seen as the
best fit for humanity. 57 The bishops assert:
Above all the Church knows that her message is in harmony with the most secret desires
of the human heart when she champions the dignity of the human vocation, restoring
hope to those who have already despaired of anything higher than their present lot. Far
from diminishing man, her message brings to his development light, life and freedom.
Apart from this message nothing will avail to fill up the heart of man: ‗Thou hast made us
for Thyself,‘ O Lord, ‗and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee.‘58

Hence, the human person has a natural knowledge of God‘s existence, nature and
providence over creation. This aspect to conciliar teaching is an indispensable element of
classical apologetics. For this method begins with the truths accessible from natural
theology.
The Church boldly favors the use of human reason: ―In her loyal devotion to God
and men, the Church has already repudiated and cannot cease repudiating, sorrowfully
but as firmly as possible, those poisonous doctrines and actions which contradict reason
and the common experience of humanity, and dethrone man from his native
excellence.‖59 Indeed, rational argument should not be dismissed in light of the problem
of atheism―whether it is of the critical or practical variety. Indeed, the Church
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―courteously invites atheists to examine the Gospel of Christ with an open mind.‖60 This
passage provides an endorsement of classical apologetics (and could be used to support
the Council‘s endorsement of rational apologetics as a whole). Subsequent endorsements
of rational uses of apologetics will also be seen in encyclicals such as Fides et Ratio and
Benedict XVI‘s lecture at the University of Regensburg. 61
Similarly, in Optatum Totius, the Council affirms that seminarians must study
philosophy for the purposes of defending the doctrines of Catholicism: ―The history of
philosophy should be so taught that the students, while reaching the ultimate principles of
the various systems, will hold on to what is proven to be true therein and will be able to
detect the roots of errors and to refute them.‖62 Hence the study of philosophy should be
designed to foster an apologetical spirit in those men studying for the priesthood.

Vatican II and Evidential Apologetics
Elements of the evidentialism are also upheld in the conciliar documents. By
viewing science, history, psychology, and human beings in the correct way, it becomes
easier to perceive the truth of the Gospel. According to Gaudium et Spes: ―When man
gives himself to the various disciplines of philosophy, history and of mathematical and
natural science, and when he cultivates the arts, he can do very much to elevate the
human family to a more sublime understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty, and to the
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formation of considered opinions which have universal value.‖63 Interpreting the secular
world in Catholic terms is an important theme of the entire Council. 64
In the Decree on Priestly Formation, for instance, the bishops remark that recent
findings in the social sciences can provide an effective means to win people over to
religious vocations. 65 The use of science can be used for evangelical purposes, whether
evangelization is directed to outsiders or those inside the church. In the Declaration on
Christian Education it is said that part of developing a Catholic view of the world, the
cosmos, and human beings will include skills to defend Catholicism. 66 As the bishops
put it:
A Christian education does not merely strive for the maturing of a human person as just
now described, but has as its principal purpose this goal: that the baptized . . . learn not
only how to bear witness to the hope that is in them (cf. Peter 3:15) but also how to help
in the Christian formation of the world that takes place when natural powers viewed in
the full consideration of man redeemed by Christ contribute to the good of the whole
society.67

One of the roles of faculties in Catholic schools is to teach the various aspects of theology
and the other sciences in order to foster a deeper understanding of revelation, its
plausibility, and internal coherence. 68
An affinity for the use of historical evidence is found in Lumen Gentium: ―The
Miracles of Jesus also confirm that the Kingdom has already arrived on earth: ‗If I cast
out devils by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you.‘ Before all
things, however, the Kingdom is clearly visible in the very Person of Christ, the Son of
God and the Son of Man, who came ‗to serve and to give His life as a ransom for

63

Gaudium et Spes, 57.
Lumen Gentium, 36; Gaudium et Spes, 21, 43, 76; Apostolicam Actuositatem, 14, 16, 19, 20;
Gravissimum Educationis, 1.
65
Optatum Totius, 2
66
Gravissimum Educationis, 3, 10, 12.
67
Gravissimum Educationis, 2.
68
Gravissimum Educationis, 11.
64

28

many.‘‖69 Christ‘s life is apologetical in the sense that he testifies to the reality of the
Kingdom.70 A historical approach to Jesus‘ life can therefore help one to see the truth
about God and his love for humanity. Seen in this way, Christ‘s life is apologetical. A
historical and theological study of the person of Jesus can convince others that his
message is indeed trustworthy. Christ himself gave compelling evidence of the truths he
preached. 71 As the bishops explain in another place: ―It is common knowledge that
among all the Scriptures, even those of the New Testament, the Gospels have a special
preeminence, and rightly so, for they are the principal witness for the life and teaching of
the incarnate Word, our savior.‖72
Dei Verbum affirms the fundamental historicity of the Gospels. However, this
would not mean that the Gospels are straightforward, historical reports, but that they are
reliable at the core: ―Holy Mother Church has firmly and with absolute constancy held,
and continues to hold, that the four Gospels just named, whose historical character the
Church unhesitatingly asserts, faithfully hand on what Jesus Christ, while living among
men, really did and taught for their eternal salvation until the day He was taken up into
heaven (see Acts 1:1)‖73 In corroboration of this point, the bishops announce that the
Four Evangelists‘ original intention was transposed from their recollections of the
original eyewitnesses‘ beliefs to relay the truth about Christ.74
Moreover, a historical and sociological study of the Church‘s influence upon the
world might be persuasive to inquirers. 75 Conversely, ―it must be admitted that the
69
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temporal sphere is governed by its own principles, since it is rightly concerned with the
interests of this world. But that ominous doctrine which attempts to build a society with
no regard whatever for religion, and which attacks and destroys the religious liberty of its
citizens, is rightly to be rejected.‖76

Vatican II and Experiential Apologetics
Experientialism is the premiere model of the Council. Like a splash of cool
water, this model compensates for the heavy intellectualism of the other systems.
Perhaps the pastoral concern of the bishops provides the reason for this emphasis at the
Council. In Gaudium et Spes, we read: ―The People of God believe that it is led by the
Lord's Spirit, Who fills the earth. Motivated by this faith, it labors to decipher authentic
signs of God's presence and purpose in the happenings, needs and desires in which this
People has a part along with other men of our age.‖77 The witness of a holy life makes
the faith more believable. 78 Indeed, as Catholics we are ―living witnesses to him.‖79
Mother Church ―exhorts her children to purification and renewal so that the sign of Christ
may shine more brightly over the face of the earth.‖80
Apostolicam Actuositatem insists that all persons are called to testify to the Lord‘s
presence by the manner of their life: ―The very testimony of their Christian life and good
works done in a supernatural spirit have the power to draw men to belief and to God.‖81
Impelled by the love of Christ, those who have faith and seek to advance the kingdom
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inevitably draw men to Christ.82 The evidential power of human holiness is repeatedly
maintained. 83 Pastors should remember that in their daily conduct and concern for the
members of the parish they testify to the Gospel to the world. In so doing, outsiders will
judge whether the Christian message is indeed worthy of belief. 84 Unless priests are
personally holy, they will be ineffective as Catholic evangelists. 85 Indeed, the best
apologetic maneuver for winning persons over to join religious communities is seen in
the life of its members.86
The Church itself is a sacrament which points to the Savior, especially when it
radiates with prayer and holiness in the context of liturgical worship.87 As
Presbyterorum Ordinis states: ―The ecclesial community by prayer, example, and works
of penance, exercise a true motherhood toward souls who are to be led to Christ. The
Christian community forms an effective instrument by which the path to Christ and his
Church is pointed out and made smooth for non-believers. It is an effective instrument
also for arousing, nourishing and strengthening the faithful for their spiritual combat.‖88
Similarly, the liturgy is capable of building people up so that they might shine
forth as a reason for outsiders to become Catholic. 89 When believers fail to live up to
their calling, this can serve as an anti-sacrament, repelling outsiders to faith. 90 In
Perfectae Caritatis it is said that a materialistic way of life can detract from the apologia
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of religious communities.91 For instance, the response to outsiders should not be on
providing sophisticated philosophical refutations, but on living a life that can convince
persons to think in spiritual terms: ―Since in our times, different forms of materialism are
spread far and wide even among Catholics, the laity should not only learn doctrine more
diligently, especially those main points which are the subjects of controversy, but should
also exhibit the witness of an evangelical life in contrast to all forms of materialism.‖92
Under the greater theme of holiness are more specific themes such as the witness
of the saints:93 In the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, the Council Fathers write:
When we look at the lives of those who have faithfully followed Christ, we are inspired
with a new reason for seeking the City that is to come and at the same time we are shown
a most safe path by which among the vicissitudes of this world, in keeping with the state
in life and condition proper to each of us, we will be able to arrive at perfect union with
Christ, that is, perfect holiness. In the lives of those who, sharing in our humanity, are
however more perfectly transformed into the image of Christ, God vividly manifests His
presence and His face to men. He speaks to us in them, and gives us a sign of His
Kingdom, to which we are strongly drawn, having so great a cloud of witnesses over us
and such a witness to the truth of the Gospel. 94

The witness of martyrdom,95 the domestic church,96 and celibacy97 all help in the
Catholic Church‘s in her case for saving faith. Poverty and charity also serve as motives
of credibility. 98 Sacred art has a persuasive effect on observers of Catholic worship. In
Sacrosanctum Concilium, sacred art and architecture is thought to be fruitful for
evangelism. 99
When the Church qualitatively manifests the four ecclesial attributes (oneness,
holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity), this can also provide compelling evidence for
91
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Catholicism. 100 The writers of Unitatis Redintegratio insist that divisions within the
Body of Christ becomes anti-sacramental, destroying the Church‘s witness before the
world: ―Such division. . .damages the holy cause of preaching the Gospel to every
creature.‖101 In its Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church, the Council asserts
that: ―The division among Christians damages the most holy cause of preaching the
Gospel to every creature and blocks the way to the faith for many.‖102 But when the
Church is truly one, she becomes effective in the apologetic case for faith. Christians
should anticipate the one visible church of God so that the world might be converted to
the Risen Christ.103 To be sure, the fact that local churches could share common
aspirations for unity counts as evidence of the Gospel. 104 Unity is a significant concern
of the Council for the sake of evangelism. 105 Collaborating together in united action is an
effective means of effectively reaching the world with the Good News.106

Theological Apologetics and Vatican II
It is imperative to teach Catholic doctrine correctly so that the world might come
to believe in the one true Savior.107 False doctrines can destroy belief, but accurate
presentations of Catholicism can make it easier for persons to see the inner-rationale of
Catholic beliefs. ―Therefore, following in the footsteps of the Council of Trent and of the
First Vatican Council, this present council wishes to set forth authentic doctrine on divine
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revelation and how it is handed on, so that by hearing the message of salvation the whole
world may believe, by believing it may hope, and by hoping it may love.‖108
By contrast, teaching false doctrines (or living hypocritically) will ruin the
Church‘s witness for the sake of converting the world: ―To the extent that they neglect
their own training in the faith, or teach erroneous doctrine, or are deficient in their
religious, moral or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than reveal the
authentic face of God and religion.‖109
Because all Scripture is divinely inspired and is useful for refuting error (2 Tim.
3:15- 17), it is also useful for evangelical purposes. The Fathers contend that hearing
Scripture can literally open up the minds of its hearers for them to be receptive to the
Spirit:
For in the sacred books, the Father who is in heaven meets His children with great love
and speaks with them; and the force and power in the word of God is so great that it
stands as the support and energy of the Church, the strength of faith for her sons, the food
of the soul, the pure and everlasting source of spiritual life. Consequently these words are
perfectly applicable to Sacred Scripture: ‗For the word of God is living and active‘ (Heb.
4:12) and ‗it has power to build you up and give you your heritage among all those who
are sanctified‘ (Acts 20:32; see 1 Thess. 2:13).110

Thus a form of presuppositionalism seems to be upheld. By hearing and understanding
the Scriptures the light of supernatural faith is bestowed on unbelievers and believers. 111
Thus the proclamation of the Gospel is capable of drawing men and women, regardless if
they believe in Christ or not, to faith.112
The framers of Presbyterorum Ordinis also declare that preaching the word of
God should not be abstract and overly generalized, but should address the particular
circumstances that people commonly face in the world (in order to persuade them unto
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deeper faith).113 If preachers exposit God‘s word accurately, then this can open up the
eyes of unbelievers. ―Taught by the word and example of Christ, the Apostles followed
the same way. From the very origins of the Church the disciples of Christ strove to
convert men to faith in Christ as the Lord; not, however, by the use of coercion or of
devices unworthy of the Gospel, but by the power, above all, of the word of God.‖114 A
passage in Dignitatis Humanae expresses the same understanding of presuppositionalism:
―They followed the example of the gentleness and respectfulness of Christ and they
preached the word of God in the full confidence that there was resident in this word itself
a divine power able to destroy all the forces arrayed against God.‖115
Negatively speaking, the Church denounces false philosophies such as scientism.
Human ―intelligence is not confined to observable data alone, but can with genuine
certitude attain to reality itself as knowable, though in consequence of sin that certitude is
partly obscured and weakened.‖116
Gaudium et Spes is the only conciliar document which actually presents
arguments against the philosophies undergirding unbelief. 117 Marxist atheism, for
example, holds that humanity is thwarted from true liberation by believing in God
because it focuses our attention on things above, not on things of this earth. 118 The
Council Fathers respond: since human life does not end at the grave, all persons are held
accountable for their actions during their earthly life. In the end the scales of justice will
finally be balanced, and righteousness will prevail over evil. Every evil will therefore be
113
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transformed for the greater good. Every decision that is made by Christians in this
lifetime has eternal significance because there is something to hope for in the end. As a
result, Christians should make decisions that run against contrarian pressures and
embrace acts of extreme self-sacrifice in this world for the greater good.119

Integrating Models
Vatican II presents distinctive elements of each apologetic system. The Council‘s
stress on reason (classical apologetics), facts (evidentialism), experience
(experientialism), and Scripture and Church teaching (theological) all seem evident in the
conciliar documents. What we do not see is an exclusive stance to any single model.
The vision of conciliar apologetics should help theologians to recognize there is no single
way to defend the fundamental claims of the Church about Jesus Christ.
By implication, there must be ways in which the systems work harmoniously
together. Similar to the apologetical mind of the Council, it is not a coincidence that a
kaleidoscopic picture of doctrine and practice is presented in Vatican II. As the
Magisterium became increasingly aware of the challenges associated with globalization,
she also recognized that the individual needs of persons are not all alike. Different
thought patterns within each culture will demand different apologetic approaches for the
purposes of evangelism. Everyone comes to faith through different means.
Even the most convinced apologists tend to gravitate to those methods that have
personally affected them the most. Given the person-relative nature of evangelism,
apologists should try to match their methods with the kind of person they are in dialogue
with. Someone with an academic background who is capable of processing empirically
119
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based evidence might be influenced by evidentialism. Someone who struggles
emotionally with the Church‘s claims should not be introduced to classical apologetics
(which focuses on reason), but might be attentive to the warmth of the community of
believers (thus experientialism). Confused individuals might be relieved by classical
apologetics, which is concerned with building a gradual case for faith, one step at a time.
Hence these individuals will not be sympathetic to classical apologetics.
Catholics must now consider intangible factors such as attitude, aptitude,
personality, and background experiences when presenting the case for faith. They must
also recognize that questions are often framed in different ways and so must be answered
in ways that might further a constructive conversation. From this discussion of conciliar
apologetics we have seen that Christians are not only called to provide answers to
skeptics‘ questions and challenges, they must also live out the faith in holiness (thus the
emphasis on experiential approaches). That is to say, they must not exclusively rely on
classical apologetics and/or the evidential approach.
But it must be remembered that if one is holy, then they will use every means at
their disposal to reach one‘s dialogue partner, not just ways that exclude the mind and
verbal persuasion; holiness may be more than rational, but is certainly not less than
rational. Conversely, if one uses rational argument, then this can become a means by
which the Spirit sanctifies outsiders and even doubtful believers. The Tradition of the
Church, the historical context of Vatican II, and the documents of the Council all testify
to the fact that rational approaches to Catholic defense remain an indispensable
component to discipleship, apologetics and evangelism.
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Christian presuppositions will always affect the apologist. One cannot begin with
every Christian belief from nowhere. However, according to Catholic theology, some of
the mysteries of faith can be known by all normally functioning individuals without the
help of divine, authoritative revelation. At this point the natural philosophy (God‘s
existence, objectivity of truth, etc.) of the classical apologist gives the evangelist
something that theological apologetics cannot provide him or her with. Indeed, without
positing some mutually shared starting points with unbelievers and other doubters (which
the classicalist can provide), the apologetic enterprise as a whole will collapse. 120 Indeed,
presuppositionalist turns into fideism without the help of the universal philosophical
conclusions that can be previously established by the classical apologist. If each and
every mutually shared starting point with outsiders is illusory, then evangelists are forced
to work out of the fideist theological mindset.
Alternatively, some uses of presuppositionalism can provide Catholics with the
recognition that we must begin with Scriptural and ecclesiastical presuppositions. For all
people interpret reality in a way that is consistent with their presuppositions, including
unbelievers.
Nonetheless, it is commonly assumed that theological presuppositions can change
through arguments and lived experience. Even if the apologetic mandate demands that
Christians work with a certain set of presuppositions, this would not have to mean that
the Gospel is irrational (or that evidences in favor of Christian faith cannot be trusted).
Perhaps the Gospel is true and the evidence is trustworthy. As C.S. Lewis, that doyen of
twentieth century apologists, wrote: ―I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has

120

I defend this contention in the chapter on postmodernism and apologetics.

38

risen—not only because I see it, but because of it, I see everything else.‖121 It is possible
that Christians know the truth about God because of faith, not in spite of it. Again, what
is needed to help one determine this is the careful weighing and assessing of the
evidence. And this assessment is where the evidentialist and the classical apologist are
again needed.
Classical apologists provide positive arguments for the Gospel. Proponents of
this method argues for God‘s existence, the reasonableness of Jesus‘ divinity, and the
divine origins of the Catholic Church. Presuppositionalists and evidentialists can
complement the classicalist with negative arguments (arguments that deflect the
challenges to Catholic belief and practice), demonstrating where competing viewpoints
are fallacious or shortsighted. Not to be overlooked, the evidentialist and theological
apologist can also provide positive arguments for faith. But the classicalist complements
the evidentialist by providing the necessary philosophical framework that is needed for
apologetic engagement to begin with. That is to say, evidence without a prior
philosophical framework can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Thus proceeding with
logical steps can be supplemented with the probabilistic evidences given by the
evidentialist. The experiential apologist complements all three of these approaches, both
negatively and positively, by providing an existential means of persuasion to outsiders
and by reinforcing the commitment of lukewarm believers.
The experiential and the theoretical side of conciliar apologetics will provide a
holistic approach to Catholic defense which is surely more effective than using one
procedure in dialogue with all persons in every situation. Undoubtedly one method
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should be privileged for a particular audience. But this would not mean that it should
become the only method in the arsenal of the evangelist/apologist. So, in the postconciliar era, we must recognize the importance of integrative apologetics systems. The
integrative apologetic system of the Council might be conveniently called
combinationalism.

Models of Catholic Apologetics in a Postconciliar Church
Throughout Church history, different apologetics systems have emerged in
response to the various challenges posed to Catholic doctrine. 122 Though there has never
been a consensus on which way to categorize the approaches, they have all been used by
different Christians who represent different denominations for various purposes and
audiences (and/or critics). The advocates of each system have often castigated one
another for the sake of demonstrating the superiority of their own method. At times, each
approach has overlapped with the others. Nonetheless, there are some generally
understood terms which can be used in a meaningful way to understand each of them as
distinct approaches. We will elaborate on four individual systems: classical apologetics,
evidentialism, experiential apologetics, and presuppositionalism.
Classical apologetics is a step-by-step method of defending Catholicism. This
tradition is prominent among Catholic thinkers and reaches back to the early Church
Fathers. 123 Following Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas, classical apologists
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maintain that each step builds and presupposes more general preconditions necessary for
the rational possibility of faith. A classical apologist establishes the existence of God
before they present evidence for the deity of Christ. For them, it would not make sense to
argue for the Son of God unless there is a God who can have a Son who can institute a
certain kind of Church.
They claim that God‘s existence can be proven apart from the influence of faith.
The next step in this method is to show that miracles are possible. After demonstrating
the likelihood of miracles, the New Testament writings are then shown to be
fundamentally historically trustworthy. From the time of the Reformation Catholic
apologists then strenuously argued that the Catholic Church is the Church which best fits
the four ecclesial attributes of the Church as expressed in the ancient creeds. This final
step was used to demonstrate that Protestants could not be the one, holy, catholic and
apostolic Church because none of them could sufficiently characterize the four marks.
One of the indispensable strengths of classical apologetics is the focus on
common ground between believers and unbelievers. Hence it reaffirms the universal
importance of natural theology and the importance of reason. Post-conciliar advocates
might include Peter Kreeft, Ronald Tacelli, Benedict Ashley, Robert Spitzer, Brian
Davies, and John E. Wippel. 124 Richard Swinburne epitomizes the best work in
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contemporary classical apologetics in the postconciliar era.125 Protestants such as
William Lane Craig, Norman Geisler, R.C. Sproul, and J.P. Moreland have also appealed
to this method in their published works.126
One of the pitfalls of classical apologetics is that it does not necessarily make
Christianity applicable to real life scenarios. Truth is not always a guarantee of
relevance. However, Christianity is not merely about what happened two thousand years
ago in the person of Christ; it is also about what God is doing today in salvation history.
Thus the classical method seems like an impersonal method of Catholic defense. The
facticity of Christianity is not automatically connected to the value of Christian faith to
persons living in the here and now. This shortcoming is precisely one of the reasons why
it has been so sharply criticized in recent years. Second, its emphasis on the mind makes
it unattractive to many people. Fundamentally, classical apologists rely on reason to
defend the claims of Christ. Most people are not convinced to believe in Christianity
because of reasoned arguments. Thirdly, it has a difficult time exposing the fallacies of
other perspectives. Instead, classical apologists merely seek to overwhelm other secular
and religious claims by providing positive arguments in Christianity‘s favor. Thus it is
generally lacking in the ability to expose fallacious views in other positions except by
default (or, indirectly).
Other apologists have challenged the overly propositional understanding of
theology that classical apologists have relied on (e.g., Søren Kierkegaard, Rudolph
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Bultmann, and Karl Barth). For them, classical apologists do not adequately regard the
mysteries of faith as paradoxical, going beyond the propositional mode of understanding.
An incomprehensible God simply cannot be put into a box and defended with reasoned
arguments. God is a mystery capable of being apprehended, but he could never be
comprehended. Seen in this way, God can be known, but is also forever unknown.
Unfortunately many classical apologists overlook this crucial distinction, and turn the
notion of Catholic defense into a matter of winning a debate.
There is long and reputable tradition of evidential apologetics in the Church.
Instead of stressing reason, evidentialists would rather use facts. In this view of
apologetics there is no specific procedure as in the classical apologetics; there is no
logically prior and necessary step before one proceeds to the other pre-conditions for
faith. For evidentialists, anyone can perceive that Christianity is true if they simply look
at the relevant evidence with an open mind. The evidentialist stresses the need to
establish scientific, archaeological, sociological, psychological, historical, and even
experiential evidence in any combination of ways that might be profitable in the case for
faith. Evidence is one of many strands in the overall web of argument. One of the
strengths of this method over classical apologetics is that it can use negative evidence to
refute (or make less probable) the claims of other worldviews. It overlaps with classical
apologetics by using evidence, but it tends to overlook the classicalist‘s use of the prior
philosophical framework.
Instead of speaking in terms of proof or demonstration, evidentialists often
propose cumulative case and/or inductive arguments.127 This realistic perspective is one
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of the strengths of evidentialism. Most of the time arguments are counted as
probabilistic, not conclusive. In contrast to experientialism, evidentialists stress the
importance of using facts. Noted evidentialist approaches are offered by the scientisttheologians Arthur Peacocke, Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne, John Haught and Kenneth
R. Miller. 128 Wolfhart Pannenberg, N.T. Wright and John Warwick Montgomery are
contemporary representatives of historical evidentialists.129
Like classical apologetics, evidentialism suffers some crucial setbacks. First, it
cannot make Christianity true for any person. It cannot show that Christianity is true for
today. Second, most people are suspicious of evidences for faith. Furthermore,
evidentialists presume that unbelievers are interested and willing to examine the evidence
for Christ. Moreover, the use of hard evidence (from, say, science or history) is not
exactly the warmest way to win over the hearts of many people.
Classical apologists quickly point out against the evidentialist that there is no such
thing as bare facts to be assessed. As Norman Geisler states: ―facts and events have
ultimate meaning only within and by virtue of the context of the world view in which
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they are conceived.‖130 He adds: ―evidence gains its meaning only by its immediate and
overall context; and evidence as such cannot, without begging the question, be used to
establish the overall context by which it obtains its very meaning as evidence. . . . it is a
vicious circle to argue that a given fact (say, the resuscitation of Christ‘s body) is
evidence of a certain truth claim (say, Christ‘s claim to be God), unless it can be
established that the event comes in the context of a theistic universe.‖131
Thus meaning is always derived from within an interpretive context. Other
apologists representing other defense systems rightly insist that Christian evidentialists
must assume a theistic worldview as they provide the data in support of Christian faith.132
One simply cannot argue from the data unless there is an implicit philosophical
framework already in place. As Sproul, Lindsey, and Gerstner explain: ―Miracles cannot
prove God. God, as a matter of fact, alone can prove miracles. That is, only on the prior
evidence that God exists is a miracle even possible.‖133
Experientialists appeal to human experiences of God and the Christian
community. Unlike classical apologetics and evidentialism, this apologetic system is
practical and more personally oriented. The experientialist is acutely aware that the
problems which prevent individuals from embracing the Gospel are often deep and
psychological, not just intellectual. Apologists must confront these issues and address
them as well. Thus, one salient aspect to experientialism is an emphasis on human
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holiness and the development of the entire person. One of the strengths of
experientialism is that it takes the limits of reason seriously.
Experiential approaches are numerous in contemporary Catholicism and generally
follow the line of thought in John Henry Newman and Maurice Blondel. 134 Postconciliar
Catholic experientialists might include René Latourelle and Hans Urs Van Balthasar. 135
Although these apologists should not be considered experientialists in the strict sense of
the word, they certainly do stress the importance of human experience over rational
approaches to Catholic defense. The strength of experientialism lies in its popular appeal
and is the most common means by which most people come to faith (it is also the most
pronounced apologetic model of the Council). Unlike the intellectualism of classical
apologetics and evidentialism, the stress is on the heart and lived experience within the
community of believers.
Other experientialists testify to the way in which God has worked in their life to
persuade either themselves or outsiders unto faith. Existential experiences are also
reported as unmediated, self-authenticating experiences of God, and they vindicate
Christianity to those who have them. Some experiential apologists literally depreciate the
use of rational argument for apologetic purposes; they often scorn evidentialist and/or
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classical apologetics. These experientialists include Søren Kierkegaard, Rudolph
Bultmann, and Karl Barth. Experiential arguments can certainly be used by
evidentialists, but the experientialist wants to use experiential arguments alone. The
experiential apologist is not as concerned with building a systematic, gradual case as in
classical apologetics as much as they want to persuade others by speaking with them
about their experiences.
For all of this method‘s strengths, it is necessarily shortsighted in many respects
(and possibly harmful in others). In and of itself, experientialism downplays the use of
objective evidence and the propositional mode of understanding. Though propositional
knowledge may be a poor substitute for knowledge of God, it can still serve as a means to
foster a personal relationship with God and others. Without the use of propositional
understanding, one could never adequately interpret their experience. Hence, in the
absence of hard evidences, experientialism (construed as an apologetic method that
denies the validity of the other apologetic models) remains an inadequate model of
apologetics. Experiences are never self-authenticating, and they must be interpreted
through some other philosophical means.
Experiences are often unverifiable and must be taken on faith alone by outsiders.
In this way, the hardheaded skeptic is unlikely to be persuaded by hearing the testimony
of believers and how they came to believe in Christianity. Many skeptics will quickly
dismiss the warm experience of the Church by dismissing them with naturalistic
explanations. Lastly, radical proponents of experientialism often overlook the primary
sources of Christian theology (e.g., Scripture and Tradition) for the sake of their unique
experiences.
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Protestants who are sympathetic to apologetics tend to embrace some form of
experientialism or are presuppositional apologists (or, as described in this dissertation,
theological apologists). Some theological presuppositionalists include Gordon Clark,
Carl Henry, and Cornelius Van Til. 136 In this view one must begin with the
presupposition of Scripture and the Church‘s teachings to expose the errors of
Christianity‘s critics. The assumption is that life, the universe, language, and history
cannot make sense apart from the assumed postulate of Christianity. Christian faith
therefore demonstrates itself to be true because it is the only world and life view that is
coherent and livable. It is the only religion which embraces and incorporates the truth of
revelation which broadens and intensifies our understanding of humanity and the world.
These apologists argue transcendentally by showing that all meaning and human thought
presupposes the truth of Christian faith. As one theological presuppositionalist puts it:
―[We] should present the biblical God, not merely as the conclusion to an argument, but
as the one who makes argument possible.‖137
All the known facts must be taken into account when comparing and contrasting
worldviews. Since Christianity is true from the start in this view, theological
presuppositionalists hope to find contradictions in other competing views. And in so
doing, they want to show the superiority of Catholicism by default. One of the strengths
of theological apologetics is the recognition that we must begin with presuppositions.
There is certainly no such thing as a view from nowhere. Some advocates of this method
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have no problem including livability as one of the criteria for determining truth claims.
This point nicely coalesces with experiential approaches.
Presuppositionalists often clash with advocates of classical apologetics,
evidentialism, and experientialism. Undoubtedly this has to do with the doctrine of total
depravity which its advocates often endorse. They accuse traditional rhetoricians for
being too confident of what reason can demonstrate apart from the influence of divine
revelation. Thus presuppositionalists are a certain type of fideist and are sometimes
unafraid to be labeled as such. While some Catholics might think this makes
presuppositionalism incompatible with Catholic theology, it can be utilized if understood
in a certain way. As Avery Dulles rightly observed: ―. . . something analogous to this
method may be found among Catholics who follow Augustine and Anselm, speaking of
‗faith seeking understanding‘. Many recent and contemporary Catholic apologists take
over from Rouselot the idea that the credibility of the Christian religion, which
apologetics seeks to demonstrate, can be seen only from within the posture of faith. . .
.Vatican II seems to endorse this style of argument.‖138
Unlike classical apologetics, which is often framed in terms of positive argument,
presuppositionalists are limited to refuting attacks and exposing errors within these
criticisms. Therefore, it can only show what is false, not what is true. The idea that
Christianity is true by default does not seem like a convincing apologetic to those willing
to think through the logic of this position. As one critic of this method remarks: ―As
commonly understood, presuppositionalism is guilty of a logical howler; it commits the
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informal fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, for it advocates
presupposing the truth of Christian theism in order to prove Christian theism.‖139
What is more, it is difficult to know whether the dialogue partners have all the
necessary data in order to make a proper assessment between worldviews. How could
one ever know whether they have all the needed evidence to make an adequate
assessment? Theological presuppositionalists seems to stymie intelligible discourse since
it is presupposed that there is no common ground between its proponents and unbelievers.
Advocates of rational apologetics supplement the use of presuppositionalism because it
can provide common points of reference with those who do not share Catholic beliefs. 140
In conclusion, we have seen that proponents of one method of apologetics can
provide legitimate critiques of the others. Perhaps a combinatorial approach might be a
good candidate to replace these often isolated methods. Vatican II endorses the
distinctive elements of each model. This strongly suggests that each model is inadequate
and that a holistic approach to Catholic defense should be welcomed. Stephen Bevans
and Jeffrey Gross recommend that ―Scholars of the Second Vatican Council point out
that it is not enough simply to consult any of its texts that deal directly with a specific
theme—e.g., church, revelation, liturgy—in order to understand how that theme was
developed by the council. Rather, they say, one needs to see how an individual theme is
expressed throughout all sixteen council documents. This is particularly true in terms of
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. . . ‗evangelization‘ or ‗mission‘ . . . because in many ways it is a theme that is at the
heart of what the council was about.‖141
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DOES POSTMODERN RELATIVISM DEFEAT APOLOGETICS?

The traditional conception of truth as an absolute, objective, and universal
description of reality has undergone a radical reinterpretation in the West. Truth is no
longer seen as a goal that all persons are obligated to know and pursue as an end in and of
itself, but is rather understood as something completely inseparable from politics, culture,
psychology, biology, race, and gender. In this postmodern view of truth, reality is
determined by individuals, not discovered by them. As Richard Rorty puts it: ―Truth is
made rather than found.‖142 Although it is difficult to define postmodernism, the
movement is usually characterized by (1) the affirmation of radical and irreducible
pluralism; (2) the rejection of unifying metaphysical or religious claims; and (3)
suspicion toward binary categories that characterizes different regions of thought or
ontological realities.143
Negatively speaking, postmodernism is sometimes considered a type of
relativism. In this understanding of postmodernism, all metaphysical truths, including
linguistic meaning, moral values, and human nature no longer have a stable meaning. I
will discuss some representative postmodern relativistic views in this chapter. Since
there is no overarching story to guide individuals with this type of relativism in the
background, some strands of postmodernism is also characterized, in the words of Jean
François Lyotard, by ―incredulity toward meta-narratives.‖144 The most radical
understandings of pluralism makes it difficult to have a unified view of the world under
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the banner of Catholic Christianity. Some Catholic theologians seem to have absorbed
this same understanding of truth in their reflections on divine revelation. As Avery
Dulles seems to suggest: ―Theology, for its part, all too often evades the challenge of
truth. Falling into fideism or sheer positivism, many theologians limit themselves to
sociological, linguistic, and historical studies of the Bible and Church teaching.‖145
As a result of the paradigmatic shift from modernism to postmodernism, the
unifying claims of the Church can no longer be seen as true and thus binding on persons.
So, what is sorely needed in the post-conciliar apologetics literature is a robust response
to some of the extreme views of postmodern relativism and its impact on retrieving the
discipline of apologetics. A response to the relativistic mentality of postmodernism will
also help theologians to reformulate arguments that may be more effective.
Many apologists simply evade the question of truth, settling for other
transcendental means of persuasion such as moral goodness. Other apologists simply
resort to arguments that assume that truth is correspondence with reality. Hence, in this
chapter I will address the challenge of anti-realism, showing its incoherence in order to
argue for the importance of a rational or reasonable apologetics. For it would not make
sense for apologists to make arguments and present evidence for the faith unless the
doctrinal positions they at least think are provable or ―more probable than not‖ are
construed as legitimate claims to truth in the first place.

The Demise of Truth
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Professor Allan Bloom is no stranger to our current cultural malaise. Surveying
the landscape of higher education in the 1980s, Bloom wrote that
There is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student entering
the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the
test, one can count on the students‘ reaction: they will be uncomprehending. . . . The
danger they have been taught to fear from absolutism is not error but intolerance.
Relativism is necessary to openness; and this is the virtue, the only virtue, which all
primary education for more than fifty years has dedicated itself to inculcating.
Openness—and the relativism that makes it the only plausible stance in the face of
various claims to truth and various ways of life and kinds of human beings—is the great
insight of our times. . . . The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was
made in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions,
slavery, xenophobia, racism, and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the mistakes
and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all. 146

Bloom‘s book has lost hardly any of its relevance in today‘s cultural milieu. The decline
of truth is not only occurring in the academy, it is found everywhere in popular culture.
The denial of objective truth is usually assumed rather than argued for by the ordinary
person. Cheap slogans such as ―true for you, but not for me!‖ run rampant in certain
quarters of postmodernity.
Like most revolutions in human thinking, the emergence of postmodernism did
not creep into Western culture overnight, but can be traced back to the fact/value split of
Enlightenment philosophers such as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).147 He combined
complete skepticism about metaphysical knowledge along with an overly optimistic
outlook which held that universal, necessary (a priori) knowledge of the conditions of
experience was possible. This severance of fact from meaning made it easier for persons
to be leery of truth claims, especially metaphysical claims. Whether these claims are
pronounced in the name of religion or not, however, objective truths are generally
relegated with suspicion and are interpreted as expressions of subjective preference. As
John Caputo writes: ―Each thing has its own drive or local force—its ‗perspective‘—and
146
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the world is a multiplicity of competing perspectives. Ideas have not ‗truth‘ but ‗value,‘
that is, an effectiveness that is measured by their capacity to enhance life.‖148
The Kantian divorce of fact and meaning eventually culminated in the philosophy
of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900),149 a forerunner and prophet of postmodernism. In
his words: ―What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem
firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people; truths are illusions about which one has
forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous
power; coins which have lost their picture and now matter only as metal, no longer as
coins.‖150 Indeed, for Nietzsche, ―There are no facts, only interpretations.‖151 In
reference to Nietzsche‘s denial of universals, Michel Foucault explains the origins of
Nietzsche‘s idea: ―Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin (Ursprung) . . .
? First, because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, . . . because this
search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the eternal world of
accident and succession. . . . However, . . . there is ‗something altogether different‘
behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no
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essence‖ (emphasis mine). 152 For Nietzsche, the universal naming of objects does not
arise out of recognizing actual essences in reality.
As an extension of Kant‘s distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal
worlds, Foucault then maintained that human judgments about the world are first filtered
through psychological, cultural and historical contingencies, leaving little room for
metaphysics. 153 Thus it becomes impossible to achieve knowledge of the world as it is.
In reference to the idea that persons must refer to human nature in order to make ethical
judgments (i.e., natural law morality), for example, Richard Rorty claims: ―there is
nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that
we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is
not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our
own conventions.‖154
The postmodern rejection of universals also has an impact on the possibility of
interpersonal communication. Because words do not have corresponding referents,
language loses its power to make definitive statements and is no longer capable of
persuading others. Written texts no longer refer to reality when metaphysical truths (such
as human nature) are illusory. 155 Some thinkers such as Ferdinand de Saussure and
Roman Jakobsen claim that texts must be released from an objective message that readers
can somehow discover for themselves. Here, every text can be shown to be ambiguous.
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The original meaning the author placed in her or his writing does not limit the reader‘s
understanding of what is written. Therefore, every reader imposes their own meaning
onto the text. In Jacques Derrida‘s words: ―Those who wish to ground solidarity in
objectivity . . . have to construe truth as correspondence to reality. . . . By contrast, those
who wish to reduce objectivity to solidarity . . . view truth as, in William James' phrase,
what is good for us to believe. So they do not need an account of a relation between
beliefs and objects called ‗correspondence‘.‖156
The second principal way that postmodernists have attacked the nature and
knowability of truth is derived from yet another angle of Nietzsche‘s philosophy. Truth
is not correspondence with reality, but is reduced to the function of power
relationships. 157 By suppressing the weak in society, the powerful exert their voice over
the weak to guarantee that their voice will be heard to influence the world. In this
perspective, truth is seen as that which favors the powerful. As Foucault once said: ―I
think that, instead of trying to find out what truth, as opposed to error, it might be more
interesting to take up the program posed by Nietzsche: how is it that, in our societies, ―the
truth‖ has been given this value, thus placing us absolutely under its thrall.‖158
One of the negative impacts of postmodernism is that human understanding is so
conditioned by historical and cultural contingencies that it becomes impossible of
knowing objective truths. Not all postmodern philosophies are hostile to Christian truth
claims. Other postmodernists contend that truth is the product of the human drive for
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power, not reality as such. No matter which conception is proffered, both of them are
relevant for Catholics because it undermines the idea that Christianity is true for
everyone, independently if anyone‘s belief in it. And if Christianity is not true, then why
should believers seek to evangelize others (and not proselytize!) to believe in it? The
denial of objective truth therefore undercuts the impetus for participating in the Great
Commission. What means of persuasion could be given if Christianity is merely one of
many opinions in the marketplace of ideas? Of course, the negative side to
postmodernism militates against rational apologetics, whose practitioners firmly believe
that the principal reason why anyone should believe in Christianity is because it is true
for everyone.

Postmodern Relativism and the Need for Apologetics
Traditionally Catholic apologists assumed that truth is objective, exclusive, and
absolute. The knowability of objective truth was not a concern for them. Rather, they
began with establishing God‘s existence, the human need for God, and then they argued
for the historical credibility for Jesus‘ divinity. All of this culminated in an assessment of
which Church best fits the four attributes of the Church (i.e., one, holy, catholic, and
apostolic). 159 This step-by-step method made good sense, for it did not seem reasonable
for doubters of the faith to believe that Jesus is the Son of God unless there is a God who
can have a Son who can institute a certain type of Church.
159
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Older apologetical methods were often accompanied by a faulty epistemological
outlook (Enlightenment rationalism), the situation in apologetic methodology must
change today. For the burning issue today is whether anything is objectively true, let
alone that it can be known as such. According to Pope Benedict XVI: ―Relativism has
thus become the central problem for the faith at the present time. . . . The faith cannot be
liberated if reason itself does not open up again. If the door to metaphysical cognition
remains closed, if the limits of human knowledge set by Kant are impassable, faith is
destined to atrophy: It simply lacks air to breathe.‖160 A refurbished method of classical
apologetics must not only evade the older epistemological error commonly known as
―evidentialism,‖ it must also begin with the nature of truth, for apologetical arguments
and other related evidence assumes the knowability of first principles.
While many forms of postconciliar apologetics have appealed to beauty or
goodness as a means of persuasion,161 these should not become an exclusive means for
the apologist. Emphasizing truth without beauty and goodness can lead to dogmatism
(which was part of the problem with pre-conciliar classical apologetics). An approach
that appeals to beauty at the expense of the other transcendentals can lead to hedonism.
And goodness without truth and beauty can lead to legalism. Thus, what is sorely needed
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is an emphasis that provides evidence which leads to all the transcendentals, not one over
the others. For all the transcendentals are formal descriptions of God himself. 162
Other approaches can and must complement the rational approach. In reaction to
neo-scholasticism, then, which was heavily concerned with the truth of Christian faith,
theologians must now emphasize the beauty, goodness, truth, and relationality of the
Godhead. When individuals stress truth at the expense of other transcendentals, then this
can lead persons down the path of rationalism which can make one combative,
triumphalistic, and, in the worst case scenario, atheistic. But then again, this should not
become an excuse to give up on truth. As one noteworthy commentator states: ―although
Aquinas says that the Five Ways are arguments for the existence of God, they are not
intended as an exhaustive defense of belief in God‘s existence.‖163
Because the surrounding context must be taken into consideration when doing
apologetics,164 some occasions are simply not conducive to engaging in rational
apologetics, (which relies on the mind and the proper use of evidence). But when the
opportunity arises for such an interaction, the first place to begin might be with the nature
and knowability of truth, especially if one‘s dialogue partner is skeptical of objective
truth in the first place. The success of the evidence for Jesus of Nazareth and the positive
influence that Christianity has had upon the world all depend on the logical precondition
of God‘s existence. The arguments for God‘s existence all depend on first principles
such as the law of non-contradiction, the law of identity, and the law of the excluded

162

Robert J. Spitzer, New Proofs for the Existence of God: Contributions of Contemporary
Physics and Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 239-286.
163
Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University, 1992), 26.
164
Gaudium et Spes, 4, 10, 11, 12, 41, 62 ; Apostolicam Actuositatem, 6, 13, 25, 27; Ad Gentes,
10, 20, 21; Presbyterorum Ordinis, 10, 17 ; Perfectae Caritatis, 20, Christus Dominus, 13.

60

middle.165 And it is precisely the first principles of knowledge that postmodern relativists
argue against.
On the contemporary scene, many Catholic apologetics publications do not touch
upon the need for rational apologetics. Undoubtedly one of the best published works in
the apologetics literature is René Latourelle‘s Christ and the Church: Signs of
Salvation.166 Latourelle takes great pains to stress the importance of the evidential power
of human holiness.
But it must be stressed that if one is holy, then they will use every means to reach
unbelievers, not just ways that exclude the mind and verbal persuasion. Holiness may be
more than rational, but is certainly not less than rational. Conversely, if one uses rational
argument, then this can become a means by which one is sanctified. Latourelle paints
with beautiful, broad strokes in his otherwise excellent book by emphasizing the
importance of holiness without elaborating too much further upon the need for rational
apologetics. Of course, rational apologetics is not always needed, and is dependent on
the context of the discussion. 167 Therefore correct readings of Vatican II will include the
use of rational apologetics, but go beyond it as well.
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Theologians such as Hans urs Van Balthasar contend that love must serve as the
primary means of apologetic persuasion. 168 As in the case with Latourelle, there is
something right about this contention. But, if one loves, then appeal can and should be
made to reason (especially if the context and/or dialogue allows for it). Like the other
transcendentals, an apologetics of love simply cannot replace the enterprise of rational
apologetics. Love includes the use of verbal discussion and argument when the
circumstances allow for it.
Of course, not every published work in the post-conciliar era has appealed to
beauty or goodness. Every so often a good work of Catholic rational apologetics can be
found.169 Benedict Ashley‘s Choosing a World-View and Value System: An Ecumenical
Apologetics170 is one of the few published works in the mainstream which is unafraid to
engage central issues of credibility with reason and hard evidence. Like these other
works in rational apologetics (e.g., works by Hugo Meynell, John Martinelli and Richard
Purtill), Ashley successfully avoids the pitfalls of Enlightenment rationalism, comparing
and contrasting different conceptions of deity. Unfortunately, however, there is no
engagement with first principles which make the project of natural theology and the
demonstratio christiana coherent and thus reasonable to engage in. Correlatively, there is
no substantial engagement with postmodern relativism in these works. Undoubtedly one
of the main reasons why individuals under the influence of postmodernism will resist
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these books is that there is no such thing as objective truth, let alone that it could be
known as such.
Perhaps a more dominant tradition of rational apologetics after Vatican II has
come from the school of Thomism known as the ―Transcendental Thomists.‖171 Even so,
neither do these theologians see an urgent need to explicate and defend the nature and
knowability of truth for the purposes of reinvigorating the discipline of apologetics. A
great reference work is the Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, which has dozens of
very fine articles on issues of credibility. 172 Yet hardly any of the contributors discuss the
postmodern critique and the ramifications this has on Catholic apologetics and/or
evangelization. Avery Dulles‘ standard work on the history of apologetics barely
mentions the influence of rational apologetics in Catholic circles after Vatican II.173
Though he commends a handful of lay apologists for their enthusiasm in using evidence
for faith, Catholics scholars working in the mainstream have yet to make their presence
felt.
Because the primary lens through which many individuals interpret the world is
relativistic, apologists can and should begin with truth. Still many theologians resist
anything that resembles a reasoned defense of the faith, claiming that it smacks of
modernism where the canons of reason are upheld at the expense of other forms of
knowing. But I believe this is a serious misreading of Enlightenment rationalism and its
relationship to rational apologetics. To this we must now turn.
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Rational Apologetics and Enlightenment Rationalism
Cartesian foundationalism (which emanates from the philosophy of René
Descartes, 1596-1650) is an epistemological outlook which insists that unless knowledge
is self-evident or incorrigible, one does not have true knowledge. As a reaction to
modernism, postmodernists have dealt a heavy blow to Descartes‘ version of
foundationalism. The latter is self-refuting. As a result, his epistemological theory has
been almost universally rejected by philosophers.
But this does not mean all foundationalisms are incoherent. While the
postmodern critique has been widely accepted, it does not successfully apply to modified
versions of foundationalism which have been gaining in momentum since the mid1970‘s. These versions are more modest, making it difficult for the postmodernist
critique to succeed. As philosopher Tim Triplett recognizes: ―It is not clear that the
standard arguments against foundationalism will work against these newer, more modest
theories. Indeed, these theories were by and large designed with the purpose of
overcoming standard objections.‖174 Indeed, without some version of foundationalism,
the common ground that is needed for effective communication would be lost. As Pope
John Paul II declared:
Although times change and knowledge increases, it is possible to discern a core of
philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. Consider, for example, the
principles of non-contradiction, finality and causality, as well as the concept of the person
as a free and intelligent subject, with the capacity to know God, truth and goodness.
Consider as well certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all. These are
among the indications that, beyond different schools of thought, there exists a body of
knowledge which may be judged a kind of spiritual heritage of humanity. It is as if we
had come upon an implicit philosophy, as a result of which all feel that they possess these
principles, albeit in a general and unreflective way. Precisely because it is shared in some
174

Tim Triplett, ―Recent Work on Foundationalism,‖ American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, 2

(1990): 93.

64

measure by all, this knowledge should serve as a kind of reference-point for the different
philosophical schools. Once reason successfully intuits and formulates the first universal
principles of being and correctly draws from them conclusions which are coherent both
logically and ethically, then it may be called right reason or, as the ancients called it,
orthós logos, recta ratio.175

Like Cartesian foundationalism, the Pope maintains that some principles are universally
applicable to human knowers and are inherent to reality itself. Otherwise, nothing could
be known by anyone at any time or place. First principles are either undeniable or are
reducible to the undeniable.176 According to philosophical proponents of
foundationalism, nothing at all could be known with first principles. Unlike Cartesian
foundationalism, however, epistemological foundations in the modified version are
necessary for knowledge, but they are not totally absolute. Let us call this modified
version ―soft foundationalism,‖ or ―fallibilist foundationalism.‖ This difference is the
first way in which fallibilism differs from classical foundationalism. Thus the kind of
foundationalism that is necessary for Catholic apologists to understand, articulate and
defend does not have to be Cartesian. Rather, a modified version can be defended—one
that may be defended from the postmodern critique.
The self-evident principles of foundationalism are true by their very nature. 177 To
deny them one must engage in self-stultifying statements. In a sense, then, individuals
must use them. 178 Consequently, one of the increasingly evident objections to anti-realist
views of truth is the problem of auto-referentiality: the incapability of postmodern
relativism to apply its own tenets to its own conceptions of truth. According to Catholic
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philosophies which endorse soft versions of foundationalism, first principles are intrinsic
to the nature of God (the first universal) and each person, all of which have been created
in the image of God (second universal). Other modes of understanding (ones that are not
on the same foundational level as first principles) are not known with logical certainty,
but are still held with certainty on a more tentative level.
The second principal argument for first principles is that there must be an ultimate
basis for truth claims, otherwise there would be an infinite regress of reasons for
justifying knowledge (which is impossible). 179 Thirdly, unlike classical foundationalism,
the relationship between secondary propositions (i.e., propositions that are known with
less certainty than indubitable first principles 180) and indubitable first principles is an
inductive one, not a deductive one. Secondary propositions are somehow derived from
these other first principles, but they are not derived deductively from them. So the
problem with classical foundationalism did not consist in its endorsement of first
principles, but in its restrained definition of what could count as a first principle. Soft
versions of foundationalism acknowledge that first principles exceed what reason can
discover.
In Cartesian foundationalism, knowledge must be reduced to self-evident or
incorrigible beliefs. Under fallibilism, human experience (e.g., beliefs related to memory
and sense perception), and even faith in the Christian God can count as true knowledge.
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Within these parameters, modified versions allow for the possibility that persons can err
and misinterpret what is at least thought to be true in the process of acquiring knowledge.
Even from the standpoint of faith, then, a type of fallibilism can be practiced.
Take the Chalcedonian definition on the two natures of Christ. One can be certain
through faith that Christ is true God and true man, but there would still be room for
additional exploration and more intense understandings of the incarnation within the
parameters officially set by Chalcedon. As Walter Kasper explains, ―Revelation is
‗supra-rational,‘ not irrational or antirational. It represents the enrichment of reason, not
a spurning or constriction of it.‖181 For every kataphatic statement of theology, there is a
corresponding apophatic element. From the standpoint of the apologist, the evidence and
arguments for faith can never be logically certain (though first principles and what they
can demonstrate is actually undeniable), but is more probabilistic and thus tentative in
nature. Beginning from the ―ground up,‖ apologists begin with first principles; beginning
from the ―top down,‖ they seek resonance with what is already believed about revelation.
Some postmodernists present their views not as mere expressions of feeling, but
as viewpoints that their readers will comprehend and accept what they have to say. They
also hold that their viewpoints are preferable to competing positions, and that there are
correct and incorrect interpretations of their positions. As a case in point, Derrida
smuggled in a realist conception of truth when he made it evident that one of his
detractors misunderstood what he was saying (in a long, ninety-three page article!).182
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Understanding the shift from classical foundationalism to fallibilism is hugely
important for reinstating the use of rational apologetics in a post-conciliar Church. The
history of apologetics strongly suggests that when apologists absorb Cartesian
foundationalism (and its direct corollary, evidentialism), it becomes easy for atheism to
follow shortly thereafter. For it was not until Descartes and Kant that the rational
arguments for God‘s existence became the foundation upon which theologians sought to
show the credibility of Christianity. The upshot of this development was that theologians
began to think of religion primarily in terms of reason alone. The effect of their approach
was that revelation became relegated to a lower, less important role. Deism flourished,
and then atheism followed shortly thereafter. 183 As Michael Buckley explains: ―the
strategies of theism or religious apologetics in early modernity had led theologians to
bracket whatever was of specific religious character or warrant and to rely upon the new
and prospering sciences for ‗the first foundations of religion.‘ The implicit but
unrecognized premise in such a strategy, building upon the new mechanics, was that the
uniquely religious―in all of its experiential, traditional, institutional, and social
forms―was cognitively empty.‖184 The truths of the faith should never be seen as a
stepping stone building on top of the conclusions of reason. That procedure would be
guilty of the evidentialist challenge.
According to evidentialists, beliefs are rational if and only if one has reasons to
ground one‘s belief. As W. K. Clifford memorably put it: ―It is wrong always,
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everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.‖185 Thus
one should not believe in God or in Christianity unless one has good reasons to believe in
it. But the Church insists that although one might have evidence to make faith
reasonable, such evidence is not necessary for all believers to have ready in defense of
the faith. 186 Only those believers endowed with certain virtues and/or callings are called
to do rational apologetics. Instead, the ground upon which our faith rests is found in
God‘s revelation to humanity.
As the Catechism of the Catholic Church plainly states: ―What moves us to
believe is not the fact that revealed truths appear as true and intelligible in the light of our
natural reason: we believe ‗because of the authority of God himself who reveals them,
who can neither deceive nor be deceived‘.‖187 The bishops add: ―Faith is certain. It is
more certain than all human knowledge because it is founded on the very word of God
who cannot lie.‖188 Therefore, arguments may help to confirm one‘s belief in
Christianity, and it may serve as a means of providing signs to unbelievers, but the
arguments themselves do not constitute the ground upon which faith stands (or falls).
Believing in Christ provides one with certainty of the truth of Christianity, but the
reasons for this faith has more of a provisional character. Aquinas holds that Catholic
faith can be known with as much certainty as first principles such as the law of noncontradiction!189
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Aware of the dangers of evidentialism, some theologians seem to be unaware of
the distinction between the classical and modified versions of foundationalism, and they
prematurely reject the enterprise of rational apologetics altogether. For them, it is
reminiscent of the parasitical origins of atheism upon the apologist‘s attempts to defend
Christianity. Accepting the widespread rejection of classical foundationalism, some of
these theologians obviously do not recognize that fallibilist foundationalism is defensible,
and that it includes first principles.
So, it is one thing to say there is such a thing as objective truth (which is possible
because of first principles). But it is quite another to maintain that fallible human
knowers can understand the truth absolutely (we are therefore endorsing a critical realism
within the parameters set by fallibilist foundationalism, not a naïve realism on the one
hand or an epistemological skepticism on the other). As Alister McGrath explains:
. . . these conclusions must be treated with caution. While there is a proper place for a
critique of the Enlightenment‘s unrealistic aspirations to total objectivity of judgment,
postmodernity must be seen as representing an ultimately indefensible alternative. A
critical attitude to the Enlightenment on this specific issue does not lead to the
problematic conclusion that no degree of objectivity is possible at all, so that all beliefs or
interpretations can be held with equal merit. The proper response to the Enlightenment‘s
unrealistic aspirations to objectivity is not to abandon any attempt at critical evaluation of
interpretive possibilities, but to encourage a realistic and cautious attempt to determine
which of the various interpretations of nature may be regarded as the ‗best explanation,‘
as judged by criteria such as parsimony, elegance, or explanatory power.190

First principles are not restricted to self-evident or incorrigible truths. They can be
derived from history, culture, and other social contingencies, providing individuals with
true understandings of the world.
Critiquing a method of discovering the truth is surely a different enterprise from
defining what truth is. Thus the Cartesian epistemological tradition had it right when
they understood truth as correspondence with reality―universal, objective, absolute, and
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exclusive. The nature of truth had been accepted from the time of Plato and Aristotle and
was not new at the time of the Enlightenment. Where Descartes may have erred was in
the idea that knowing the truth must be relegated to reason alone. For there is a
significant difference between the nature of truth and the means that are used to discover
it. Catholics can agree with the entire previous western philosophical tradition with
respect to the nature of truth, not with the latter which emanated from Descartes. Our
knowledge of the truth (an epistemological issue) is influenced by culture, biology,
political environment, upbringing, economics, gender, and so on, not whether truth itself
(a metaphysical reality) is absolute, universal, objective, exclusive, eternally engaging,
systematic, and one.

Postmodernism and the Prospects for Apologetics
The Thomistic arguments for God‘s existence all depend on first principles. 191 If
the Council Fathers at Vatican I had Aquinas‘s proofs for God‘s existence in mind, 192
then it would not mean that classical foundationalism was being upheld by the Church.
Rather, it means that a certain type of foundationalism was seen as valid. What the
Council must be saying, in one way or another, is that some knowledge is universally
known. Certainty in scholastic terminology allows for different degrees of conviction:
logical certainty, moral certainty, virtual certainty, and so on.193 ―As a lifelong student of
Aristotle,‖ Ralph McInerney urges, ―Thomas was convinced that there are sound and
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cogent proofs of God‘s existence. For Thomas, natural theology is not a possibility. It is a
fact. It is the achievement of pagan philosophy. Ab esse ad posse valet illatio.‖194 Thus
Aquinas‘s proofs capture an undeniable existential insight (nothing less, and nothing
more). With fallibilist foundationalism in mind, Catholic apologists now might argue
that any worldview that contradicts the fundamental claims of Church cannot be true (and
so should be rejected).
Representatives of anti-apologism may retort: ―Only the Holy Spirit will bring
unbelievers to Christ, not human arguments.‖ Now all of this is certainly true, but a
couple of things must be kept in mind. First, the Spirit can work through humans who
use arguments for evangelical purposes. It is not an either-or approach. It is not the Holy
Spirit or human reason. It can be both. A rational God can use people to reach those
who need evidence to believe in something. One can bring a horse to water, but no one
can make him drink except by surrendering to the Spirit. God can work through the
intellect to lend credibility to the decision of faith. And anything less would be fideistic.
In the words of Brian Hebblethwaite,
it is surely a mistake to regard the logic of theological rationality as something wholly
internal to the perspective of faith. Torrence, and Barth too, are entirely persuasive in
their insistence on theological rationality being responsive to the unique nature of
theology‘s object. But the supposition that theological thinking has its own logic only
available within the relation of grace and faith, has the same effect on Lonergan‘s
insistence on conversion. It makes theology, natural or revealed, undiscussable, immune
to criticism, and unsusceptible of being pondered hypothetically. 195

Many theologians are correct when they claim that faith has its own unique
rationality that is unavailable to unbelievers. But this would not mean that theological
claims should not be evaluated by Christians and their opponents. Nobody believes in
anything unless they know that it is first believable. Faith, to be sure, is not a blind leap
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in the dark without evidence. Neither will evidence demand faith, for unbelievers will
always come up with different excuses as to why the Catholic faith is false or irrelevant.
When considering the relevant reasons for faith, apologists must never give the
impression that faith is based on the conclusions of reason. Rather, the Christian faith is
based on the saving work of Jesus Christ. Faith, however, can be supported and
reinforced by reason.
As a result of the modification from classical to fallibilist foundationalism,
Catholic apologists will now have to resort, for the most part, to a cumulative case for
Catholic faith, not apodictic demonstration (though God‘s existence can still be proven in
the non-mathematical sense of the term if one is Thomistic in their philosophy). Apart
from the preambula fidei, apologists work with probabilistic arguments in support of
Christianity, which is predicated upon marshalling the best evidence we currently have
in, say, science, history and philosophy. Though apologists argue for the plausibility of
Catholic doctrines, they cannot defend these as objectively true unless they are willing to
presuppose first principles which are not limited or relative to cultural, historical, or other
social contingencies in the first place. 196 Unless first principles exist and can be known
by all, the Catholic world and life view would remain insulated and we must then resort
to fideism which holds that there is no reason why anyone should believe in anything at
all.
Christian doctrine can be seen as an explanatory hypothesis that accounts for a
wide variety of features, including history, the cosmos, and the nature of humanity.
Christian scholars are now beginning to utilize newer approach to apologetics in contrast
to the evidentialist challenge. As a reaction to modernism, postmodernism accords well
196
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with the provisional nature of knowledge advanced by fallibilism. John Polkinghorne
holds that believers can retain their presuppositions when comparing and contrasting their
views with other competing claims. The final assessment is predicated on whose
Weltanschauung resonates and makes the most sense out of the agreed upon evidence. 197
Though there is no consensus on which criteria should be used, apologists can
learn from professional scientists who are used to evaluating their theories through
multiple lines of criteria.198 George Ellis argues that scientific theories are assessed in
light of four standards: simplicity, beauty, accuracy in prediction and verifiability, and
explanatory power―a capacity for giving the most adequate account of problematic
data.199 Philosopher of science Ernan McMullin offers six criteria: predictive accuracy,
internal coherence, external consistency, unifying power, fertility, and simplicity. 200
Other notable scientists, such as Howard J. Van Till, Ian Barbour, and Francisco Ayala,
offer another distinctive set of criteria to test their scientific theories.201

In Defense of a Primitive Correspondence Theory of Truth
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Until the middle of the nineteenth century almost every mainstream philosopher
in the West held to some form of the correspondence theory of truth. In the
correspondence view (or, as others might call it, a ―realist conception of truth‖), minds
are either knowing or ignorant; propositions are either true or false; and reality is either
real or imaginary. Truth pertains to those properties of a proposition which refers to
reality. 202 So when a proposition (i.e., a belief, thought, statement, or any other mode of
representation) accurately represents reality, then the proposition is said to be true. When
the proposition does not correspond to reality, then the proposition is said to be false (or,
depending on the content of the proposition, it may be partially true or false). When a
mind assents to a true proposition, then the person is said to have knowledge of the truth.
A proposition, moreover, needs to be distinguished from a sentence. A
proposition is what a sentence either affirms or denies. Another way to understand this is
that a proposition is what a sentence means. Questions, imperatives, exclamations,
requests, and entreaties are not propositions, but presuppose the truth of at least one
proposition which successfully refers to reality. For example, the imperative command,
―do not allow abortions!,‖ is not a proposition as such, but presupposes the proposition
that ―abortion is wrong.‖ The proposition ―abortion is wrong‖ corresponds to the reality
of the moral realm.
Propositions, moreover, can be controversial, trivial, obscure, frightening, or
comforting. Yet none of these features of propositions would refute a primitive
correspondence theory of truth. Although the significance or subjective effect of a
proposition might be person relative, this would not mean the truth or falsity of the
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proposition (or the correspondence theory itself) should be cast into doubt. Hence, the
nature of a proposition needs to be distinguished from the effects it has on persons.
God‘s revelation is propositional, but it comes to persons in various forms, and it has
many different effects on individuals and/or communities. Thus the purpose of the
propositional model is to ensure that one Mind is communicating with human minds.
Without a propositional view, the cognitive content that is necessary for interpersonal
communication is rendered impossible.
Similarly, a proposition is not the same thing as a perspective. Everyone has
perspectives about what they think is the truth. Perspectives can be biased, prejudiced,
ignorant, and uninformed, but this is not the same thing as saying that truth itself is
relative. Rather, a perspective is always a perspective on or about something, or
someone, independent and outside of the percipient‘s viewpoint. Perspectives are either
successful or unsuccessful in their attempt to capture reality. Taken to the extreme,
perspectivalism is self-stultifying, for it assumes that perspectivalism is true—and that all
other views in competition with it must be false. Hence truth must be distinguished from
what is true, how one arrives at the truth, and the effects that truth has on persons. In no
way is metaphysical objectivity incompatible with epistemological subjectivity. Our
epistemological thrust toward the truth is loaded with all sorts of factors which influence
us as limited knowers—level of intelligence, background beliefs, education, gender,
motivation, personal interests, upbringing, genetics, etc.
All true propositions have a few common characteristics. First, truth is exclusive
and antithetical. For every article of faith that is pronounced as true, any other viewpoint
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which is in opposition to it will necessarily be false. In this way, truth is, by definition,
antithetical. Anything that opposes the truth is incorrect. Moreover, truth is specific.
The Council expresses this concern from a theological standpoint about doctrine
in Gaudium et Spes 21 and Dei Verbum 1. Truth, moreover, is absolute (truth applies to
everyone, at all times and everywhere) and objective (if something is true then it is true
for everyone regardless if anyone believes in it or knows it or not). Not to be overlooked,
truth is also eternally engaging (it can never be exhausted). Truth is unified and
systematic (truth is one; truth will never contradict another truth). It is always an end in
and of itself; it is never a mere means to an end.
There are at least two positive arguments in support of a primitive correspondence
view of truth. First, the theory has commonsense appeal. Before one comes to the
philosophical task of understanding the world, one already has a common-sense notion of
what truth is. At least one form of the correspondence theory of truth seems to capture
both common-sense appeal. Therefore its pre-analytic justification gives individuals
something with which to start. When most people speak of truth, they are usually
referring to ―what is the case.‖ Second, those who endorse arguments against the
correspondence theory seem to presuppose it in their presentations. In short, the
correspondence theory of truth seems rationally inescapable. To say that ―truth does not
correspond to reality‖ one must implicitly hold that this describes a true state of affairs.
Aquinas, for instance, holds that there is no disjunction between the rational and
the real. Aquinas is a realist. First principles, in Aquinas‘ view, are both metaphysical
and epistemological. Thus individuals have no choice but to use them. Because
Catholic theology holds that human beings are made in the image of God, it recognizes
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that knowledge is possible (i.e., one Timeless Mind is capable of creating other minds;
the Timeless Mind is also capable of communicating--and guaranteeing that
communication takes place--with those other minds). How does the apologist know
truth? Because the Catholic apologist begins with the lived experience of Catholic truth,
she or he is allowed to know truth in a way that is not possible without the influence of
God‘s grace.
If someone holds to the correspondence theory of truth and claims to believe in
Jesus Christ, this would not mean that she has unlimited or perfect knowledge of God (or
any other doctrine believed by Christians). For every kataphatic statement of theology
there is an apophatic element. Hence, to deny that absolute truth can be known not only
gets something wrong about philosophy, but it also gets something wrong about the
nature of faith. Having faith does not stretch the shape of truth in a direction that is
unnatural to reason, but strengthens and clarifies what persons naturally desire to know.
Advocates of critical realism recognize that we are always in the process of trying to
achieve a truer perspective about the truth. Nor would belief in the universal lordship of
Jesus Christ entail that we can prove the truth of the Catholic Church to anyone at will.
Mentioned earlier, verifying Christian faith and positing it as the truth are two very
different things. When someone believes in the absolute truth of Christianity, this would
not preclude one from participating in the give and take of argument and evidence both
for and against faith. For genuine respect for the mystery of faith will seek to understand
more fully that which is believed. Of course, the process of trying to understand the faith
will include vigorous intellectual striving and therefore be an attempt to reach people
with good arguments for the Gospel. Nor would the belief that Catholicism is true mean
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that everything that we believe as Catholics must be held definitively or that we are
always inerrant in our understanding of the truth.

Addressing Critics
In this section we are going to address arguments against a primitive
correspondence theory of truth from within the standpoint of philosophical theology. The
reason for addressing these objections is that they are often used to undercut the need for
rational apologetics.
The first objection is that the correspondence theory is not found in the Bible or in
Church teaching. Now, it has never been the primary intention of the Church to
enunciate a particular theory of truth. When the Church pronounces on certain
theological matters, she assumes that her doctrines are true. This does not mean that the
Scriptural writers did not unthematically presuppose the soundness of a particular theory
of truth (namely, truth as correspondence with reality). 203 The biblical terms for truth are
emet and aletheia. Though these terms are broadly understood and multifaceted, the
biblical writers assumed that the actions they referred to when using these terms were
actions of reality: faithfulness, or rectitude, etc. Clearly, the Scriptural writers assumed
that what they were saying in regard to salvation depended upon metaphysical realities
and held to other similar assumptions. 204 As one commentator puts it: ―In tradition, in
addition to the use of the notion of truth derived from Greek philosophy [i.e., truth as
correspondence], we find in some of the fathers and in the liturgy a resumption and
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development of the biblical conception of truth, but sometimes with a stronger emphasis
on its doctrinal aspect. Generally speaking, truth designates the Christian faith, i.e., the
divine revelation as it has been handed down in the church.‖205
The next objection is that the correspondence theory is unable to account for the
mysteries of faith. These objectors are often influenced by Eastern religious thought. In
this view, all religions are seen as inadequate pointers to what is ultimately inexpressible.
This ultimate mystery exceeds the use of human logic.
The project of rational apologetics will certainly be undercut if believers are
unable to give a reason for their hope. There might as well be no apologetic mandate at
all if God cannot be spoken of. For there would be no common points of contact with
persons who do not share our common faith convictions. And if there are no common
points of contact with doubters and outsiders, then how could anyone be held accountable
for rejecting the Christian God?
Christians must learn how to understand the incomprehensibility of God in such a
way that still preserves some knowledge of the divine. It is not under dispute that
Catholic truth is deeper than conceptual and linguistic categories of speech. Truth is
more than rational; it is personal, moral, dynamic, and life changing. There is always
room to explore the fullness of truth even more fully. Just because there is absolute truth,
this would not mean that our understanding of it is absolute. Although truth goes above
reason, it is definitely not irrational. There is a sense in which the ―otherness‖ of God
evades both cognitive and linguistic categories, but this would not mean all language is
incapable of adequately referring to God. One cannot say that language does not apply to
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God unless one is capable of successfully applying certain concepts to God in the first
place. Take the statement ―no linguistic categories or conceptions can apply
meaningfully to God.‖ One would have to know something meaningful about God in
order to know that ‗nothing‘ linguistic or conceptual applies to him; theologians cannot
know what God is not unless one already knows what God is.206
To say God is not a creature, one must have some previous understanding of God.
Thus, one must know something about the term ‗God‘ in order to employ the via
negativa. Otherwise one could not distinguish God from created entities. Thus the issue
is not whether we can apply certain concepts to God, but how we pour meaning into those
concepts. The way meaning is poured into these concepts has traditionally been negative.
Some postmodernists might respond by noting that first principles are merely
expressions of Aristotelian logic―constructions of Western thought which are not
applicable to other times and cultures (or religious understanding). Wilfred Cantwell
Smith is representative of this outlook: ―Modern Western logic, I myself am pretty sure,
though serviceable for computers, is in other ways inept and is particularly ill-suited, it
seems, for thinking about spiritual matters.‖207 Not only does Smith smuggle in an
―objection from mystery‖ (objection 2) here, but he also challenges the universality of
first principles by affirming that they are conditioned.
A few things could be said in response to this. Smith seems to be confusing the
nature of propositions with the linguistic style and/or thought patterns used to express a
proposition. According to philosophers William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland:
In his Summa Theologiae, Thomas used a literary style in which his prose explicitly
follows strict logical form and syllogistic presentation. By contrast, an isolated culture in
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the mountains of Brazil may use a poetic form of oral tradition, their sentences may not
follow an explicit, tidy subject-predicate form, and they may reach tribal conclusions in
ways quite foreign to Western culture. But none of this has anything to do with the deep
logical structure that underlies their claims or with the conformance of their individual
assertions to the three laws of logic, and it is simply a mistake to think otherwise. We
invite the reader to present any declarative utterance in any culture, including the
assertion that ‗Western logic,‘ is culturally relative, that does not conform to Aristotle‘s
three laws of logic. Any such assertion, to the degree that it is meaningful or asserted as
true or false, will conform to the three laws of logic. Any alleged counterexample will
either be self-refuting or meaningless. After all, Aristotle did not invent these laws any
more than Columbus invented the New World. Aristotle may have been a Western
thinker and he may have discovered these laws, but that does not imply that the laws
themselves are Western constructions.208

Thus, there is a difference between cultural expressions and the underlying logic which
undergirds every person‘s thinking. 209 Mentioned earlier, a proposition is not the same
thing as a sentence. John Searle points out: ―From the fact that a description can only be
made relative to a set of linguistic categories, it does not follow that the facts/states of
affairs, etc., described can only exist relative to a set of categories.‖210 The relativity of
sentences would not count as a refutation of the correspondence theory. How our
language applies terms is often relative, but this would not mean that some other theory
of truth should be preferred over the correspondence theory. Says Searle: ―We arbitrarily
define the word ‗cat‘ in such and such a way; and only relative to such and such
definitions can we say, ‗That‘s a cat.‘ But once we have made the definitions and once
we have applied the concepts relative to the system of definitions, whether or not
something satisfies our definition is no longer arbitrary or relative. That we use the word
‗cat‘ the way we do is up to us; that there is an object that exists independently of that
use, and satisfies that use, is a plain matter of (absolute, intrinsic, mind independent)
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fact.‖211 In effect, the idea that the relative selection of terms should prevent persons
from saying that anything can be objectively true makes no more sense than saying that
one cannot satisfy their craving for a dessert because there are many kinds of desserts.
A rejection of the correspondence theory is certainly no substitute for actually
refuting it.

Saying that ―first principles are merely expressions of Aristotelian logic‖ is

tantamount to excluding other propositions that implicitly affirm the first principles. So
if the objection is true, then it must be false. And if it is false, then it is false as well.
Further justification of the assertion that ―first principles are merely the expressions of
Aristotelian logic‖ would, in one way or another, have to employ first principles in the
first place.
Still other critics complain that truth is uninformative and uninteresting in the
correspondence theory. 212 Objective truth is static, abstract, cold, and impersonal. Thus
Smith says that truth is not to be found in propositions, but in persons alone: ―Truth, I
submit, is a humane, not an objective, concept. It does not lie in propositions.‖213 At this
point in the paper we should set aside the obviously self-refuting nature of Smith‘s
contention and demonstrate that even if the point is granted, this would still not count as
an argument against the correspondence theory. Rather, it serves as an argument against
the possibility of knowing what the truth is. Truth is formally distinct from what is true.
In the case of the Catholic apologist, there are truths that are already assumed.
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There are two basic avenues the apologist can take which seem to make this
objection irrelevant. On the one hand, one can make arguments from the ―bottom up‖ on
the basis of first principles and arrive to some undeniable conclusions, namely, that truth
is objective, that God exists, that human beings are more than just material stuff. These
truths are based upon first principles. This approach is confident about our mutually
shared assumptions (human nature and self-evident first principles). This was a more
traditional apologetic methodology. Perhaps the truth that something exists is
uninformative and abstract, but we can also know with certainty that God exists, and that
an anti-realist view of truth is false. Perhaps these truths are ―uninteresting,‖ but then
again this is clearly person relative and thus does not apply to everyone!
On the other hand, it is perfectly acceptable to begin with Christian truth claims
and then compare and contrast them with competing perspectives. From the outset
apologists claim that some things are true, and then attempts to rationally argue for these
truths. Everyone must begin somewhere; all people interpret reality in a way that is
consistent with their underlying presuppositions. No Catholic who holds to the
correspondence theory of truth is left with a floating, uninformative conception of truth,
but presupposes the truths of Catholic Christianity. There is no reason to suppose that
because Christian truth is absolute and unchanging that it cannot be a channel by which
individuals come to better understand and experience God.214 Personal encounter with
the divine simply cannot take place in a cognitive vacuum, but assumes that some things
are absolutely true.
The final assessment in this newer, ―top-down‖ approach is predicated on whose
worldview and value system resonates and thus makes the most sense out of the agreed
214

Paul Helm, Divine Revelation (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1982), 27.

84

upon evidence. Even if this approach begins with a Catholic worldview, this would not
have to mean that the Good News is irrational (or that the evidence in favor of the
Catholic faith cannot be trusted). Perhaps the Gospel is true and the evidence is
trustworthy. As C.S. Lewis wrote: ―I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has
risen—not only because I see it, but because of it, I see everything else.‖215 Catholic
apologists can begin with their presuppositions. This is no different for anyone else
coming at the debate from within their perspectives of the world. It is possible that
Christians know the truth about God because of faith. What is needed to help persons to
determine the truth would still be the careful weighing and assessing of the accepted
evidence from the various sides and perspectives to the best of our God given abilities in
the dialogue and/or debate.
Absolute truth prevents inculturation and human individuality. However, there is
a difference between the nature of truth and the various ways in which individuals and
groups of people arrive at the truth and express it. There is a difference between the
nature of truth and the effect it has on individuals. Truth, as we have seen, is not
parochial, partial, and it is not provincial. It allows for creative cultural expression and
individuality so long as the Catholic worldview is believed and faithfully lived out.
Conversely, certain cultures can make the Gospel message more conducive for reception
within that particular culture. Receiving God‘s truth does not flatten us out in blind
obedience to Christ, but liberates persons to become who they were meant to be.
Affirming the objective truth of Catholicism carves out space for the development of
individual spiritual gifts, callings, and personality types in the risen Christ.

215

C.S. Lewis, ―Is Theology Poetry?,‖ Essay Collection and Other Short Pieces (London: Harper
Collins, 2000), 21.

85

Apologists now might argue that we would expect the one true faith to be able to
affect all people, regardless of the culture they inhabit. When missionaries endeavor to
present the timeless truths of the Gospel to persons who have been unaffected by the
Catholic world and life view, they are not starting from nothing, but are convinced that
because every human being is made in the image of God, there are many things
(including the Gospel itself) that all persons can understand. Listen to John Paul II: ―In
proclaiming Christ to non-Christians, the missionary is convinced that through the
working of the Spirit, there already exists in individuals and peoples an expectation, even
if an unconscious one, of knowing the truth about God, about man, and about how we are
to be set free from sin and death. The missionary‘s enthusiasm in proclaiming Christ
comes from the conviction that he is responding to that expectation, and so he does not
become discouraged or cease his witness even when he is called to manifest his faith in
an environment that is hostile or indifferent.‖216
If the Gospel message is true, then we would expect the message to be capable of
resonance with persons—no matter when they live or where they are from. As the
framers of Gaudium et Spes state: ―Moreover, since in virtue of her mission and nature
she is bound to no particular form of human culture, nor to any political, economic, or
social system, the Church by her very universality can be a very close bond between
diverse human communities and nations, provided these trust her and truly acknowledge
her right to true freedom in fulfilling her mission.‖217 Although human minds are subject
to the fluidity of semantics and the syntax of numerous languages and thought patterns,
there are some structural constants―such as first principles, fallibilist foundationalism,
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and the referential nature of propositions. It is noteworthy that Vatican II says that the
Church should be more focused on what unites us as a human race to generate a sense of
unity instead of considering the particularities that are becoming increasingly apparent as
of late.218
Apologists will now want to emphasize the success of missionary activity across
the many cultures of the world (to bolster their claims about Christ). For if Christianity
true, then it will make sense to more than one limited group of persons. Relevant is the
Catechism: ―Only faith can recognize that the Church possesses these properties from her
divine source. But their historical manifestations are signs that also speak clearly to
human reason. As the First Vatican Council noted, the ‗Church herself, with her
marvelous propagation, eminent holiness, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in everything
good, her catholic unity and invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of
credibility and an irrefutable witness of her divine mission‘.‖ 219 The catholicity of the
Church testifies to the fact that people from different cultural and religious backgrounds
can come to understand the same basic Gospel message, and that it changes individuals
and even whole societies for the better.220
Lastly, some claim that either/or thinking can lead to violence.221 Aside from the
fact that either/or thinking is rationally inescapable (i.e., the law of non-contradiction), it
must be stressed that first principles do not lead persons to become violent, but that
certain understandings and applications of what is thought to be true can steer persons
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down the path of violence. Well-meaning Christians who believe that everything should
be conceived in one shade of black and white may unknowingly harbor bad attitudes to
justify violence that is opposed to healthy forms of faith and evangelism.
So I am not saying that we should renounce hard truth claims, but that certain
(shortsighted) interpretations of them need to be jettisoned. In a rigid view of truth it
becomes easy for Christians to view outsiders as enemies who deserve to be punished
because they think differently than believers. As Charles Kimball points out: ―When
particular understandings become rigidly fixed, and uncritically appropriated as absolute
truths, well-meaning people can and often do paint themselves into a corner from which
they must assume a defensive or even offensive posture.‖222 Catholic thinking does not
do away with absolutes, but allows for a variety of interpretations within an orthodox
spectrum. Truth leads to a symphony of voices in unity, not stagnant uniformity. Part of
the post-conciliar apologetic approach is one that will include goodness, relationality,
beauty and truth. If there is one good thing that postmodernists have taught us, it is that
the quest for human understanding cannot be reduced to reason alone. In this very way,
postmodernism serves as a corrective to Enlightenment rationalism.
A reason alone approach to faith can incite individuals to rationalism and then
combativeness. But on the other hand, I submit that when Christians limit the intellectual
engagement of faith, then this can make them prone to become violent as well. For
example, it is a known fact that David Koresh and Jim Jones ordered the women in their
groups to have sex with them. These women completely bypassed the voice of common
sense and conscience and, in blind faith, did what they were told—all in the name of
222
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―faith.‖ Thus when reason and faith are divorced from one another, then this can lead
persons to become violent. Healthy Catholic faith affects all of a person‘s nature,
including the mind. It can begin by having adequate evidence, continuing in the proper
disciplining of the emotions which culminates in virtuous conduct in cooperation with
God‘s will. Catholic faith is all about responsible thinking, personal freedom, and
common sense. Faith is a rational step into the light, demanding responsible thinking; it
is not a credulous leap in the dark. Reasons can be given for faith; and no truth of reason
will ever contradict the truths of faith.
It should be stressed that the specificity of accepting Catholic Christianity
involves high stakes in the life of discipleship; it demands that we become tactfully
confrontational with all kinds of evil in the world (cf. 1 John 2:15-17). Catholics simply
cannot rest content in a world streaming with error and many forms of injustice.
Apologists must still remain person sensitive and culturally aware within the confines of
her truth centered dialogue and debate with those who do not share our beliefs.
According to Vatican II, the study of other world religions should help Catholics to learn
how to refute the errors in other faiths: ―Let them also be introduced to a knowledge of
other religions which are more widespread in individual regions, so that they may
acknowledge more correctly what truth and goodness these religions, in God's
providence, possess, and so that they may learn to refute their errors and be able to
communicate the full light of truth to those who do not have it.‖223 In Ad Gentes, the
Fathers of the faith state: ―Moreover let them take care that apostolic activity be not
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limited to those only who have already been converted. A fair proportion of personnel
and funds should be assigned to the evangelization of non-Christians.‖224

Conclusion
Many postmodernists do not see truth as an objective description of reality. As a
result of this paradigmatic shift, the Church‘s central claims are no longer seen as binding
on all persons. Rather, the Catholic worldview is reinterpreted in terms of opinion.
Indirectly this shift makes rational apologetics unfashionable. Because theologians have
been relatively silent in addressing this most salient challenge to faith, the need to
reinstate the project of rational arguments has been neglected. Philosophical, historical,
aesthetic, and experiential evidence may be plausible in making the beliefs of Catholics
more credible than competing claims, but for the hardheaded skeptic who is willing to
think through the reasons for and against the Church, this form of apologetics remains
indispensable for the purposes of Christian evangelization.
C.S. Lewis once captured this insight in the Screwtape Letters. In the story the
senior demon of hell, Screwtape, instructs a lower ranking demon on how to dissuade
persons‘ from seriously taking the role of reason and evidence in the life of Christian
faith. For in so doing, skeptics and other lukewarm believers will be less convinced of
Christianity. After all, says Screwtape to his disciple in training: ―Your man has been
accustomed, ever since he was a boy, to have a dozen incompatible philosophies dancing
about together inside his head. He doesn‘t think of doctrines as primarily ‗true‘ or
‗false,‘ but as ‗academic‘ or ‗practical,‘ ‗outworn‘ or ‗contemporary,‘ ‗conventional‘ or
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‗ruthless.‘ Jargon, not argument, is your best ally in keeping him from the Church.‖ 225
Indeed, Screwtape knew that clear thinking was on the side of the Church.
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A TEST CASE IN CLASSICAL (SCHOLASTIC) APOLOGETICS
One of the traditional hallmarks of Thomistic philosophy is that God‘s existence
can be known with certainty apart from the influence of authoritative, divine revelation.
This longstanding belief in the church reached somewhat of a high point at the First
Vatican Council on April 24, 1870 when, in response to the prevailing trends of
traditionalism, rationalism, and fideism, the Council Fathers steered a middle course in
response to these extreme positions, declaring that God‘s existence can be known with
certainty through the natural light of human reason.226
Though criticisms advanced by Hume and Kant are occasionally addressed by
Thomists, this essay brings contemporary atheism face to face with Aquinas and his
interpreters. This issue in apologetic theology is always necessary, for as Kasper writes:
Modern atheism [which stems from the philosophies of the Enlightenment] has put
theology in a difficult position. Of particular importance here is mass atheism, a
phenomenon unparalleled in past history; it regards the practical, if not theoretical denial
of God or at least indifference to belief in God as being by far the most plausible attitude
to take. As a result, theology has been stripped of its power to speak to people and to
communicate with them. There are now no generally accepted images, symbols,
concepts, or categories with which it can make itself understood. The crisis in the
presuppositions for understanding talk about God is the real crisis of present day
theology. To put the matter in more Scholastic terms; the crisis of contemporary theology
arises from the loss of the preambula fidei, that is, of the presuppositions which faith
needs if it is to be possible as faith and if it is to be able to make itself intelligible as faith.
226
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The quandary becomes clear when we consider the various ways in which theology
comes to grips with modern atheism. 227

This chapter is not so much a critical work in Thomistic philosophy as much as it
seeks to highlight the contemporary trends in atheist criticism of Aquinas‘ arguments for
God‘s existence. We will focus in particular on Aquinas‘ intellectus essentiae argument
for God‘s existence as the representative piece of natural theology. In order to highlight
these atheistic trends, I will also discuss how Thomists have generally responded back to
them. The purpose of this essay is to help theologians and Christian philosophers to be
alert of the major atheistic critiques of Thomistic natural theology and to understand the
different responses currently being given to them.
Hopefully the chapter of this dissertation will restore the possibility of a
philosophical apologetics in a post-conciliar church. This chapter will exploit the
soundness of Thomist natural theology, and it also admits the insufficiency of the
classical approach, at least in terms of recognizing the truth of Christian faith. In this
way, the combinational model of the Council might be upheld, reinstating the importance
of combinationalism.

Knowing That God Exists
Thomistic philosophers agree that natural knowledge of God is not necessarily
philosophical. It is (and can be) pre-philosophical. Thus professional philosophers are
not at an advantage over the ordinary person when it comes to knowing that there is a
God. As Walter Kasper explains: ―Thomas says the same thing in a more substantive
way. . . This element of the unconditioned in the conditioned is not first brought home to
227
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us by a complicated proof; it is grasped unthematically in every knowledge of the
conditioned as conditioned. When thus understood, the cosmological argument is in the
final analysis simply reflecting this primordial knowledge; it is an explanation of the
astonishment felt at the wonder of being.‖228
The ordinary person does not have the time, energy, or resources to study the
arguments for and against God‘s existence. But this does not prevent them from knowing
that there is a God. And this is why, at the end of each of the Five Ways, Aquinas says
with confidence: ―and this is the God that all people speak of.‖
Let us now spell out this pre-philosophical intuition in the form of a philosophical
argument for God‘s existence. Many scholars maintain that behind the Five Ways there
is one basic form of argument. Each of the Ways begins with a different starting point
(i.e., change, causality, contingency, perfection, and final causality), but they all
presuppose the existence/essence distinction spelled out in one of Aquinas‘ earlier and
more influential tracts, the De Ente et Essentia.229 Commonly known as the intellectus
essentiae argument for God, I will elaborate and defend a contemporary version in this
chapter. One of the argument‘s strengths is that it establishes a being whose essence and
existence are identical. Its essence is to exist. While each of the Five Ways, as
arguments simpliciter, do not entail all the traditional attributes of God, within their
broader philosophical context they lead to nothing else. That metaphysical context is
provided in a more immediate sense in the De Ente.
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Although many atheists are unwilling to grant the truth of most premises in
Thomas‘ arguments, some of them maintain that his proofs remain one of the best
resources for justifying theistic belief. At the very least, they argue, the cosmological
argument has epistemic value for theism. It may fail as a proof, but theists are given
ample reason for still holding that there is a God.230
Premise 1: At least one potential being exists. It is impossible to deny that
something exists without implicitly conceding to the truth of the premise in the process of
denying it. If someone denies that something exists, then it should be admitted that they
are saying is something significant. Otherwise, why listen to the person? Hence the
proposition ‗nothing exists‘ is self-defeating. While it is logically possible that nothing
exists, it is actually undeniable that something exists. Because the proposition ―at least
one potential being exists‖ is not logically compelling, the argument does not proceed on
the assumption that we are proving logically the existence of God.
When Aquinas speaks of demonstrating God‘s existence, he does not speak of
proving God in the logical sense of a proof. It is logically possible that nothing ever
existed,—including the universe and God,—but it still remains undeniable that something
exists. Logic cannot show that something exists, only that it is possible for something to
exist. When I say that a potential being exists, I mean that a being exists that does not
have to exist. It is possible that these beings do not have to exist. This is an undeniable
fact of experience. A potential being is a being that did not have to come into existence,
but nevertheless still exists without ultimate necessity.
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We will now argue for the existence of potential beings. First, beings must either
be necessary, possible (potential) or impossible. Philosophically speaking, this exhausts
all of our options. We can set aside the existence of an impossible being, for an
impossible being is not. Neither is the being that currently exists a necessary being. A
necessary being is a being that cannot fail to exist. The nonexistence of a necessary
being is a contradiction in terms. If there is a necessary being, then it exists out of
necessity. A necessary being, moreover, is equivalent to a purely actual being with no
potential. An actual being with no potential must have many attributes: immutability (not
able to be changed), simplicity (not divisible), eternality (not in time), infinity (not
limited), etc. The beings that currently exist, however, are beings in space and time.
As a simple being, a necessary being cannot be partly anything. Nor can there be
more than one actual being. For if there were more than one, then there would have to be
something which distinguishes the one from the other. There would have to be
something that the one has which the other lacks, but this cannot be the case if each of
them is unlimited. More importantly, an actual being must be uncaused. It is undeniable
in light of these attributes (of a purely actual existent) that the beings that do exist are not
actual beings with no potential. Those things that exist are changing, moving in space
and time, and have the capacity for additional causal change. They are not wholly
simple, immaterial and immutable.
Potential beings are undeniable fact of sensory existence. Atheists do not dispute
the first premise.231 As Richard M. Gale notes, ―These are commonplace observational
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facts that only a complete skeptic about our senses would want to challenge.‖232 Graham
Oppy agrees: ―the first premise in the argument seems unproblematic: there are many
beings that are ‗contingent‘.‖233
Premise 2: The existence of every potential being is actualized by another.
Whatever has the potential for nonexistence is not a purely actual being. Because a
potential being is not a purely actual being, the former must be caused or preserved in
existence by something other than itself. No potentiality can actualize itself. Therefore,
there must be some actuality apart from it that can account for its existence. Likewise,
every potential being needs a cause, not just ―some‖ potential beings.234 For if any
potential being exists, then it does not have to exist. When I speak of the actualization of
potential beings, I am referring to the transition that takes place in a being from
potentiality to actuality (all the while retaining its potential for additional change). The
change that takes place is referring to a sustaining cause, not a cause in the temporal
sense of becoming. Jordan Howard Sobel accepts the causal premise of Aquinas:
―Whatever else they would be, sustaining causes would be necessary for the existence of
things they sustained. But that is not all they would be, for they would be sustaining
these things and so engaged in ‗activity‘ somehow sufficient for their existence.‖235
Nicholas Everitt agrees: ―in all our experiences of series of events, we have never
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experienced an event which did not depend on a predecessor, and if we try to think of
what an event might depend on other than a predecessor, no answer comes to mind.‖236
The second premise is evident given the aforementioned definition of change.
Change means to pass from a state of potentiality to a state of actually having it.
Although rocks do not have the potential to express emotion, persons have that potential.
When this potential is actualized in people, then they change in feeling. A being that
changes must have some potential for that change. Otherwise this change could never
become actualized. No potential for being a certain way can actualize itself. For
potentiality is not actual. The essence, form, or quiddity of a potential object cannot be
what brings it into existence, for considered in itself, potentiality is the mere essence of
something, not an actuality. Thus potentiality cannot cause anything.
But when an actual being has potential, then it must be caused by something other
than itself. As Peter Angeles rightly states: ―If the thing were not prior to itself in order
to cause its existence, then something else must have been in existence to bring it into
existence—and such a happening is not self-causation.‖237 The sheer potential to be
something cannot account for why something might achieve that potential. The
possibility for existence does not account for existence. Sheer potentiality (essence) is
not the same as actuality (existence).
Only something that actually exists can account for the existence of something
else. As John Shook admits, ―Premise {2} and variations on its theme (such as ‗every
effect must have a cause‘) appear to make sound common sense. Intellectual curiosity
and scientific methodology spring form this basic theme, which appears to be essential to
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the normal functioning of our brains. . . if something unusual catches our attention, or if
we just focus our attention, we can ask and often answer the ‗why?‘ question which our
mind so easily arouses.‖238
Conversely, out of nothing, nothing comes. Likewise, if a potential being is not
preserved in existence by another, then it would immediately go out of existence. No
matter how many potential beings there might be, all of them are unable to remain in
existence without something actualizing them. To say that potential beings can exist
without a cause is equivalent to holding that potential beings can come into existence out
of nothing without a cause. But nothing is the complete absence of being; nothing has no
causal power.
Every potential being is either self-caused, caused to exist by another, or
uncaused. This tri-polar classification exhausts all of our options. Potential beings
cannot cause themselves; they would have to precede themselves which is impossible.
Neither can potential beings be uncaused. If they are uncaused, then they would be the
ultimate ground of actual being. Nothing, however, can produce something. Hence we
conclude that all potential beings must be caused by another. The type of causality
involved in this view is conserving causality. It is concerned with the causes in the hereand-now, not with originating causes in the temporal sense of origination.
Premise 3: An infinite amount of potential beings (which have been caused by
another) is not possible. A chain of causes where every potential being is preserved in
existence by an actually infinite amount of other potential beings is impossible. Either
the series of all potential beings is sufficient to account for itself or it is not. But the
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series cannot account for itself. For if each being in the series of caused beings is itself
caused, then adding all of them together will not alter the fact that each of them are still
in need of a cause. If each part in the entire series of potential beings is potential, then
the entire sum of these beings will still remain potential. If someone chooses to make the
series longer, this will not make the sum of potential beings as a fully actual set of beings
(or that they are able to account for themselves).
By saying that a potential being can account for some other potential existent is
tantamount to saying that one paratrooper whose parachute does not open can prevent
another paratrooper from falling to the ground (i.e., a paratrooper whose chute does not
open either). When one adds paratroopers by grabbing ahold of other falling paratroopers
(whose parachutes will also not open), this will only compound the problem, not lesson
it. If there were no first cause then there would be no final effect. But there is an effect;
therefore there cannot be an infinite regress.
No effect has within itself the power to cause something else. Rather, it is an
actual being working in and through each potential being which causes them to be what
they are.239 Arguing that an infinite amount of causes is possible is tantamount to saying
that every single potential being has come from nothing, for not a single potential being
has any real ground for its own existence, but depends on something else to account for
it. The only being that can actualize another in a state of potentiality and actuality must
be an actual being without potential. Only a being of pure actuality with no potential is
capable of causing the existence of another.

239

Rowe misunderstands the Thomist cosmological argument by thinking there are intermediate
causes. William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument, 4.

100

Conclusion: The only being which can cause a potential being in existence is an
actual being. Therefore, at least one first actualizer exists. The first actualizer’s essence
is to exist. It is therefore uncaused. This conclusion follows logically and inescapably
on the basis of each premise. We know that if something exists, then it must exist
necessarily or it depends on something else for its existence. Something exists. This
being is not a necessary existent. Its nonexistence is a real possibility. Its nonexistence,
moreover, has already been (say, before it existed in the form it which it now appears).
Conversely, an actual, necessary being has no potential for nonexistence; it cannot fail to
exist. Because a potential being‘s nonexistence is a possibility, it exists potentially as a
metaphysical composite of act and potency. It remains actual because it is. And it has
potential for additional change. And we see it changing. Every being that is a composite
of actuality and potentiality is caused to exist by another. So long as the regress does not
immediately terminate in the existence of a purely actual being, we are left with a limited
regress of causes. Therefore, a first actualizer must be responsible for sustaining each
and every potential being in existence in the here and now. 240 The nature of the first
actualizer is different from all potential beings.
2d Conclusion: The nature of a first actualizer must be necessary, one, good,
eternal, infinite, immaterial, simple, immutable, omnipresent, and omnipotent. Given the
nature of the first actualizer, there cannot be more than one of them. The nature of this
being is what all people mean when they speak of God. We might also add that this being
is not sensible, for potential beings are known through human sense and the first
240
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actualizer is only known by negating what is already known about potential beings. This
conclusion, says Aquinas, is what all people mean when they speak of God. Since a
purely actual being has no potential, it cannot change; it is immutable.
Moreover, the necessary uncaused cause must be nonspatial (infinite) and
atemporal (eternal). Since time and space involve a change of position and time, an
actual being cannot exist in space or time. It lies beyond spacetime and thus properly
transcends both of them. According to Graham Oppy, ―If the existence of the physical
universe depends upon something else, then—at the very least—there are possible worlds
in which there is no physical universe because that something else is different in some
way. Moreover, if there is neither space nor time ‗beyond‘ the physical universe, then the
‗something else‘ upon which the existence of the physical universe depends can be
neither spatial nor temporal.‖241 Though Oppy invokes a necessary existent as
responsible for the preservation of potential beings, he does not think it is God.
Nonetheless, his point is well taken. Everitt seems to agree: ―The only way in which the
resort to a creator will block an infinite regress of super-creator, super-super-creator, and
so on, is if the creator can have a different kind of existence from the universe.‖242
A necessary being must also be indivisible, or simple. If the necessary,
unchanging, timeless, and spaceless being were composed of parts, then it would be
capable of decomposition. But an actual existent does not have any potential for
anything, including decomposition. We conclude: a pure, actual being must be utterly
simple. A being that is pure actuality must also be infinite in power. Having the power
to keep things in a state of potential existence, it can have no limitation in any respect.
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Therefore the actual being must be infinite in power. A necessary existent is uncaused;
its essence is to exist. The fact that essence and existence converge also provides support
for its simplicity. All other beings (i.e., potential beings) have existence. They must
therefore participate in the existence of the actual being. Without the actual being, all
potential beings could not exist and be what they currently are.
Lastly, an actual existent must be good. Nonexistence is not good or evil, for it is
not. But if something exists, then it is good.243 Goodness and existence are convertible
categories in Thomistic metaphysics. If something exists, then this is a good quality, not
an evil one. In this way, existence is a good and nonexistence cannot be classified as
anything. So it does not make sense to say that if an actual being without potential exists,
then it might be, as Stephen Law puts it, an evil being. 244 Oppy is also incorrect when he
says that the most that could be concluded about the argument is that a first actualizer
exists―a first cause that is ―not itself in a process of change.‖245
Let us turn to the most salient atheist criticisms (and provide a brief response to
each of them from the post-Vatican II Thomist literature). Again, the point is to highlight
the atheist criticisms and discuss the responses currently given by Thomistic theists. One
might interpret the following section as a bibliographical appraisal of the theism-atheism
debate from a Thomist perspective.

Thomas Aquinas Models Reality Arbitrarily
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Some have argued that the way Thomists model reality is arbitrary, a loaded
metaphysics which is not necessary. Reality can be explained and described from other
legitimate perspectives. George Smith, for instance, claims that the categories of
contingent and necessary are arbitrary (thus the Thomistic argument are ―drenched in
medieval metaphysics,‖ as he puts it) and so must be successfully argued for if the
argument is to succeed.246 Be that as it may, Thomists argue that the object which exists
must either be a potential being or an actual being. Philosophically speaking, this
exhausts all of our options. As Jacques Maritain once put it:
in order to recognize in the philosophic proofs of the existence of God, notably in the five
ways of St. Thomas, their full demonstrative value, it is not necessary to be a philosopher
trained in the school of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, nor even to be a philosopher by
profession. What is prerequisite is to perceive and adhere firmly to the primary truths
which Thomist philosophy attempts more successfully than any other to justify. . .But in
the East as in the West it is by no means the only philosophy to recognize and to cultivate
these primary truths. Indeed, the very fact of their primacy prevents them from being the
monopoly of any one system; they precede every system. They are part and parcel of
what has been called the natural philosophy of the human intelligence. . . They are
grasped by common sense before being the object of philosophic consideration.247

There is no third category of being other than a potential or actual being. Neither is there
such a thing as sheer potentiality. Sheer potentiality is not actual, but is the mere capacity
for something to actually exist in a certain way. Only potential beings and an actual
being exist. Or, just an actual being exists. There is no other option. 248 This model is
derived from undeniable human experience. We do not superimpose the categories of
potentiality and actuality onto reality. These categories describe the world in the way it
really exists.
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Petitio Principii and the First Premise
Another response to the first premise (and/or second premise) is that it begs the
question in favor of God‘s existence. 249 But this argument is philosophically naïve. If
such an objection implies intuitively that if something exists then God must exist, then
the objector recognizes the soundness of the proof, and it would be a quick short-cut
through the argument. Such an intuition would make the point of the argument without
going through the sequence of each premise.
But if the objector means that the argument cannot be made unless the natural
theologian was already convinced in her mind that there is a God before she even sits
down to lay out the premises of the argument, then we must admit that this is
psychologically true. Nobody formulates an argument unless they intend on
demonstrating the likelihood of a conclusion. But this should not be considered a case of
circular reasoning because nowhere in the first and/or second premise does it state that
God exists.

Potential Beings Can Exist Uncaused
Atheists argue that there is no reason to exclude the possibility that potential
beings always exist. Potential beings are sometimes uncaused. This kind of reasoning is
widespread in the atheist literature.250 Writing boldly on behalf of the atheist community,
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J.L. Mackie wrote: ―Why, for example, might there not be a permanent stock of matter
whose essence did not involve existence but which did not derive its existence from
anything else?‖251
With respect to the possibility that uncaused contingent beings might exist
because they are at least ―conceivable,‖252 a few responses have been recently given.
John Shepherd illuminates various ways in which contingency can be understood, and
concludes that the term does not function as a proposition, but as a statement about
existence.253 Bruce Reichenbach agrees with him, noting that the conception of a
causeless, potential being is empty.254
In some sense it is at least conceivable that married bachelors or square circles
exist, but this conception cannot be a substitute for the actual reality of such things. Can
square circles actually exist? Atheists need to answer these questions successfully.
Though it may be possible to psychologically conceive of an uncaused potential existent,
it remains metaphysically impossible for potential beings to exist without a cause. Norris
Clarke contends that in order for beings to be potential and actual, they would have to
exist and not exist in the same time in the same sense. Of course, this is impossible. 255
Stephen Davis argues that it may be possible in the Thomist argument for potential
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beings to exist forever in the past (and into the future), but this would not mean that an
actual being (without potential) is not ultimately responsible for currently causing them to
exist.256
Aquinas himself addresses this criticism when he describes the nature of potential
beings. Whatever changes from a state of potential for the change in question to the new
state in which it becomes must have an external cause that precedes it in being (not in
temporal succession). All potential beings have act (existence) and potential (essence).
Existence as such is unlimited. If potential beings did not have act and potency, then they
would have to be annihilated and then recreated from nothing, which would be
impossible without a cause. No potential in limited, potential beings can actualize itself
any more than the potential for cotton to become a t-shirt can actualize itself into that tshirt without an external cause. An actual existent with no potential does not have
limited qualities, for it has no potential for anything. If it had potential for something,
then it would be, by definition, limited. Thus a potential being must be caused by
another.

The Causal Principle is an Illusion
The next criticism is a recurring atheist criticism. Although Michael Martin
accepts the threefold categorization concerning existential causality (i.e., potential beings
are either caused by another, uncaused, or self-caused), he quickly adds that the principle
might be an illusion: ―One can look upon the causal principle not as metaphysical truth to
be believed but as a principle of inquiry that is useful to follow. On this view, if we act
as if the principle is true whether we believe in it or not, then if there is a cause to be
256
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discovered we have a chance of discovering it. On the other hand, if we do not so act, we
stand no chance.‖257 He thus insists that the principal is assumed—and so must be
rejected until proven otherwise.
Yet Thomas‘ argument is not based on empirical observation, but on metaphysical
necessity. 258 Causality is not based on conceptual (or definitional) necessity as in the
Leibnizian cosmological argument, which is based on the principle of sufficient reason,
but is based on the undeniable existential insight that nothing cannot bring something into
existence without a cause.259 As atheist philosopher J.J.C. Smart rightly acknowledges,
the Humean critique of causality has no relevance to the Thomist argument. 260 Nonbeing has no potential for anything. Out of nothing, nothing comes. If a potential being
exists, then it must be caused to exist by another. The only kind of being that is not
caused by another is an uncaused being. Since an actual being is not the same thing as a
potential being, the latter must have a cause.
Some atheists do not dispute the Thomistic approach of existential causality. No
less a critic of theism than Graham Oppy says: ―it seems quite uncontroversial to accept
that some things have causes.‖261 Despite J.L. Mackie‘s other misgivings, he agrees that
the principal of existential causality ―has some plausibility, in that it is constantly
confirmed in our experience (and also used, reasonably, in interpreting our
257
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experience).‖262 Conversely, it might be argued that if the causal premise were not true,
then we would expect to see objects pop into existence from nothing and then vanish
back to nothing without a cause.263
Still others maintain that Thomists need to explain how the purely actual being
causes potential beings, not merely assert that the former is causally responsible for
them.264 Since we cannot grasp what an actual being (i.e., an actual existent without
potential) is, but only what it is not, we must admit that we cannot know how it might
cause/preserve potential being. However, there is something right and wrong about this
objection. We know that the cause has certain attributes, but we cannot comprehend how
he exists, let alone how it actualizes potential beings. Yet we know that this must be the
case.
How does created reality remain in existence through the power of pure act?
Such a question seems impossible to answer in any comprehensible manner. We can
apprehend the change in causality, but not comprehend it. Because the preservation of
created realities is a spaceless and timeless act, the actual being‘s relation with the world
is utterly unique. Thus we are unable to think of any adequate analogies by which to
suggest how it sustains potential being. If the sustainable universe is the result of the
Actualizer‘s continuously free decision, then his act cannot be subject to the same kind of
determinacy that potential beings are subject to. The asymmetric character of the relation
between the Actualizer and potential being simply cannot be emphasized enough.

Potential Beings Can Come From Nothing
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Some atheists have argued that potential beings can pop into being from nothing
without a cause.265 Michael Martin urges that scientific notions might account for this
phenomenon:266 ―The supposition that . . . that there could not be something brought into
existence by nothing is by no means self-evident. At least, given the biblical authority of
the book of Genesis, where God created the world out of nothing, it should not have
seemed so to Aquinas. For if God could create the world out of nothing, one might
suppose that something could be spontaneously generated out of nothing without God‘s
help.‖267 One way to think of something coming from nothing is by understanding the
role of quantum mechanics.268 Although these criticisms are often directed against the
Kalām argument, they are sometimes cast against the Thomist version as well.
However, the sub-atomic world is not equivalent to nothing, but is something—a
vibrant field of sub-atomic energy. Moreover, Martin‘s suggestion that God creates ―by
nothing‖‘ is multiply confused. The phrase ―creation out of nothing‖ is not meant to
convey that something can be created by nothing, but that something can be created after
nothing. After nothing, a state of something exists. Things can be created (i.e.,
preserved) out of nothing, which is reliant on an efficient cause, but not by nothing.
Creation out of nothing simply denotes a movement of a state of nothingness to a state of
something. It does not imply that nothing is a state of existence out of which God creates
(de nihilo ipso); God does not start things off (or keeps things in existence) by
manipulating a peculiar kind of stuff known as ―nothing.‖
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Moreover, the ―something‖ at the quantum field level is operated by some kind of
regulative law. Even if all possiblities can be realized in a chance world, there would
have to be some deeper law under which quantum particles can fluctuate or further
actualize themselves. At this level we are doing metaphysics, however, not science.
Physicists, moreover, have typically used the word ―nothing‖ in a variety of ways.
Sometimes the word is used in the sense of non-being. When they speak about ―nothing‖
in this sense, then they pour the same meaning into the word that Thomists do.
Absolute nothingness has no potential for anything, let alone for some-thing. Nothing is not some-thing. To argue that something can remain into existence from nothing
without a cause requires a denial of the law of non-contradiction (A cannot be A and nonA at the same time and in the same relationship). For something to come from nothing it
must precede and then create itself. But this is logically impossible. In order for
something to come from nothing without a cause, the potential being would have to exist
before it exists. But this is clearly impossible; there must be a cause.

“Chance” Explains the Second Premise
Still other atheists claim the causal premise is dubious because there are ―chancy
processes‖269 at work. Chance can refer to an event which is incapable of being
predicted by persons in advance. Events of this sort are due to ignorance of all causal
factors involved. A tsunami that kills millions of people might seem like a chance event
to innocent bystanders, but if scientists had all the relevant knowledge required to predict
its occurrence, then we would indeed be able to save lives before the tragedy happens. A
second meaning of chance stems from the intersecting lines of different causal chains.
269
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Sometimes when two forces collide an unforeseen consequence occurs and we call it a
chance event. This is precisely what happens in natural selection. Third, we can also
speak of chance in quantum physics. At this level, scientists speak in cautious terms,
usually in terms of probabilities rather than strict cause-effect relations.
None of these of these examples overthrow the truth of existential causality. In
each case there are antecedent causes needed for an effect. Some take chance as that
which happens spontaneously without a cause, but it is impossible to ascribe chance with
a power to do anything. There is simply no such thing as a chance cause. ―Chance‖ is
merely a word to cover up our ignorance. 270 To say otherwise is to invoke magic. Even
in the case of quantum indeterminacy, a cause is still at work. As R.J. Russell avers: ―We
speak of this kind of chance when we do not know, or prefer to ignore, the underlying
causal factors—while believing they are there in principle. We could in principle give a
complete causal—i.e., deterministic—description of natural processes from the cells to
galaxies; we chose a statistical description merely out of convenience.‖271 Indeed, these
scientific disputations simply have no bearing on Aquinas‘ natural theology.

Thomistic Natural Theology is Based on Outdated (Medieval) Science
Some Thomists have been accused of presupposing an antiquated scientific view
of the world. As Anthony Kenny memorably said, Aquinas‘ arguments depend on his
false medieval view of the world.272 As such, Aquinas‘ arguments cannot be trusted
because of this obvious flaw. Others have assumed the same stance as Kenny. Mortimer
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Adler explained that the soundness of Thomist arguments depends on Aquinas‘ faulty
medievalism. 273 Of course, Mackie picked up on this line of criticism and also claimed
that the argument rests on a false scientific view of the world.274 For him this explains
why the argument is not of interest to theologians anymore.
Many Thomists contend that such disputations are irrelevant to Aquinas‘
argument. Robert Koons argues that no scientific paradigm―that is, the indeterminism
of the wave collapse, the Bell inequality theorems, or other features of quantum
mechanics―can serve to undercut the causal principle of most cosmological
arguments.275 According to Brian Davies, Thomas‘ argument is a metaphysical
argument, not a scientific one.276 For him the success of the argument does not depend
on any scientific picture of the world. 277 William Rowe, who has been a critic of theism
for years, agrees with Davies about the science issue.278 Fogelin responds directly to
Kenny and argues that until arguments are presented (and not assertions), Aquinas‘
arguments can continue to be endorsed.279
The science only applies in the case of Aquinas‘ use of illustrations, not in the
arguments per se. Science does not determine the truth of the premises, and Aquinas was
well aware of this. Thus the ―argument from bad science‖ can now be laid to rest; for it
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does not understand the point of Aquinas‘ argument. The use of erroneous scientific
illustrations simply does not detract from what is first and foremost a metaphysical
argument. As Antony Flew himself once said: ―Once it is appreciated, with some
difficulty, that none of this is even supposed to apply to causes in the ordinary temporal
succession it will become clear that this argument . . . is safely beyond the reach of
science.‖280 Indeed, the idea that the Thomist argument is based on an outdated scientific
picture of the world seems to smacks of a soft ad hominum attack on theists.

Issues Related to Infinite Regresses
B.C. Johnson offers a criticism of the third premise: ―Compare a row of dominoes
endlessly long . . . which has always been toppling a domino at a time. One could ask
what began the dominoes‘ movement in the first place. But this is just to assume that
there was a first place.‖281 Thus atheists argue that theists assume the first member of the
causal series.
However, the argument does not depend on a question begging argument in
support of limited regresses. Aquinas‘ allows for the possibility of an infinite regress in
the temporal sense of becoming, but this would not become an excuse to ask about why
the series itself exists. In this way, says Brian Davies, objectors miss the point of the
argument.282 There can be no chain of intermediary causes in between the ultimate
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causer and potential beings. Hence, it is unnecessary to claim that theists beg the
question in support of a finite regress.
More atheists would rather argue for the possibility of an infinite regress.283
Mackie uses an illustration where an infinite regress would be possible: endless motion
around a circle.284
Now, this illustration might give insight into the nature of what an infinite
regresses actually is, but it is no substitute for philosophical argument. The circle must
have already been drawn or created within a contingent universe to begin with. So it does
not help the atheist to posit these illustrations when they are dis-analogous to the
metaphysical problem at hand.
Hence pseudo-examples of infinities can at most count as a potential infinite, not
an actual infinity in the hierarchical structure of the real, concrete world. Some antitheists respond: mathematics is known to have actual infinities. Two distinctions need to
be made in response to this challenge. First, there is a difference between mathematical
and concrete infinities. The former is theoretical and has no place in the real, concrete
world; but actual infinities cannot exist in the real world. Second, there is a difference
between actual infinities and potential infinities. Potential infinities are always reaching
toward actual infinity, but never able to actually reach it. An actually infinite existence
cannot be added to or subtracted from.
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No matter which way potential beings come in and out of existence, the series
must come to a stop in the here-and-now.285 Thomas refers to essentially ordered causes
of potential beings, not change as such. The only kind of being that can keep the series of
hierarchical, concurrent causes going is a purely actual being that has no potential for
change and, by extension, for nonexistence. Since each member of the series is caused to
be, the entire series must have a cause. It is in the very nature of the case that if all of the
members in the series are caused, then each one of them needs to be caused. 286 However,
Aquinas allows for the possibility of per accidens infinite regresses, not a causal series
per se.287 All potential beings are caused beings by nature; but they are not causing
beings. Because their own existence is received by another, they have no existence to
give to another. Thus the need for a first cause follows from the fact that each member in
the series, composed by definition of potency and act, has no causal power. Extending
the series backward in the here-and-now would not alter the fact that an uncaused cause
is needed to preserve each of them in existence. We need to be careful about what kind
of series is being exploited.
―In all our experience,‖ Everitt concedes, ―chains are always of finite length, and
if they are suspended vertically, they are always supported by something that is not itself
a chain or another link in a chain. A chain might be hanging from a nail in the wall, it
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might be held aloft by a person, and so on.‖288 Whereas common sense leads one to
accept a limited amount of potential beings, infinite regresses are counterintuitive. Until
atheists can argue for the infinite regress (and not merely provide an psychologically
based illustrations), then it does not seem that the infinite regress should be accepted. For
them the infinite series is, counterintuitively speaking, a ―brute fact.‖289

The Universe is the First Actualizer
Still other atheists argue that even if certain beings are potential, the fundamental
elements of the universe are necessary. ―For all we know,‖ says Johnson, ―the ultimate
sub-atomic particles which compose the universe just exist, being dependent on
nothing.‖290
Notice that there is no denial of a first uncaused actualizer in his claim. In fact it
is endorsed by Johnson. As Douglas Krueger rightly points out, Aquinas‘ argument leads
one to accept that a first actualizer exists (though he believes that the first actualizer is the
universe). 291 More importantly, the first cause exists outside the sphere of potential
beings; it alone is responsible for the here-and-now existence of potential beings.
Therefore the first actualizer is not another potential being. While accepting each of the
previous premises, they conclude that the actual being is the universe itself. To be
shown in the second part of the conclusion of the argument, the attributes of the first
actualizer resemble God more than physical reality.
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Other atheists, such as Wallace Matson,292 Peter Angeles,293 and Robin Le
Poidevin, 294 argue differently. For them a cause only applies within the sphere of time
and space. They argue: if ‗God‘ is considered the cause of all potential beings, then he
must be another spatiotemporal existent. And if this is what the Thomist argument
amounts to, then obviously God is no different than any potential being within the
universe. Despite the commonsense appeal of Aquinas, Everitt evades the problem and
concludes that deeper reality is unknowable: ―Our background expectations about the
nature of physical chains of links are therefore very different from our background
assumptions about causes in general, and we cannot assume that what seems obvious
with the former will also apply to the latter.‖295
But these objections do not amount to much; for they do not apply to Aquinas‘
natural theology. As Robert Koons states, the premises and the conclusion use the
concept of cause within the time-space continuum, but at the conclusion they are negated.
Because an actually infinite amount of essentially hierarchical, sustaining causes is
impossible, we have no choice but to resort to a cause that is itself uncaused. Otherwise
we are left with another limited being. Or, we are left with every potential thing coming
into existence from nothing sans a cause.

What Caused God?
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Richard Dawkins holds that Aquinas ―makes the entirely unwarranted assumption
that God himself is immune to the regress.‖296
But the never-ending question of asking ―who or what caused God?‖ is surely
guided by either the atheist‘s refusal to accept the impossibility of an infinite regress or
because of a false understanding of existential causality. Unlike the Leibnizian principle
of sufficient reason, the causal principle of Aquinas is not that ―everything must have a
cause.‖ Rather, every potential being must have a cause (or, every finite, limited,
changing being must have a cause). As Angeles rightly said: ―If God is eternal, then He
is uncaused. It would be silly then to ask ‗What caused God‘?‖297
What is more, the question ―Who made God?‖ commits what might be called the
―category fallacy.‖ It eliminates from the outset any possibility that the ultimate
explanation of potential beings might be an actual being, or a theistic God. It is like
asking ―who caused the being who is, by definition, uncaused?‖ As a result, Thomistic
theists have not given much attention to this objection.

Premise Three Commits the Compositional Fallacy
Peter Angeles298 and Michael Martin have argued that although a finite, changing
being might need a cause, it would be fallacious to then argue that all potential taken as a
whole would need a cause: ―the argument seems to commit the fallacy of composition.
Just because each thing is capable of not existing, it is not obvious that the totality would
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be capable of not existing.‖299 Thus they charge Thomistic theists with committing the
fallacy of composition. Just because each potential being is caused, they say, it would
not follow that all of them together would need a cause. 300 In this fallacy one illicitly
argues that each part will also apply to the collection of the whole.
The compositional fallacy is an informal fallacy. That means that the fallacy does
not always apply in every scenario. Sometimes square tiles will not always make a
square shaped floor. Sometimes it will be rectangular instead. But sometimes each of
the tiles will be a large square shaped floor. Hence, the fallacy needs to be considered on
a case-by-case basis.301 Atheists allege that when Thomists argue that since every
potential existent is caused, therefore the universe is caused, they are committing this
fallacy.
Now Thomists might say that although many potential objects exist, this remains
irrelevant to the success of the argument. The existence of one potential being is
sufficient condition for demonstrating the existence of God (regardless if there are other
potential beings or not). So long as one accepts Aquinas‘ essence-existence distinction,
then one does not need to entertain the atheists‘ allegations about the compositional
fallacy. Perhaps the discussion at this point should turn to the legitimacy of the essenceexistence distinction instead. Against George Smith, 302 John Haldane points out that
because Thomas‘ arguments are not concerned about temporal succession (meaning that
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Aquinas is not so concerned to show that if we had enough time, all potential beings
would eventually disappear). Time only functions within the greater context of
contingency. 303
Aquinas is not so much concerned with arguing for the cause of the entire whole
in the sense of becoming, but for the cause of any potential being. 304 He is not saying
that because one potential being exists, the whole universe must be potential. The point
is that as long as there is one potential being, then there must be a unique being whose
essence is to exist. The aggregate collection of potential beings does not leave the critic
with saying Thomas commits the compositional fallacy, and it also misses the thrust of
the argument altogether.

Premise Four Commits the Quantifier Shift Fallacy
Antony Flew once said that the quantifier shift fallacy ―is committed more than
once in the Five Ways.‖305 His reasoning is as follows. The second premise holds that
potential beings are preserved/caused by another. But the conclusion says that there is a
First Cause of potential beings. The quantifier shift fallacy says that going from things
being caused to a cause of things is fallacious. Just because each potential being has a
cause, it does not follow that there is a single cause of all potential beings.
Several things have been said in response to this criticism. When the Five Ways
are understood within the underlying existence-essence distinction, the unity of the cause
inevitably follows. The first actualizer cannot be limited by potentiality. If it was limited
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by potentiality, then it would need a cause too. For every existent that is limited by
potentiality is, by definition, caused by another.
Second, Thomas' argument does not suggest that each thing has a cause in the
same exact way. Taking the cause in one sense, Thomas is not actually arguing for the
conclusion in the same exact sense of the second premise. Once the conclusion is
reached, the attributes are discovered through a different form of argument: negation.
Thus the term ―cause‖ does not necessarily mean finite or infinite cause. It means a
necessary and sufficient condition needed for the existence of potential existents. Thus
there is no equivocation in the term ―cause‖ in the premises and in the conclusion. The
conclusion is a necessary inference given the nature of the argument. The via negativa
does not leave us with absolute nothingness. The first actualizer is demanded given the
nature of what a potential being is.

Not Enough Attributes of the First Actualizer to Consider it “God”
Atheists have argued that even if theologians could prove a first actual being, this
would not mean it is God.306 Atheists insist that unless most or all or most the divine
attributes can be demonstrated, then the first actualizer cannot be equated with a theistic
God.
In response to this challenge, Thomists have relied on the distinction between the
formal and material objects of knowledge. Persons can recognize the same object in
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different formal respects. The philosopher‘s God is the same God as the God worshipped
by Christians, but the philosopher‘s God cannot be known as the God of Christianity
until she begins to have faith in Christ. Philosophy can only bring one to accept some
(or even most) of the attributes of God.
Notwithstanding the familiar distinction between faith and reason, many attributes
flow directly from Aquinas‘ argument. The attributes come cascading down one after
another once a being of pure act is shown to exist. Since existence as such is unlimited
unless conjoined with a limiting essence, then a being whose essence is existence will
exemplify all perfections infinitely. God will be infinite in his goodness, knowledge and
power, as well as other attributes.
Once the essence of the argument is understood, the final conclusion can be
extended by additional arguments to demonstrate that it must be one, simple, immaterial,
immutable, omnipotent, etc. Shepherd concludes that a ―Cosmic-Explaining-Being‖307 is
the cause of Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments. By extension he demonstrates that by
definition it must have additional properties: perfection, creator, sustainer, etc. If the first
cause‘s essence is to exist, then it contains all the perfections that there can be. As
Thomas goes on to say very soon after the Five Ways, ―All perfections existing in
creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly.‖308
George Smith retorts: ―the concept of causality makes sense only within the
context of the natural universe, and to demand a cause of the universe is nonsensical.‖309
In one sense Smith is right: the first actual being lies outside the purview sense
experience. When one examines the nature of the first actualizer, it is evident that the
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physical universe does not match that description (for some of the attributes include
infinity, eternality, and omnipotence, which would imply immateriality).
Sobel claims that although finite, limited beings would need a cause, it would be a
mistake to infer that their intermediate causes would again needs a cause. For an
intermediate cause would be beyond the realm of sensible experience. 310 Since Aquinas‘
argument draws on sense experience, Sobel charges him with committing the ―post hoc
fallacy.‖ Though on the level of experience it can be difficult to pinpoint what is doing
the causing, this would not mean that potential beings can continue in existence without a
first actualizing cause. By no means is Sobel‘s argument a refutation of existential
causality; rather, it is concerned with knowing positively the nature of the cause. As
Keith Ward recognizes, ―we cannot rule out the existence of causal influences that are
undetectable by us, and which may be non-computable. We can never be sure that we
have specified all causally relevant properties exhaustively.‖311 Sobel is not saying there
is no cause. He is merely exploiting the fact that we cannot know the nature of the
―intermediate cause.‖
Again, there is something right and wrong about Sobel‘s contention. In the De
Ente argument, there are no intermediate potential beings that serve as causes. If a
potential being exists, then an actual being exists. It is working in and through each
potential being in an essentially ordered series (not an accidental series) of causes. In the
absence of such a being, there could be no potential beings. When we try to understand
the nature of the actual existent, then we realize that human language can only make valid
predications of its essence, not express it fully.
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Other atheists maintain that the universe should be considered the first actualizer
because that would be a simpler explanation than invoking God to explain it. As Krueger
puts it: ―This explanation is simpler than the explanation that god and the universe exist.
The simpler view is more likely to be true than its rival since the ―universe only‖ model
assumes less than the other model.‖312 Whenever it is possible we should use the
principle of parsimony to get rid of unnecessary explanations. Otherwise we would be
left with a more difficult phenomenon to explain, one that begs for explanation: potential
beings which cannot be explained by an infinite regress of causes. In point of fact, God
and the universe is the simplest answer to the phenomena under scrutiny.

The First Actualizer Has Contradictory Attributes
Other atheists argue that the divine attributes are incompatible with one another:
―The most telling objection that can be lodged against the cosmological argument is that
it is impossible for such a being to exist, thereby showing that this argument‘s conclusion
is necessarily false.‖313 Many atheists have argued in this way to show that no matter
how compelling Aquinas‘ argument might seem to be, its conclusion cannot be true. 314
The properties of the first actualizer are contradictory to one another. Until the theist can
provide an internally consistent definition of God, ―the concept is rightly considered
incoherent and explanatorily impotent.‖315 The very concept of a purely actual being is
either self-contradictory or meaningless. 316
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But this objection is fallacious for a variety of reasons. 317 On the face of it, there
is nothing logically contradictory with the existence of an actual being. Since we know
what a potential being is, we can just as easily conceptualize a non-potential being. We
know what an actual being is not. Necessity denotes that it is not dependent on anything
else for its existence; immutability is another way of saying that it does not change. All
the attributes stem from experiencing the nature of the world and drawing conclusions
based upon what is entailed from that nature. Knowledge of God is derived from
negating what is already known about potential beings. The negative terms used to speak
about God does not mean that we are left with nothing. Positive information about God
is derived from applying the principle of causality. He is a being because all potential
beings depend on him for their existence. He is pure actuality because he is the first
cause of lesser actualities. We can prove that pure act exists, but we will never be able to
grasp what he is.
Although many distinct characteristics are being attributed to God‘s nature, they
are only being said of one being whose essence is to exist. He is one being, but many
things are being said about him. All of the attributes are referring to the same being.
There is only being about which these attributes can be mentioned.

There Might Be Many First Actualizers
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But what if there are many actual beings, each of which is uncaused? 318
However, even if the argument is granted, it would not be a favorable conclusion for
atheism. Surely the atheist does not want many Gods! Nonetheless, Thomists have
always had the resources to combat this problem. 319 There cannot be two or more actual
beings (an actual being which is simple, good, eternal, infinite, immutable, and
omnipotent). As Norris Clarke said: ―This is a quick and easy step, admitted by just
about all metaphysicians, I believe, once the existence of an absolutely infinite being is
granted.‖320
If there were more than one actual, unlimited being, then there would have to be
something that distinguishes the one from the others. But there is no way for an infinite
being to differ from another infinite being unless there is some potential for
differentiation inherent in each of them. In order to distinguish between two beings, there
must be something that is different about them. Otherwise, one could never differentiate
between them to identify either of them. But actual being has not limitations. Because
an actual being has no potential for differentiation, there can only be one of them.

The New Atheism and the Arguments of Aquinas
The release of several major books on atheism has put the God question on the
front lines of current cultural conversation. This movement is commonly known as the
―New Atheism.‖ Unfortunately these critics have failed to interact in any significant way
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with Aquinas‘ natural theology. 321 Richard Dawkins is the only one who entertains
Aquinas‘ arguments.322 Sometimes the lack of dialogue with the most formidable
arguments for God‘s existence can give innocent bystanders the impression that God‘s
nonexistence is ‗more probable than not‘ or even proven. Worse, Aquinas is rarely
mentioned by the New Atheists, and this might suggest that he is irrelevant. Some
Thomists have written published responses to Dawkins‘ case, but they have yet to be
seriously considered by any of the New Atheists. 323

Interlude
While most of the attention surrounding Vatican I is dedicated to papal primacy
and infallibility, many Catholic theologians forget about the vital statements pronounced
in the Constitution on faith and reason. Most Catholic theologians and philosophers
vigorously defended the Council‘s teaching well into the middle of the twentieth century.
But almost immediately after the Second Vatican Council, theologians began to neglect
it, and, in some cases, argued that it was irrelevant or even problematic for faith. As
Hans Küng observed: ―Against the exaggerations of a natural theology that assumes that
it is possible to prove by pure reason the existence of God and even the attributes of his
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nature, objections have increased enormously.‖324 Not only did many theologians
depreciate the conciliar teaching on faith and reason, but many atheists continue to
challenge it. However, such a view cannot be squared with the teaching of Vatican II.
The most salient contemporary atheistic critiques of Aquinas‘ natural theology
were presented and briefly discussed in this chapter. Theologians now might gain a
comprehensive understanding of the recent trends in atheist criticism. It will also help
theists understand how Thomistic theologians have responded back to them in a
postconciliar church in the relevant literature. Neither side of the debate shows any signs
of weariness, but Thomists continue to have the philosophical capital that is needed to
answer these criticisms and show the inherent weaknesses in atheistic critiques of
Aquinas‘s arguments for God. With a solid argument being made in favor of a theistic
God existing, we should ask whether this God is likely to communicate with the human
race in a special way. For example, Christianity claims that God has revealed himself in
the person of Jesus. Islam claims that Muhammad received a special message from the
angel Gabriel. These conclusions will establish a philosophical framework for the
evidentalist approach in the next chapter.

Why God is Likely to Communicate With the Human Race
All three monotheistic religions teach that God's existence can be known through
the natural light of human reason (Psalm 19:1; Rom. 1:18–20; Sura 17:44). Whether this
bland understanding of God is accessible to persons by an internal intuition or by
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philosophical reasoning is insignificant to the Scriptural writers. They do appeal to
reasoning at least of a common sense kind that is accessible to all persons.
Statistics indicate that the majority of the world's population, whether they are
religious or not, believe in some sort of God. Atheism has never been a popular world
and life view. Although most of the world's religions tend toward monotheism, their
understanding of God is formulated in different ways.
The deist conception of the natural knowledge of God remains unstable (deists
hold that God exists, but that he remains aloof from the world, unable or unwilling to
disclose himself to humanity). Theists, on the other hand, maintain that a transcendent
God exists, but that he is active, purposive, and caring for the human race. In this view,
God seeks communion with human beings. It is easy to see why deists typically deny the
possibility of miracles. Considering that they emphasize that a perfect God will
necessarily create a perfect universe, there would be no subsequent need for this kind of
God to ―interfere‖ or ―tune it up‖ again by performing a miracle on behalf of the creature.
A perfectly created universe ought to run on its own steam without any form of divinehuman communication. But this seems contrary to some deists‘ belief that God is
personal. The idea that a personal God would want to communicate with humanity
seems not only possible, but likely with this premise in mind. What personal being would
not want to respond to other persons who are in need of personal attention?
For some deists to argue that God would not want to communicate with the
human race because creation must have been perfectly created seems to diminish the
perfect nature of the Deity – not enhance it. If a perfect, personal God had enough reason
and love to create humanity in the first place, then it seems that he would want to address
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and help persons with their most vexing problems. As Avery Cardinal Dulles states, ―If
God were so cold and detached, it is impossible to conceive why He would have made
the world in the first place.‖ 325 God would try to help those persons that he is responsible
for creating to help them become good. Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne notes,
―Good people seek to share what they have with others and to cooperate with others in all
these activities. Good people forgive those who make reparation and ask for forgiveness.
But also, … good people may sometimes to a limited extent and for a limited period
allow those for whom they are responsible to suffer … if only by so doing can some good
purpose be achieved.‖326 The Dionysian principle still rings true: a good person does not
remain enclosed within him or herself, but diffuses her goodness outward for the
betterment of others.
Some of the deepest questions that most, if not all, persons ask during their lives
include the following: where have we come from (origins)?; why do we suffer?; what
makes life worth living (questions about meaning or purpose)?; what is right and wrong
(morality)?; who are we (identity)?; and what awaits us at death (destiny)? 327 These
common questions stem from our natural inclinations. Thomistic natural law theorists
propose at least five natural inclinations which are common to all normally functioning
persons: the inclination to the good; the inclination to preserve life, including sexual
union and the rearing of offspring, the inclination to have knowledge of the truth, and to
live in society. 328
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Therefore it makes sense that a perfectly good and personal God would want
persons to have insight into the nature of the answers to these questions. A theistic God
will intervene in human history (and not disclose himself to impersonal creatures) to not
only identify with his personal creations, but to show them that they have intrinsic dignity
(for God acts in history for their own sake) and that he cares about them. God will
probably concern himself with giving personal creatures some theoretical answers and
practical solutions to questions like these in order to make life more bearable. Although
the common person on the street can know that God exists, it makes good sense to
suppose that God will bring this vague knowledge of his existence to an even greater
fulfillment by revealing himself more clearly to persons.
The existence of so many theologies and ways of speaking about God in the
world's great religions strongly suggests that humans are not content with knowing that
God exists, but that they have a longing to know God in the best way that they can. The
fact of so many theologies in so many of the world's religions strongly attests to this
point. Humans ceaselessly search for answers to their problems in the light of the divine.
Seen within this light, it seems cruel that God would refrain from providing some sort of
human fulfillment that goes beyond the bland knowledge of his existence. Real needs can
probably be satisfied. If there is a real need for food, then food probably exists. If there is
a real need for camaraderie, then friendship can be attained. The same principle holds
true about human needs with respect to ultimate concerns.
In conclusion, the existence and nature of God and the human race provides us
with compelling reasons to hope for at least one divine disclosure at one point in human
history. Human action requires some sort of architectonic principle that has the capability
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of specifically organizing human life around it. As Charles Morerod explains: ―As it is
impossible to build a house if all workers just keep moving without any global purpose, it
is impossible to live a somehow efficient life without a main organizing principle.‖ 329
God created us with these desires to begin with. Says Morerod: ―To know the
final end matters supremely for all human actions. As long as we do not know it, we can
make different kinds of mistakes, that is, substitute the final end with partial ends (a kind
of idolatry), or choose the wrong means to reach the final end, or simply refuse God to be
our final end.‖330 A divine revelation will be able to help persons to focus on their final
end in order to help them live life in the way it was meant to be lived. Although it is not
necessary for God to reveal himself to humanity, there are nevertheless good reasons to
think he would do such a thing in light of his nature, along with some of the intrinsic
needs of humanity.

The Number and Mode of Revelation(s)
I will now address some additional questions that are much more tedious than
what was said in the last section. The questions that will guide this section will be the
following: How many revelations should we expect from a theistic God? What form will
this revelation take? What is the time and place it will occur? These questions must be
answered before we embark on the evidential apologetics component of the dissertation.
If human persons are to develop their characters (which seems like a good thing
for all persons to do), then they will need a certain amount of epistemic distance between
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themselves and God.331 If God were to make his presence immediately known to all
persons at once, then in all likelihood persons would not learn to perform good actions
because of their inherent goodness. In this respect, God stands back from human affairs
in order for us to develop character in ourselves and in others. The Creator gives us a
significant amount of responsibility so that we will learn how to exercise our freedom in
the proper way.
Like any good parent, one of the greatest tactics in parenting is to stand back and
let the child learn what it means to be responsible for their actions (and to be responsible
for others). On the face of it, this notion makes the likelihood of many divine revelations
unlikely. Many revelations will not necessarily make persons flourish and become the
persons they were meant to be. As in the case of any loving, personal caregiver, God will
give persons what they need, not an excessive amount of guidance that will probably
prevent persons from learning what it means to develop a good character. Too much
divine interference could make us too dependent on these disclosures and less concerned
with the good things in life for goodness sake.
Many revelations would deprive persons of the responsibility to tell others about
the answers and solutions that would be given by few revelations. Given the
communitarian nature of humanity, we can safely assume that if someone receives the
revelatory message that God has given to them that they will want others to know and
accept it (for it is good that humans should build one another up with the truth that was
given to them from God). Numerous amounts of revelations would prevent persons from
fostering human relationships because there would be no need for persons to tell one
331
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another about them. A large amount of revelations could impede God's purposes for
renewing humanity. We should expect these revelations to be ―less‖ rather than ―more.‖
Further, the number of revelations should be very few in number if God will
ensure through his general providence that those who learn or believe in his disclosures to
humanity will share these messages with as many people as possible. Because the
strengthening of the communion of persons seems like an inevitable result of the purpose
of God giving a revelation in the first place, it is likely that we should expect very few
revelations if persons have the capability of spreading it effectively to majority of the
human population. Although we could never know how many revelations to expect from
God (after all, some persons might expect a dozen of them, for that seems like a ―small
number‘ to them), we can safely surmise that there will be a direct correlation between
the number of revelations and the intrinsic capabilities of persons to bring this message to
others. If the human race as a collective whole is capable of bringing the message of a
single revelation from God to the majority of the population across the ages of human
civilization, then of course there will be no need for God to provide more than one of
them.
Turning to another concern, we would expect this revelation to meet us on our
grounds so that we can sufficiently understand it. The message will not take the form of a
language or some other communicative means that persons are incapable of learning (or
believing, or what have you). Considering that human persons are made up of body and
soul, we would expect this revelation to meet us in material and spiritual forms. If this
revelation does not manifest itself in or through these forms, then we would have good
reason to question whether it is an adequate enough revelation.
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But what about the time and place of revelation? Here we can say a few things as
well. On the one hand, it seems highly probable that a divine revelation will have to occur
when human persons are able to understand and absorb its contents. So, it will not occur
at an exceedingly early stage in evolutionary history when the human brain is still
undeveloped. On the other hand, it is likely that a revelation will occur at a time and
place that will enable the original witnesses of the revelation to successfully bring the
message out to others. Thus there will have to be an adequate communication system into
the surrounding region where the revelation occurred in order to allow the original
recipients of the revelation to keep the message and its following going. The revelatory
message will be given at a time and place where humans have the capability of
successfully spreading the message to as many people as possible within the short span of
time that the human race will have to live their lives on the earth. A perfect God will
want as many people as possible to hear his answers to their most profound questions and
concerns.
Perhaps there will be a reliable oral and written tradition process in the culture
where the revelation will occur. The transmission of this revelation in either written or
oral forms will be able to satisfy every subsequent generation's questions about it. To
boot, the original recording of the event ought to be able to withstand critical scrutiny by
modern epistemological standards. For example, if the revelation occurred thousands of
years ago in a very obscure part of the world, then we as modern Westerners would
expect to have a convincing amount of evidence for the event that will satisfy the rigors
of modern scientific standards (and other reliable means of attaining knowledge).
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Let us draw some conclusions about the probability of certain types of divine
revelation(s). First, we know that it is likely that a theistic God will disclose himself to
humanity. Second, these revelations will be ―few‖ in number. A miracle is, by definition,
something that does not happen very often. It is possible that there could be only one
revelation, but we simply cannot know for sure how many there will be. God is the only
one who knows whether persons are capable of bringing the message to the majority of
people who will ever live. With this foreknowledge, he determines how many times that
he will provide a message.
Third, they will occur in a form that is conducive to human understanding. Lastly,
a revelation will occur at a time and place that is culturally and technologically conducive
for humans to propagate the message successfully. When I say ―successfully,‖ I also
mean that subsequent generations who are exposed to the message will be intellectually
satisfied by the evidence for the event.
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A TEST CASE IN EVIDENTIAL APOLOGETICS
Many Catholics have been hesitant to affirm and defend the resurrection of Jesus
as an historical event. This hesitation stems, in part, from the abuses of neo-scholastic
resurrection apologetics that prevailed roughly from the middle of the nineteenth century
up to the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). According to these scholars, the neoscholastic approach all too easily interpreted Jesus‘ resurrection as a mere resuscitation or
reanimation of a corpse, not allowing it to be seen as a central mystery of the Christian
faith.332
As a result, many postconciliar theologians have said that the resurrection a
―meta-historical‖ or ―trans-historical‖ occurrence, not an event within history. 333 They
recognize genuine continuity between the earthly body of Jesus and his glorious,
incorruptible body in an other-worldly realm of existence, but this transition should not
be affirmed as historical in any proper sense of that term. 334 This shift away from the
historical understanding of Jesus‘ resurrection may be partly responsible for some writers
simply denying the bodily nature of Jesus‘ resurrection.335
But there are many reasons why the resurrection should not be interpreted as a
sheer meta-historical event, not to say that the appellation itself is self-contradictory. 336
First, this interpretation of the resurrection is difficult to square with Catholic teaching.
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The Catechism of the Catholic Church remarks: ―Christ‘s Resurrection cannot be
interpreted as something outside the physical order, and it is impossible not to
acknowledge it as an historical fact.‖337 Pope John Paul II described the resurrection as,
―in the first place, an historical event. It took place in a precise context of time and
place.‖ He went on to note that ―while the resurrection is an event determined according
to time and place, nevertheless it transcends and stands above history … Christ's
Resurrection is the greatest Event in the history of salvation, and indeed, we can say in
the history of humanity, since it gives definitive meaning to the world. The whole world
revolves around the Cross, but only in the Resurrection does the cross reach its full
significance of salvific Event.‖338 While speaking of the resurrection as transcending
history, it remains an event ―in the history of humanity‖ and is ―an event determined
according to time and space.‖ If more nuanced, the late Pope seems in substantial accord
with the Catechism.
Second, the meta-historical view can hardly claim much precedent in the history
of Jewish and Christian thought. N.T. Wright has shown that the ahistorical view of
Jesus‘ resurrection, which tends to reduce it to exaltation, is the product of modern
theology: ―the idea that there was originally no difference for the earliest Christians
between resurrection and exaltation/ascension is a twentieth century fiction, based on a
misreading of Paul.‖339 Skeptical scholar Peter Carnley agrees with Wright: ―For many
centuries the accepted and, indeed, quite unchallenged way of understanding the
resurrection of Jesus … was to regard it as an historical event …. Regardless of whether
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one relied on an authoritatively-backed, transmitted tradition or a more scientifically
based reconstruction, supported by evidence and rational inference from it, the assertion
that the resurrection of Jesus was an historical event of the past has been offered to men
and women as the distinctive substance of Christian belief.‖340
Furthermore, the meta-historical view involves, in the words of William Lane
Craig, ―a patent misreading of the gospel narratives, not to speak of Jewish texts.‖
Scholars who deny the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, in effect, turn it into ―Jesus‘
translation into heaven on the pattern of Enoch and Elijah, a quite different category than
resurrection of the dead.‖341
Third, even if the corpse of Jesus disappeared into an otherworldly state of
incorruptible existence, this would not mean we should refrain from recognizing a
historical transition. As Craig argues:
Transitional events like stopping, exiting, and dying do not occur at any single spacetime
point. That the sorites paradoxes are, indeed, the culprit here, and not the nature of the
resurrection, is evident from the fact that even if the resurrection were conceived as a
transformation wholly within space and time, one could not specify a single spacetime
point at which it happened. Nevertheless, just as it is perfectly acceptable to say that the
shopper exited the building, say, through the front door rather than the rear entrance, so
Jesus' transformation to his glorified state can be similarly located in the sense that one
can specify the spacetime point at which his corruptible existence ended. So just as the
historian can determine where someone exited a building or when someone died, there is
no in principle objection to the historian's determining where and when Jesus'
resurrection occurred. It would be very much like determining on the basis of testimony
and evidence where and when the children in C.S. Lewis' tale first stepped from this
world into Narnia.342

Thus proponents of the ahistorical view are hard put to escape from an historical
understanding of Jesus‘ resurrection.
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Undoubtedly the newest quest for the historical Jesus has ushered in a strong
wave of apologetic writings defending the historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection. The main
evidence considered usually consists of the post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb,
and the origin of the earliest disciples‘ belief in the Risen Christ, along with earliest
Christians‘ worship practices despite their every predisposition to the contrary. Apologist
Gary Habermas has developed what is called the ―minimal facts approach‖343 to
defending the resurrection. According to him there are twelve widely accepted facts that
have been furnished by the majority of New Testament scholars:
(1) Jesus died due to the rigors of crucifixion and (2) was buried. (3) Jesus‘ death caused
the disciples to despair and lose hope. (4) Although not as frequently recognized, many
scholars hold that Jesus was buried in a tomb that was discovered to be empty just a few
days later.
Critical scholars even agree that (5) at this time the disciples had real experiences
that they believed were literal appearances of the risen Jesus. Because of these
experiences, (6) the disciples were transformed from doubters who were afraid to identify
themselves with Jesus to bold proclaimers of his death and resurrection, even being
willing to die for this belief. (7) This message was central in the early church preaching
and (8) was especially proclaimed in Jerusalem, where Jesus had died shortly before.
As a result of this message, (9) the church was born and grew, (10) with Sunday as
the primary day of worship. (11) James, the brother of Jesus and a skeptic, was
converted to the faith when he also believed he saw the resurrected Jesus. (12) A few
years later Paul the persecutor of Christians was also converted by an experience that he,
similarly, believed to be an appearance of the risen Jesus. 344

Habermas wants scholars to begin with the conclusions set by the scholarly consensus:
―one of my interests is to ascertain if we can detect some widespread directions in the
contemporary discussions—where are most recent scholars heading on these issues? Of
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course, the best way to do this is to comb through the literature and attempt to provide an
accurate assessment.‖345
The consensus is known from the conclusions set by most scholars who study the
subject, including conservative and liberal scholars. He explains how he is able to
determine what counts as the consensus in his article: ―Resurrection Research from 1975
to the Present: What are Critical Scholars Saying?‖ Says Habermas: ―Since 1975, more
than 1400 scholarly publications on the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus have
appeared. Over the last five years, I have tracked these texts, which were written in
German, French, and English. Well over 100 subtopics are addressed in the literature,
almost all of which I have examined in detail.‖346 By cataloguing the major trends in the
field, Habermas wants everyone in the dialogue and/or debate to begin with the same
basic evidence. As indicated by Habermas in his major study, unbelievers and skeptics
of Christianity have taken these reported facts seriously and try to account for them in
purely naturalistic terms.347
Let us turn now to the historical evidence for the resurrection before we assess the
rival explanations of it.

The Honorable Burial and Empty Tomb of Jesus
Many scholars argue for the credibility of the honorable burial of Jesus. As Bart
Ehrman writes: ―What I think we can say with confidence is that Jesus . . . probably was

345

Gary R. Habermas, ―Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What are Critical
Scholars Saying?‖Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, 3.2 (January 2005): 135-153. See also John
M. G. Barclay, ―The Resurrection in Contemporary Biblical Scholarship,‖ in Gavin D‘Costa (ed.),
Resurrection Reconsidered (Oxford: Oneworld, 1996), 13–30.
346
Gary R. Habermas, ―Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What are Critical
Scholars Saying?,‖ 135.
347
See also James Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975), 97.

142

buried.‖348 Nowhere does Ehrman show signs of doubting the burial in his writings.
Closely linked to the burial is the discovery of the empty tomb by a group of Jesus‘
women followers. Ehrman says we have ―solid traditions‖ about the empty tomb, and
that we can have ―some certainty‖ for its reliability.349
Although the Gospels contain widely divergent portraits of Jesus, this would not
mean that the historicity of certain central events reported in them are unreliable. 350 All
four Gospels agree that at least one woman discovered Jesus‘ empty tomb: ―It seems hard
to believe that this just happened by a way of a fluke of storytelling. It seems much more
likely that, at least with the traditions involving the empty tomb, we are dealing with
something actually rooted in history.‖351
These conclusions are consistent with the judgment of many other scholars. 352
Usually cumulative case arguments are employed in support of the burial and/or empty
tomb of Jesus. While each piece of evidence may be individually suggestive, when
combined together the case becomes all the more plausible. Here I will briefly comb
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through the relevant literature to present the most common arguments used in support of
these reported facts.
The first prong of the argument in support of the empty tomb lies in establishing the
burial of Jesus in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea. If one recognizes the burial account,
then the place of Jesus‘s tomb would have been known to Jew and Roman (and probably
the women disciples). By identifying the historicity of the burial, this creates a
conundrum for those who deny the empty tomb because they must answer the question as
to how the disciples preached the resurrection in the city of Jerusalem, the city where
Jesus died and was buried. 353 The enemies of the Christian faith could have easily gone
to the tomb and paraded the body across the streets to subvert the new Christian heresy.
Notice that the case for the burial and empty tomb is just as crude as the historicity of the
crucifixion or the existence of Jesus himself. Nothing is miraculous about these events.
First, the burial is mentioned in the primitive confession of 1 Cor. 15:4, which can
be traced back to within the earliest time after the crucifixion. The passage is written by
Paul to ensure and reinforce that Jesus truly died and was buried. In this verse, we read:
―For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that Christ died for our
sins according to the scriptures, and that he was buried. . .‖ Dale Allison points out that
―The Greek verb [in verse 4] means to ‗bury‘ and would hardly be used of the
unceremonious dumping of a criminal into an unmarked trench as dog food; that was not
burial but its denial.‖354
Second, the burial account was in the source material used by Mark—and is
probably very old. As William Lane Craig comments, ―It is now universally
353
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acknowledged that the burial account was part of that story, which was used as source
material by Mark. There is no break at all between Mark‘s description of Jesus‘ death
(Mark 15:33-41) and his description of Jesus‘ burial (Mark 15:42-47). It is a continuous
narrative, and there is no reason to think that Mark‘s source ended abruptly with Jesus‘
death without telling of His burial. That means that the burial account is very old and
therefore probably historically reliable.‖355
The third evidence for the burial comes from analyzing the role that Joseph of
Arimathea played in the burial account. As Wolfhart Pannenberg states, ―The burial itself
is tied to the name of Joseph of Arimathea. This can hardly have been invented
secondarily, since the entire tradition about Jesus‘ burial hangs on this name.‖356
Fourth, the tomb stories in the Gospels do not show signs of legendary traces and are
written in a straightforward, factual way (Mark 15:42-47; John 19:38-42). All four
Gospels mention the burial story—a significant point given the criteria of multiple
attestation: ―each contains additional traditions presupposing that Jesus was not thrown
onto a pile for criminals but rather interred (Matt. 27:62-66; 28:11-15; Mark 14:8; 16:1-8;
Luke 24:13-35; John 20:1-10, 11-18).‖357
Fifth, considering the different kinds of tombs that archaeologists have furnished us
with, it is evident that Jesus‘s tomb was probably an acrosolia tomb, or what is known as
a ―bench tomb‖ (this tomb is consistent with someone with the status of Joseph of
Arimathea).358
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Sixth, the fact that women saw the burial place where Jesus was laid is highly
probable, confirming the historicity of the burial. ―The crucial point here,‖ says Stephen
Davis, ―is that the Gospels all claim that the location of Jesus‘ tomb was known to the
women and to the disciples (Mark 15:47; Matt. 27:61; Luke 23:55; John 20:1). This claim
is clearly embedded in the burial account of Jesus.‖359 The Jewish New Testament scholar
Pinchas Lapide argues that ―The circumstances that the women wanted to anoint the dead
Jesus shortly after his burial, as Jewish custom demanded, proves that basically none of
the disciples nor the women themselves, . . . expected his resurrection (my emphasis
added).‖360 Therefore it is implausible that Jesus was not buried or that the place of the
tomb was unknown.
Closely linked to the burial account are the traditional arguments for the empty
tomb.
First, the earliest Jewish polemic against the resurrection presupposes that the tomb
was empty, or at least shifted elsewhere (Matt. 28:11-15; John 20:2, 13, 15). As Gerald
O‘Collins has stated, ―We have no early evidence that anyone, either Christian or nonChristian, ever alleged that Jesus‘ tomb still contained his remains.‖361 Thus the earliest
Jewish argument against the resurrection was not whether the tomb was empty, but who
or what emptied it.
Next, the relevant texts mentioning the empty tomb are not apologetical or creative
in scope; they intend on giving historical fact (cf. Mark 16:1-8; John 20:1, 2, 11-18). To
appreciate how sober Mark‘s account is, for example, one ought to read the account of
359
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the resurrection in the Gospel of Peter. This gospel describes Jesus‘ egress from the tomb
with angels accompanying the risen body into the heavens. A talking cross and a voice
from heaven are heard in this magnificent scene. The event is witnessed by the Roman
guard, the Jews and a multitude of other people. Unlike the Gospels, this kind of
description is characteristic of a legendary account.
Moreover, women are seen as the ones who discover the empty tomb. 362 As
illustrated by Lapide: ―in a purely fictional narrative one would have avoided making
women the crown witnesses of the resurrection since they were considered in rabbinic
Judaism as incapable of giving valid testimony (compare Luke 24:11).‖363 Legend
makers do not usually invent positively unhelpful information. Pinchas Lapide seems to
attest to this point: ―nowhere in the most ancient reports is it asserted that the statements
of the women brought anyone to faith in the resurrection.‖364
The wording that Jesus was ‗buried and then raised‘ in 1 Cor. 15 implies the empty
tomb.365 Even though the empty tomb is not explicitly mentioned in the creed, this would
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not mean Paul did not know about it, or that we cannot infer that it was factual. 366
Commenting on these verses, N.T. Wright remarked,
Early Christianity did not consist of a new spirituality or ethic. It consisted of the
announcement of things that had happened, whose significance lay precisely in their
happenedness: specifically, the messiah‘s death, burial, and resurrection. . . The empty
tomb, though not mentioned here, is presupposed. It is we, not the early Christians, who
have made the empty tomb a major focal point of discussion. For Paul the Pharisee,
saying ‗he was raised, leaving an empty tomb‘ would have been tautologous. 367

Raymond Brown concurs with Wright on these passages: ―It is not difficult to understand
why this presupposition of an empty tomb may not have been articulated until later. The
early preachers were not giving continuous accounts of what happened but were
proclaiming the risen Jesus.‖368
Still other scholars proposed different reasons why Paul did not explicitly mention
the empty tomb. Perhaps he was disinclined to mention it because he has up to this point
in the letter been at pains to persuade his readers that he is just as much as an apostle as
James and the others (cf. 1 Cor. 9:1-5). Maybe Paul knew that the Corinthians already
knew about it and did not feel the need to mention it. Maybe it was not as important as
the appearances and/or salvation (cf. 1 Cor. 1:23). It must be remembered that in the
Jewish mindset the empty tomb would have been axiomatic given what was meant by
resurrection. Resurrection in Judaism, to be sure, included one‘s physical body. 369
The notion of ―on the third day‖ in 1 Cor 15. counts as additional evidence for the
empty tomb. 370 As Craig concluded in his excellent article, ―the phrase ‗on the third day‘
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in the formula of 1 Cor. 15 is a time indicator for the events of Easter, including the
empty tomb, employing language of the Old Testament concerning God‘s acts of
deliverance and victory on the third day, perhaps with texts like Jonah 2.11 and Hos 6.2
especially in mind. The phrase is, in Liechtenstein‘s words, a fusion of historical facts
plus theological tradition.‖371 The third day motif is not only found in Paul‘s letters, it
can be found in other places in the New Testament.
In addition, since the gravesite was not venerated by the early Christians, this
connotes that it was empty; for there were no remains to be venerated (cf. Matt. 22:29).372
As James Dunn puts it: ―This is indeed striking, because within contemporary Judaism,
as in other religions, the desire to honour the memory of the revered dead by constructing
appropriate tombs and (by implication) by veneration of the site is well attested.‖373 N.T.
Wright fortifies this point by explaining why the disciples would have venerated the
gravesite: ―The practice is usually thought to reflect a belief in resurrection, in that the
bones of the individual person continued to matter.‖374
Through the criteria of multiple attestation scholars have constructed arguments for
the empty tomb. Each of the Gospels, with indirect references in Acts and 1 Corinthians,
provide an empty tomb scene (Matt. 28:1-8; Mark 16:1-8; Luke 24:1-12; John 20:1-8;
Acts 2:27-29; 1 Cor. 15:4). In each of the Gospels the tomb is vacated and confirmed by
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an angel who says Jesus is not there (cf. Matt. 28:6; Mark 16:6; Luke 24:6; John
20:12).375
Like the case for the burial account, the empty tomb is part of the pre-Markan
Passion story. In this part of Mark we do not see any kerygmatic coloring, prophecy
citations from the Old Testament, and/or use of christological titles. This has led some
scholars into thinking that we are working with very old material. 376
Since the disciples preached the resurrection in Jerusalem, it is difficult to believe
that the tomb, which would have been in an identifiable place, still contained the cadaver
of Jesus. Enemies of Easter faith could have gone to the tomb to prove that Jesus was not
raised. 377 Instead, we see no resistance from the Jews. Apologist Stephen Davis
concludes: ―We can infer, therefore, that the apostles‘ proclamation of the resurrection
was successful precisely because (among other things) nobody was able to produce the
corpse.‖378 In conclusion, the affirmation of the historicity of the burial and empty tomb
are consistent with the cumulative case arguments provided by many scholars. As Hans
Freiherr von Campenhausen concluded: ―If one examines what there is to examine, one
cannot avoid accepting as fact the news of the empty tomb itself and of its early
discovery. There is a great deal that is convincing and definite to be said for it and little
to be said against it; it is, therefore, in all probability, historical.‖ 379
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Another significant piece of historical evidence for the resurrection is the earliest
disciples‘ experience of what they at least thought were appearances of the risen Jesus. 380
These appearances occurred to different individuals, groups, and even enemies of Jesus
and his closest followers: ―some of his disciples claimed to have seen him alive
afterward. Among those who made this claim, interestingly enough, was Jesus‘ own
brother James. . . Paul claims that he himself saw Jesus after his death.‖381 Elsewhere,
Ehrman says: ―There is little doubt, historically, about what converted Paul. He had a
vision of Jesus raised from the dead. That is what he himself says, and it is recorded as
one of the key incidents in the book of Acts.‖382
Paul‘s experience of the risen Jesus was so strong that he sought to convert the
Gentiles to faith in Jesus. Unlike his previous convictions, Paul held that all people were
meant to believe in Jesus. Ehrman continues: ―The vision showed Paul beyond any
reasonable doubt that Jesus—who had been crucified, dead, and buried—had come back
to life. There was only one possible explanation for Jesus coming back to life: God must
have raised him from the dead. And if God raised him form the dead—well, that changed
everything.‖383 Paul‘s visual experience was so significant to him that almost all of his
subsequent theology was centered around the truth of Jesus‘ death and resurrection.384
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Ehrman‘s historical conclusions about the appearances are supported by many
lines of evidence. First, the earliest and most reliable testimony that we have on the
appearances is found in the ancient creed of 1 Cor. 15:3-8.385 Exegetically speaking,
Raymond Brown, Pinchas Lapide and many others have demonstrated that the wording
for ―received‖ and ―passed on‖ in verses 3-5 were technical standard terms for the
handing down of sacred tradition in rabbinic Judaism. 386 Paul is therefore trying to
convince his readers in the most solemn way possible that Jesus appeared to them. 387
Ehrman writes that Paul‘s listing of percipients, coupled with the ―five hundred‖ in verse
6, is written for apologetic purposes. 388 Pannenberg also recognized this point: ―The
appearance to the five hundred brethren at once cannot be a secondary construction to be
explained by the development of the history of traditions, because Paul calls attention
precisely here to the possibility of checking his assertion by saying that most of the five
hundred are still alive.‖389 There is no reason for Paul to mention the 500 unless he
expects his readers to question (challenge) them as witnesses.
An analysis of these passages indicates the extramental, physical nature of the
appearances. 390 Ehrman himself agrees with this assessment. 391 Any neutral observer,
who did not have faith in Jesus, could see an appearance (e.g., Paul, James, etc.).392
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According to Stephen Davis, ―The suggestion that only the eyes of faith could ‗see‘ the
Risen Jesus seems a twentieth century import, quite foreign to New Testament
tradition.‖393 This contention is bolstered by the fact that Jesus appeared to enemies and
perhaps those who were indifferent to him during his earthly life.
The prominence of women also lends credibility to the appearance traditions
(Matt. 28; John 20).394 Because women were regarded as inferior to men at the time, they
were, for all intents and purposes, unable to be counted as legal witnesses. So if these
stories were legendary accounts, then the writer would have made men rather than
women as the original percipients of Jesus risen.
The diverse reporting of the appearances does not give an impression that they
were contrived or wholly fabricated either. As James D.G. Dunn wrote, ―Particularly in
Matthew, Luke, and John 21, there has been no real attempt to provide a sequence or
structured listing. Overall, the impression is given of a number of reported sightings
which occurred on what might otherwise be called a random basis.‖ The writers (esp.
Matthew) make hardly any attempt to pacify the doubts of the original percipients.
Therefore, says Dunn, the appearances were most likely ―part of the original eyewitness
testimony.‖395 Nowhere in the New Testament are the appearances described ―as a
miracle, as an event of salvation, or as a deed of God, a fact which tends to support the
plausibility of the report for the disinterested reader.‖396 Instead they were written with
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the intention of relaying the bald fact that Jesus appeared to them. The appearances, to be
sure, ceased shortly after the crucifixion (John 20:29; 1 Pet. 1:8).
The final line of evidence stems from the multiple sources from which the
appearance traditions originate. All four Gospels give witness to them, even to the ones
found in the Pauline corpus. The appearance to Peter is independently attested to by Paul
and Luke (1 Cor. 15:5; Luke 24:34); the appearance to the Twelve is mentioned by Paul,
Luke, and John (1 Cor. 15:5; Luke 24:36-43; John 20:19, 20); and the appearances to the
disciples in Galilee are mentioned in Mark, Matthew, and John (Mark 16:7; Matt. 28:16,
17; John 21). The Gospels take for granted that there were many different percipients
who saw them at different times and places―and under different circumstances.
To conclude: many scholars (if not a consensus) are convinced that after the
crucifixion the risen Jesus made himself seen to friend and foe alike. 397 In the words of
the critical historian E.P. Sanders: ―That Jesus‘ followers (and later Paul) had resurrection
experiences is, in my judgment, a fact. What the reality was that gave rise to the
experiences I do not know.‖ Says Sanders: ―Finally we know that after his death his
followers experienced what they described as the ‗resurrection‘: the appearance of a
living but transformed person who actually died.‖398 James Dunn adds: ―It is almost
impossible to dispute that at the historical roots of Christianity lie some visionary
397
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experiences of the first Christians, who understood them as appearances of Jesus, raised
by God from the dead.‖399

The Origins of Easter Faith
But the empty tomb and appearances are not all we have. As a result of these
visual experiences, Ehrman writes that ―Historians, of course, have no difficulty speaking
about belief in Jesus‘ resurrection, since this is a matter of public record. It is a historical
fact that some of Jesus‘ followers came to believe that he had been raised from the dead
soon after his execution. We know some of these believers by name; one of them, the
apostle Paul, claims to have seen him alive after his death.‖400 Notice that no other view
of the afterlife is affirmed and defended by the earliest Christians. So strong was their
belief in the resurrected Jesus that they proclaimed him as the ―Son of God,‖ the ―Jewish
Messiah,‖ and ―Lord of All.‖401 Moreover, without these beliefs, ―the religious
movement [Jesus] started would have died with him. There never would have been a
Christianity.‖402 Unlike Second Temple Judaism, the resurrection was at the front and
center of the newly formed faith.
Here too Ehrman is in agreement with many New Testament historians. 403
Indeed, whatever critics may think about the empty tomb and the appearances, the first
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Christians for whom we have evidence for at least believed that Jesus had been raised
from the dead (and not ascended, assumed, or immortalized to heaven). This belief,
moreover, was at the very heart of earliest Christianity. N.T. Wright recognized that ―the
historical study of early Christian practice and hope leaves us no choice but to conclude
that this unfortunate belief was what all early Christians held. Indeed, they professed that
it was the very centre of their life.‖ 404 Not only is this belief ―unanimous‖ and
―unambiguous,‖ but the sources we have are ―sober,‖ ―critical,‖ and ―reserved,‖ without a
shred of ―extravagant enthusiasm‖ which we would expect to hear in legendary
accounts.405
Phrases referring to this belief are probably the oldest and most distinctive in
early Christianity. 406 Indicated by the Greek words egreirein, a transitive verb that means
―to awaken‖ or ―to raise up,‖ and anastanai, which means ―to arise,‖ reference to belief
in Jesus‘ resurrection is found in many places (Rom. 4:24, 25, 6:4, 7:4, 8:11; 1 Cor. 6:14,
15:4, 12, 20; 1 Cor. 6:14, 2 Cor. 4;14, Gal. 1:1, Col. 2:12, 1 Thes. 1:10; Eph. 1:20; 2 Tim.
2:8; Heb. 13:20; 1 Pet. 1:21; Acts 3:15, 4:10, 5:30, 10:40, 13:30, 37). As Gerald
O‘Collins rightly observes: ―The primary claim was not that Jesus‘ cause continued or
that the disciples had been ―raised‖ to a new consciousness and the life of faith . . . , but
that the crucified Jesus had been personally brought from the state of death to that of a
new and lasting life.‖407

404

Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, 705.
Kasper, Jesus the Christ, 125.
406
As Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, p. 230, says ―Because of the multiple attestation and its
appearance in Paul‘s earliest letter, all presumption is in favor of supposing that we have here, as with ‗God
raised Jesus from the dead,‘ a very primitive way of speaking.‖
407
Gerald O‘Collins, ―The Resurrection of Jesus,‖ in René Latourelle, (ed.), Dictionary of
Fundamental Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 769.
405

156

Other noteworthy factors accompanying the disciples‘ belief include the
transformation of the first disciples from doubters to bold proclaimers of the resurrection
(Acts 4, 5); the apostolic preaching, which was almost exclusively centered on the risen
Jesus (Acts 2:22ff., 3:15, 26);408 the early and successful growth of the church (cf. Acts
2:41, 47, 4:4, 6:1);409 the drastic change that took place in Jewish social structures; the
origin of the Christian understanding of the eucharist; 410 the new meaning poured into
water baptism;411 the Sabbath being changed from Saturday to Sunday;412 the first
disciples‘ willingness to die for their belief (cf. Acts 2:41-47, 4:1-4),413 including the
resistance they showed against the Roman Empire; 414 the fact that within a few months or
years after Jesus‘ life they spoke about him in divine terms;415 they had a heightened
respect for the physical world;416 the early conversion of Jewish priests (Acts 6:7) and
other enemies of the faith (e.g., Paul: Phil. 3:4-6).417 Not to be overlooked, the listing of
Peter as the first one to see an appearance (Luke 24:34; 1 Cor. 15:5) is significant,
testifying to their Easter beliefs.
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In order to appreciate the remarkable modification of earliest belief in Jesus‘
bodily resurrection, one should understand the prevailing views of the afterlife in Judaism
at the time. 418 Jews held that (1) all people, or a least a large group of the Jewish nation,
would be raised from the dead together (not one individual apart from the rest); (2) the
resurrection would occur at the eschaton, never in the middle of history (as in the case of
Jesus); (3) none of the risen would play a role in the divine judgment (according to the
Christians, however, the Risen One was the judge of all humankind); (4) the Messiah
would not die, much less rise from the dead. Nor did they think that (5) God, or YHWH,
would be raised from the dead in human form (cf. 2 Clement 1:1).
Conversely, the first Christians proclaimed specific things about Jesus‘
resurrection: (1) they believed in a resurrected and crucified rabbi, which was seen by
Jews as a curse from God (cf. Deut 21:23); (2) they claimed that the general resurrection
had somehow already begun (1 Cor. 15:20-23); (3) they unanimously placed the
resurrection at the center of their message, excluding all other views of the afterlife
(unlike the Jews, whose resurrection doctrine was peripheral and even debatable among
other eschatological beliefs); (4) the Christians argued that the resurrected body was
―incorruptible‖ and ―imperishable‖ (unlike the Jews, who never commented on the nature
of the risen body); (5) they spoke of God‘s Kingdom as having come—and still having to
come—a very nuanced position to be in; (6) and they propagated the good news to all
people, regardless of race, gender, or social status—something the Jews did not feel the
need to do, either before and during the rise of Christianity. All of these drastic changes
should prompt historians to ask: what could have caused these major modifications?
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The Significance of Earliest Christian Worship
Another salient component of earliest Christianity is the church‘s worship and
devotional life. This phenomenon has been discussed by New Testament scholars such
as Larry Hurtado, Richard Bauckham, and James Dunn. Scholars working in early
Christian worship rarely mention the antecedent causes that were responsible for bringing
these practices into being, and their work has profound implications for resurrection
apologetics.
First, the New Testament writers presupposed Jewish monotheism (Rom. 3:28-30;
1 Cor. 8:1-6; John 10:30), but the earliest Christians infused belief in one God with a
definitive, new meaning at an exceptionally early date. Says Bauckham: ―With the
inclusion of Jesus in the unique identity of YHWH, the faith of the Shema is affirmed and
maintained, but everything the Shema requires of God‘s people is now focused on Jesus.
Exclusive devotion is now given to Jesus, but Jesus does not thereby replace or compete
with God the Father, since he himself belongs to the unique divine identity.‖419 The
highest Christology was accompanied by a particular pattern of liturgical worship. 420
Unlike Judaism, Christians held that redemption was not found through obedience
to Torah. Rather, all people, regardless of race, gender, or ethnicity, could find salvation
by accepting Jesus. ―The Torah is thereby shown not to be the basis of redemption, and
so it cannot be made obligatory for Gentile Christians.‖421 Likewise, Hurtado lists six
cultic actions in earliest Christian worship that distinguish it from Second-Temple Jewish
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worship. Although there is some precedent and analogy between the two, the earliest
believers took worship one step further by giving Jesus cultic devotion—the best
indication that Jesus was attributed with divinity. These mutations, Hurtado‘s words, are
―a direct outgrowth from, and indeed a variety of, the ancient Jewish tradition. But an
earlier stage it exhibited a sudden and significant difference in character from Jewish
devotion.‖422
These uncontroversial practices include the following: (1) Prayer was offered to
God through Jesus Christ (e.g., Rom 1:8); (2) In the Church‘s rituals, Jesus was invoked
and confessed (this implies that Jesus was given a divine status); (3) Jesus‘ name was
invoked in the ritual of baptism; (4) The association of Jesus with the Lord‘s Supper
connotes that he was a living divine power who own the meal and presides over it. This
means that he was seen a as Lord of the entire Christian congregation. This was striking
at the time, especially considering that it was celebrated in contradistinction to the cult
meals of the pagan gods in Roman religion; (5) In the early church‘s hymns, the
Christians literally sang to Jesus by using Old Testament Psalms, interpreted
Christologically; (6) The use of prophetic speech in the context of Christian worship was
seen and experienced as the voice of the risen Jesus. 423
Noting that there is nothing compelling in Second Temple Judaism to compel the
first Christians to fabricate these cultic actions (though Hurtado argues that the Jewish
veneration of the patriarchs, heroic figures, principal angels, and personified attributes of
God assisted the first believers with the conceptual categories necessary for verbally
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articulating what happened to Jesus),424 Hurtado says early devotion was
characteristically expressed in terms of Jesus‘ special relationship to God, and in
conjunction with God‘s action in the world. 425 In the earliest evidence we have (Paul‘s
letters), Jesus holds a status of divinity, or at least participating in divinity. 426 This is
attested by Paul‘s belief in Jesus‘ pre-existence, which denotes the fact that Jesus‘ origin
and meaning lie exclusively in God, and that his appearance in history corresponds to his
role in the redemption of the human race. 427
Contending that there are two ways to interpret the pertinent evidence from the
Second Temple Jewish era, Bauckham argues that the Christians‘ earliest beliefs about
Jesus were not possible by ―applying to Jesus a Jewish category of semi-divine
intermediary status, but by identifying Jesus directly with the one God of Israel, including
Jesus in the unique identity of this one God.‖428 He analyzes biblical passages such as
Deuteronomy 6:4-6 and the Decalogue. Second Temple Jews were strictly monotheistic
well before the origins of the Christian movement. Thus, the inclusion of Jesus along
with God cries out for some sort of extraordinary explanation.
At the time of Jesus, Jews understood God as the exclusive Creator and Ruler of
the universe. Thus, Bauckham: ―To our question, ‗In what did Second Temple Judaism
consider the uniqueness of the one God to consist, what distinguished God as unique
from all other reality, including beings worshipped as gods by Gentiles?,‘ the answer
given again and again, in a wide variety of Second Temple Jewish literature, is that the
only true God, YHWH, the God of Israel, is the sole Creator of all things and sole Ruler
424
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of all things.‖429 As in the case of Hurtado, Jesus is suddenly seen as the creator along
with God.430 As Bauckham rightly insists:
if we attend carefully and accurately, on the one hand, to the ways in which Second
Temple Judaism characterized the unique identity of the one and only God and, on the
other hand, to what New Testament writers say about Jesus, it becomes abundantly clear
that New Testament writers include Jesus in the unique identity of the one God. They do
so carefully, deliberately, consistently and comprehensively, by including Jesus in
precisely those divine characteristics which for Second Temple Judaism distinguished the
one God as unique. All New Testament Christology is, in this sense, very high
Christology, stated in the highest terms available in first-century Jewish theology. 431

On the one hand, Second Temple Jews viewed YHWH as the only sovereign being. On
the other hand, Christians saw the Exalted Jesus as sovereign. 432 While Jews held that
YHWH was higher than all angelic beings, the earliest Christians affirmed that Jesus was
higher than all angels.433 While YHWH has a unique divine name in the Old Testament,
so Christians also give Jesus the same unique name. Lastly, Jews held that God was to
receive exclusive worship, not worship alongside of other pagan deities. 434 The first
Christians exclusively worshipped Jesus. No other gods in the Greco-Roman world
deserved honorable worship alongside of him.
But James Dunn is quick to add that the Scriptural witness in support of
worshipping Jesus is unable to point us in any conclusive direction: ―the use of
proskynein in the sense of offering worship to Jesus seems to be rather limited.‖435 With
respect to the early church‘s prayer, hymns, sacred times, places, meals, and people, ―the
data is more complex and the implications not so clearly drawn.‖436
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For him the whole notion of worshipping Jesus is misleading. The question is not
so much ―Did the first Christians worship Jesus?‖ as much as it should be ―Was early
worship possible without Jesus?‖ Worship, therefore, was not possible without including
Jesus and God in the power of the Spirit: ―Worship of Jesus that is not worship of God
through Jesus, or, more completely, worship of God through Jesus and in the Spirit, is not
Christian worship.‖437 In Dunn‘s reading, then, the worship of Christ at the expense of
including God the Father and the Holy Spirit is tantamount to committing ―Jesus-olatry.‖
Although the first believers did not explicitly formulate a doctrine of the Trinity, it was
this novel understanding that was hugely significant and complements the other
modifications mentioned by Bauckham and Hurtado.
Hence, the single biggest distinction in earliest Christianity was its insistence on
worshipping a person who once walked the earth. This in itself was a huge mutation and
also has no parallel, let alone linguistic parallel, in Judaism. They included the teachings
of his earthly ministry. This was probably based on their innovative theology of Jesus‘
resurrection body (i.e., the same body that died was the same body that rose from the
grave). The risen Jesus is the same Jesus that the disciples knew during his life: ―in what
became the dominant view, Jesus‘ real human and historical reality remained as crucial as
the heavenly glory that he was believed to share.‖438 Moreover, there is hardly any
indication that there was ―any controversy or serious variance about this exalted place of
Jesus among the various other Christian circles with which he was acquainted.‖439
Indeed, Judaism forbade the apotheosis or the divinization of human persons.
This makes Christian devotion all the more remarkable given that Christianity was seen
437
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as an early sect of Judaism which also held that Jesus was divine. 440 Bauckham here
complements Hurtado: ―When New Testament Christology is read with this Jewish
theological context in mind [i.e. a strictly monotheistic context], it becomes clear that,
from the earliest post-Easter beginnings of Christology onwards, early Christians
included Jesus, precisely and unambiguously, within the unique identity of the one true
God of Israel. They did so by including Jesus in the unique, defining characteristics by
which Jewish monotheism identified God as unique.‖441
Moreover, according to Bauckham, we can safely surmise that the Christology of
the first Christians was already the highest Christology: ―one should note the most
significant difference between earliest Christianity and other contemporary religious
groups: the place of the exalted Jesus in the religious life, devotion, or piety of its
adherents.‖442
Worship of Jesus was not in competition for the devotion given to God, but both
were included by believers. 443 Although the first Christians considered themselves strict
monotheists, what made them so different from the Jews was that they introduced a
binitarian devotional pattern directed to God and Christ alone. This was heretical in
Judaism because it contravened the prayers, hymns, and devotion reserved for the God of
biblical tradition. There is simply no analogy in the Second-Temple period to
accommodate this binitarian pattern of worship.
In a similar vein, Christian devotion also placed strict demands on converts to
renounce all forms of pagan worship, demanding an exclusivist devotion to Christ and
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God.444 Thus Hurtado: ―We cannot appreciate early Christian worship, unless we keep
before our eyes the fact that for Gentile Christians it represented a replacement cultus. It
was at one and the same time both a religious commitment and a renunciation, a stark and
demanding devotional stance with profound repercussions.‖445 This exclusivist approach
obligated converts to abandon certain aspects of common life, and in some cases this
created tensions within their family life. 446
The sustenance of the Christian understanding monotheism in the face of the
Roman religions was another striking feature of early worship. The worship of one God
was at clearly at odds with the polytheistic belief that the gods could be worshipped in
any combination. Pagans could not understand why they could not add worship to Jesus
alongside the worship of other gods.447 Since Christianity was one religion competing in
a marketplace of religions, and considering it had an exclusivist stance, there must have
been some other feature that made it powerfully attractive to outsiders. 448 Early worship
attracted outsiders because of the way in which it changed its adherents.
Another reason why it spread so quickly had to do with the adversarial encounter
of other religions which drove and shaped the movement. 449 Martyrdom was ―the most
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vivid form in which devotion to Jesus was expressed in the earliest centuries.‖450 Dying
for one‘s beliefs indicated to the public on a large scale that some Christians were willing
to go to any length of penalty to remain faithful followers of Jesus. Of course, this made
outsiders curious and attracted them to investigate the newly found faith.
Christ‘s followers made the radical claim that Jesus must be worshipped because
he was Messiah—the mediator of cosmic redemption.451 This is truly remarkable given
that Jesus‘ messianic titles and the worship given to him occurred only after he was
crucified in a Greco-Roman cultural and religious milieu. Another important aspect is
that the earliest Christian tradition of worship can be traced back to an early time period,
soon after the crucifixion. This precludes the idea the idea that Christian practices
substantially evolved decades after the Christ event.452 Early devotion to Jesus cannot be
attributed to pagan religious influences on their Jewish-Christian thought, even to Jews
who were living in the Diaspora.453 The antiquity of the practices reaches too far back in
time.

Assessing the Evidence for Jesus’ Resurrection
Responsible historians recognize that historiography is not about pronouncing
mathematically certain conclusions about the past.454 Rather, it is about ascertaining
probabilistic conclusions about the past. Some events are more likely to be true than
others. Ehrman, for instance, departs from many other historians when he denies that the
resurrection hypothesis (cast as an historical inference) is the best explanation of the
450
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evidence.455 Instead a different scenario is proposed by him: Jesus taught that God was
soon going to intervene in history. Because Jesus‘ disciples loved him, they were
convinced that God would eventually vindicate him as the Messiah. After Jesus was
crucified, the disciples had visions of him (visual experiences akin to the widow‘s
bereavement experiences456), remembered his messianic teachings about himself, and
decided that he must be risen from the dead. 457
Now, apologists might play a significant role in helping doubters and unbelievers
to overcome intellectual obstacles set in the path of faith. Let us now turn to some of the
most salient challenges of skeptics in the post-Vatican II era in light of the previous facts
which are widely accepted by the majority of New Testament scholars who study the
subject.
The first objection is that there are too many contradictions in the resurrection
narratives for them to be considered reliable. But this complaint shows a hesitancy to
take the evidence that was tentatively established in the New Testament documents
455
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seriously. Since we have already admitted to certain facts as evidence, this objection acts
as a smokescreen in taking the explanation of that evidence seriously. New Testament
historians are not trying to demonstrate the resurrection of Jesus, and so they admit that
other possible explanations might account for the data. The more interesting question,
however, is whether the resurrection hypothesis is the best explanation of the evidence.
Even if there are contradictions in the resurrection narratives, this would not be
any more significant than the report of a past event by a number of individuals with
different perspectives. The different theologies of the Evangelists can correspond to
historical figures.
Although it may be the case that no harmonization in the Gospels is possible, ―these
irreconcilable divergences . . . agree on one thing: Jesus appeared to certain disciples
after his death; he proved himself living and was proclaimed to have been risen from the
dead. That is the centre, the core, where all the traditions meet.‖458
So, notwithstanding the legends, exaggerations, and the obvious use of
imagination portrayed in the Gospels, this does not preclude the possibility of historicity.
Blomberg concluded, ―the similarities far outweigh the differences. And of the
differences which do appear, many simply reflect varying theological interpretations of
the same historical events without calling into question the fundamental historicity of the
events themselves.‖459
Considering that the appearances were in history, but still had a mysterious,
eschatological quality about them, we should not be surprised to see some
―contradictions‖ in the texts. The different theological emphases in the narratives might
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reflect different accommodations directed to the original readers. Likewise, it would be
a mistake to consider the narratives purely legendary because they are not ―word for
word‖ translations of what Jesus said (or that the narratives are not chronological listings
of what happened first, second, and so on).
We must also keep in mind that we are dealing with texts that have been analyzed
and pulled apart more than any other work of literature in the past 300 years. Clearly we
should expect to see a few ―contradictions‖ in them. Be that as it may, no reputable
historian who finds a few of these discrepancies in her sources would automatically
conclude that they are purely legendary. Many historians argue that some contradictions
may provide greater weight to the reliability of the central events reported in them.
These contradictions would give the careful reader the impression that the story was not
contrived.
Lastly, even if the Gospels were hopelessly contradictory (which they are not),
this would not leave us with nothing. We still have to reckon with Paul’s account in 1
Corinthians 15.
The second argument against the resurrection hypothesis is that the oral traditions
undergirding the Gospels are unreliable. Ehrman, for instance, claims that cultural
anthropologists have shown that oral means of preserving religious teachings are usually
unreliable.
But these studies do not necessarily apply in the case of ancient rabbinic oral
tradition. More important for our purposes is that this objection confuses the two steps
in the argument (step one is about gathering the evidence, and step two is about
explaining the evidence). No matter the uncertainties surrounding the agreed upon
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evidence, the reader is already expected to concede the historicity of the empty tomb, the
appearances, and the origin of the disciples‘ faith.
Let us try and address this objection from another perspective. The critic may be
confusing the deposit of oral teaching and the way it was expressed (or applied) in
different circumstances. As I. Howard Marshall observed: ―If Jesus meant so much to
his followers, then it is overwhelmingly improbable that they remembered so little about
him, or that they so completely refashioned the content of their memories.‖ 460
Moreover, the fact that we have multiple sources within such a short generation
after Jesus‘s ministry makes us fortunate as ancient historians. As Ehrman himself
states: ―Therefore, if there is a tradition about Jesus that is preserved in more than one of
these documents, no one of them could have made it up, since the others knew of it as
well, independently. If a tradition is found in several of these sources, then the
likelihood of its going back to the very beginning of the tradition from which they all
ultimately derive, back to the historical Jesus himself, is significantly improved.‖ 461
Usually ancient historians have much less material to work with than historical Jesus
scholars. Usually in ancient history one or two sources renders the reported fact
unimpeachable. But in the case of Jesus‘ resurrection, we have multiple, independent
sources. It can also be argued that there was an insufficient amount of time for legends
to accrue because of the living apostolic restraints at the time. More than one or two
generations might have been needed for the Evangelists (and Paul) to completely
refashion their depictions of Jesus.
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Lastly, one might mention Paul and the ancient creed he recites in 1 Corinthians
15. Because this creed can be traced back well before the writing of 1 Corinthians, 462 it
seems to nullify Ehrman‘s concerns about the circumstantial reasons for holding to the
evidences that he already agrees with. N.T. Wright, for instance, states that it ―was
probably formulated within the first two or three years after Easter itself‖ and is ―the
earliest Christian tradition.‖ 463 Walter Kasper concurs; it goes back to ―30 AD.‖464
James Dunn dates it to ―within months of Jesus‘ death.‖465 The atheist critic Gerd
Lüdemann says it can be traced back to within ―30 and 33 A.D.‖ 466 Further, the sources
used by the author(s) of the ancient creed in 1 Corinthians must stretch back even further
to the events described in the creed itself.
Likewise, the Gospels not written by eyewitnesses. And they were written too far
after Christ to be considered reliable.467 Once more this objector (Ehrman) confuses the
notion of evidence and explanation. Even if the Gospels were not written by
eyewitnesses, this does nothing to undercut the evidence that has already been deduced
by him.
Nonetheless, let us still try and respond to his criticism. Ehrman is well aware
that later datings of the Gospels does not necessarily render them completely
unreliable.468 Though scholars generally do not believe that we have eyewitness
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accounts, a strong case can be made for the eyewitness traditions behind them. 469 As
illustrated by Lapide: ―To blame the rabbis and evangelists for deception or to accuse
them of lying would have been as foreign to the Jews and Jewish Christians of that time
as an accusation of ‗embellishment‘ against Van Gogh or of the corruption of history
against Shakespeare‘s Macbeth would be to us.‖470 According to Dulles: ―Anglicans and
Orthodox, as well as Roman Catholics, have generally rejected the Protestant position, in
so far as this is purely Biblicist, and have insisted that the Bible cannot be the rule of
faith except when conjoined with a continuous Church tradition. In this perspective,
which is fundamentally Catholic, the very sections of the New Testament which the
liberals tend to discount as too far removed from the events can be seen as providing
privileged interpretations, for, as [John Henry] Newman pointed out, events of great
importance require a considerable span of time in order to be rightly comprehended.‖ 471
Later compilers may have more well-rounded evidence from various perspectives at their
disposal to determine what should be included in the most up to date reporting.
Historians do not need earlier sources to ensure that their case is more historically
trustworthy.
What is more, the ―eyewitness argument‖ does not seem to apply in the case of
Paul. Paul himself wrote that he saw an appearance (1 Cor. 9:1). And he was originally
an enemy of earliest Christianity. He did not expect Jesus to appear to him. He became
a believer well after the Christian movement began in Jerusalem. The ancient creed
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found in 1 Corinthians 15, moreover, was formulated within years (or even months) after
the crucifixion.
Ehrman‘s next challenge is that the evidence is biased. For him the evidence is
furnished by individuals who already believed in the resurrection and so cannot be trusted
by critical historians. Here the principle of disinterestedness seems to be upheld. But
again this challenge has nothing to do with the evidence already established by Ehrman in
the first step.
Second, it should also be said that bias explains everything and so explains
nothing. Notwithstanding the issue of bias, the resurrection hypothesis is said to be the
best explanation of the known evidence, not the only explanation. Other explanations are
certainly possible, but Ehrman (and the other critics) have not provided one so far.
Alternative explanations can be given, but unless Ehrman can provide positive evidence
to establish that the early Christian movement remained deliberately silent about some
alleged, hitherto unknown source(s), historians remain completely within their rights to
use the New Testament documents to make arguments about the origins of resurrection
faith. He should use the evidence that is currently available instead of constructing a
causal theory on the basis of sheer possibility or of silence.
What is more, it is true no historical account is written from a neutral, objective
standpoint. But this does not mean that the Evangelists could not (or did not) report
anything accurate about the Jesus. Ehrman himself explains what those facts were!
Undoubtedly the Gospels are not biographical in the modern sense of the term. Unlike
modern biographies, the Gospels are only concerned with the last two to three years of
Jesus‘s life. Nor can the Gospels be classified as ―lives of Christ,‖ or as aretalogies.
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Rather, they are to be classified in the line of ancient Greco-Roman biographies or Greek
and Jewish ―historiography.‖ 472 Given the genre of the Gospels, the Evangelists were
somewhat concerned about presenting accurate depictions of Jesus (cf. Luke: 1:1-4) in
the face of different situations facing the earliest churches.
Fourth, the issue of bias seems to be drastically undercut in the case of Paul (and
the 500). Paul was not always a believer, and presumably some of the 500 did not know
or believe in Jesus either. To be sure, Paul challenges the Corinthians to ask any of the
500 who were alive at the time of his writing to convince them of the reality of the
appearances (1 Cor. 15:6).
The next argument is that other figures of history were said to perform miracles
and be resurrected. Ehrman lists figures such as Apollonius of Tyana, Honi the Circle
Drawer, Hanina ben Dosa, and the Roman Emperor Vespasian. 473 If we already accept
Jesus‘ resurrection, Ehrman says, then why couldn‘t we say these figures were raised
too? Let me say from the outset that apologists should not hold that Jesus was the only
figure of history ever to be raised. This closed-minded attitude is detrimental to the
virtue of open-mindedness about the probability of miracles. But notice that the
admission of special divine acts in other religio-cultural contexts does not undercut the
credibility of Jesus’ resurrection either.
Second, even if there is evidence for these divine acts, this would not mean that
the evidence is equally compelling in all cases. Poorly evidenced miracles scarcely rule
out the validity of well attested evidence in other scenarios, especially in the historical
case for Jesus‘ resurrection. By contrast, in these other scenarios there is minimal
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evidence appearing literally hundreds of years after the original event.474 And they are
not usually corroborated by multiple, independent sources. Consequently, the evidence
for these special divine acts allow for many plausible explanations.
Third, Ehrman asserts that many Christians naively reject miracle claims in other
religious contexts because they are not found in Scripture or church teaching. But this is
a textbook example of committing the genetic fallacy: how one comes to believe in X
does not have anything to do with the truth of X. Christians might believe in the
resurrection of Jesus because of the circumstances they found themselves in (i.e.,
upbringing, living in a Christian culture), but this does not mean that it is a false belief or
that the resurrection hypothesis is not the best explanation of the evidence. Many
Christians (and atheists, agnostics, and other religionists) hold to specific beliefs and
reject other ones for poor reasons.
Both faith and reason can lead individuals to certain conclusions. But in the case
of critical historians, they do not claim to establish, demonstrate or prove the resurrection.
Instead the resurrection hypothesis is cast as a piece of inductive reasoning on the basis
of agreed upon evidence.
The next argument is that historical understanding is relegated to multiple causes,
not just one. It is true that the early Church could have had more than one cause for its
existence, but this would not prevent historians from positing Jesus‘ resurrection as the
ultimate cause that set off a chain reaction of additional causal conditions that brought the
Christian movement into full bloom. Various causes have different values and contribute
variously to forming historical phenomena. True, historians rarely affirm that entire
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movements can be accounted for by a single cause. Many conditions surrounding the
primary event under consideration, the resurrection of Jesus, contributed to its ongoing
influence.
Larry Hurtado, for instance, has recently outlined and explained some of the many
reasons why the earliest Christian movement spread at the astounding rate it did. First, it
began in Jerusalem – a city that allowed for many persons to hear the Good News in
order for the first disciples to take the message out to a wider world. 475 Outsiders found
the strict nature of Christian worship attractive 476 including its exclusive stance with
respect to Christianity‘s relationship to all other religions. 477 Christianity, moreover, was
unlike any other religion at the time. It did not discriminate on the basis of gender or
social class. It called on everyone to repent and believe in the Gospel. 478 Christian
worship was more intense than the conventional liturgies of Judaism. 479 The earliest
Christian worship featured the belief that God was active in the midst of ritual action.480
Lastly, says Hurtado, the Christian attitude in worship was not passive, but one in which
the believer could expect to be changed by the Spirit. The early Church's intense
charismatic experience of the risen Jesus in the context of worship was attractive to
outsiders.481
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Bereavement experiences can account for the appearances. 482 Offering this
explanation as a sheer possibility, Ehrman and other critics say that the appearances can
be explained by the experience that widows and widowers sometimes have of their
deceased spouses. Undoubtedly, bereavement experiences have similar characteristics to
what the evidence has concluded about the appearances.
For one thing, both groups find themselves immersed in grief after the recent
death of a loved one. Second, both groups came into contact with the beloved. Third,
these meetings were not initiated by the living, but came from ―the other side.‖ And as a
result of these experiences, the living felt enlightened and empowered.
Notwithstanding these four similarities, there are many differences that preclude
this alternative explanation from being taken seriously. 483 First, they usually occur to
spouses, not to disciples of dead religious leaders. As O‘Collins writes: ―before the
‗bereavement,‘ the disciples of Jesus had enjoyed a different kind of relationship with a
remarkably different kind of person who made quite extraordinary claims about his
identity and mission. This dissimilarity affects the ‗point of departure‘ for the proposed
analogy.‖484
Second, one might argue that Paul had no acquaintance with Jesus during his
earthly ministry. Thus the experience of grief would not apply in his case. ―From the
outset,‖ says O‘Collins, ―any analogy between his meeting and with the risen Jesus on the
road to Damascus and the experience of Rees‘s widows and widowers seems to be ruled
482
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out.‖485 Third, there are no indications that those who appeared to their living spouse
remotely died in the same way as Jesus. Indeed, the best research indicates that they
passed away from natural causes or accidents. There are no cases of suicides or
homicides, let alone executions.
A fourth reason for differentiating the two visual experiences is that bereavement
experiences do not happen to groups. But in the New Testament there are simultaneous
group experiences of the risen Jesus (Matt. 28:9-10; Luke 24:13-35; John 21:1-14; 1 Cor.
15:6). A fifth reason is that these bereavement experiences can occur for many years
after their spouses die. Aside from Paul, the resurrection appearances ceased shortly after
Jesus was executed.
Another difference is that the vast majority of the bereaved do not tell anyone
about these episodes. On the other hand, a unique mission inaugurating experience was
perceived by the original percipients. Lastly, in the case of these bereavement episodes
there is no life-long change. But the disciples set the world ablaze with their new
convictions about Jesus‘ rising from the dead.
What is more, belief in the bodily resurrection makes bereavement experiences
highly untenable, especially in light of the Jewish matrix from which it came. As Wright
suggested: ―‗Meetings‘ with Jesus, likewise, could by themselves have been interpreted
in a variety of ways. Most people in the ancient world (though not so many, it seems, in
the modern world) knew that visions and appearances of recently dead people
occurred.‖486 So it might be asked: why didn‘t these experiences lead the apostles to say
Jesus was in Abraham‘s bosom? Or that he was in apocalyptic glory as some martyr-
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prophet? These inferences would have made more sense than the bodily resurrection in
light of the religious context of first century Palestine. As Kasper keenly asserted: ―In
neo-Judaism exaltation (or ecstasy) was the only category available to express the fact
that a human being on earth would still play a part in the eschatological events.
Exaltation was therefore a current category, which was used in an attempt to express a
person‘s eschatological importance.‖487
The earliest believers could certainly discriminate between physical, post-mortem
encounters with Jesus and other experiences of living in Christ. 488 As Pannenberg rightly
says: ―one must at the same time take into consideration that primitive Christianity itself
apparently knew how to distinguish between ecstatic visionary experiences and the
fundamental encounters with the resurrected Lord.‖489 Indeed, an alternative explanation
of these so-called meetings would have confirmed that Jesus was truly dead, not
gloriously risen from the dead, never to die again! 490
Ehrman claims that it is not within the province of historians to discuss the
probability of miracles. He writes: ―I‘m willing to grant that miracles—that is, events
that we cannot explain within our concepts of how ‗nature‘ normally works—can and do
happen. There still remains, however, a huge, I‘d even say, insurmountable problem
when discussing Jesus‘ miracles. Even if miracles are possible, there is no way for the
487
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historian who sticks strictly to the canons of historical evidence to show that they have
ever happened.‖491 Lest historians commit the ―god-of-the-gaps fallacy,‖492
methodological constraints prevent the historian from responsibly inferring the
resurrection hypothesis as a viable option. For miracles are a matter of faith, not proof.
Part of the problem for Ehrman is that he defines miracles as special divine acts
outside the natural world. Miracles are, by definition, meta-historical. 493 By contrast,
special divine acts are more than historical, but they are definitely not less than historical.
They take place in the spatio-temporal realm, thus leaving them open to historical
investigation. But they are not of the historical process. Thus there is an empirical and
superempirical aspect to them. The former is knowable in an objective way but the latter
has subjective appeal. They are not merely internal experiences; though there is a
subjective response to them. They remain objective in nature. For instance, Jesus could
be seen (Matt. 28:7, 17; Mark 16:7, John 20:14, 18; 1 Cor. 9:1, 15:5-8), heard (Matt.
28:9, 10; John 20:15, 16), and touched (Matt. 28:9; Luke 24:39; John 20:17, 20, 27). He
also ate food (Luke 24:41-43; cf. John 21:13).
Now, when it comes to determining the cause(s) of the evidence, historians
normally appeal to law-like regularities, not miraculous ones. But, in a sense, all events
are unique and without parallel. So if a naturalistic explanation does not seem to account
for the facts because the evidence is pulling in a direction which strongly suggests that a
miracle has happened, and if the context in which the event is thought to have occurred is
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religiously charged, then it would be feasible for the historian who believes in a personal
God who would reveal himself in history to conclude that a miracle has happened.494
Notice the indispensability of scholastic apologetics at this point.
Troeltsch‘s ―principle of analogy‖ 495 is not a hard and fast rule. It can be
qualified and subsequently recast in a way that is hospitable to the likelihood of miracles.
Historicism is no longer a prevailing view in the academy in a postmodern age. As
Avery Dulles wrote: ―According to a positivist view that was widely accepted fifty or a
hundred years ago, history is a science analogous to physics or chemistry. It proceeds on
the assumption that the world is a closed system in which causes and effects are
connected by strict necessity. History, in that view, leaves no place for the unique, the
exceptional, and especially not for events brought about by God‘s direct activity.‖ 496 But
such a view of history has been widely abandoned. 497 As John Meier writes: ―Whether
we call it a bias, a Tendenz, a worldview, or a faith stance, everyone who writes on the
historical Jesus writes from some ideological standpoint; no critic is exempt.‖498
Even if the historian is debarred from inferring a miracle as an explanation
because of methodological restraints, this would not mean that intellectually curious
individuals cannot take the reins from professional historians at this step in the argument
and draw this conclusion as an explanation. It would certainly be a tragedy if scholars
494
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were prevented from drawing the correct explanation because of methodological
restraints. The fact that we do not have absolute certainty when it comes to
understanding each piece of evidence, or that the resurrection is a miraculous event does
not mean that historians and other critics should refrain from using the evidence that is
currently at their disposal. Background theories are inevitable and have an impact on the
kind of conclusions that are made (one background theory is that God exists; thus the
previous chapter in this dissertation). No one can do history from a strictly neutral
standpoint. This is precisely why the classical approach to apologetics is needed.
Hence, skeptics usually acknowledge that there is evidence for the resurrection.
But he easily hesitates to explain it because of ancillary reasons that are related to
establishing what should count as evidence in the first place. Though Christian
theologians might be passionate about the argument for the resurrection, this should not
be confused with the attempt to demonstrate it. Rather, the most sophisticated critics
generally speak in tentative terms about the nature of the evidence, affirming the
resurrection hypothesis as the best explanation of the data, not the only explanation.
Ehrman claims that the appearances can be reinterpreted as bereavement
experiences, but this possibility is ruled out for a variety of reasons. Historians are not
forced to disprove all competing views before they award historicity to the most
defensible one. If a single conclusion (the appearances) seems to stand out among all
other alternatives, then historians should accept that view as the best explanation.
Ehrman‘s only significant argument against the case for the resurrection―let alone
taking it as the best explanation of the evidence ―has to do with his endorsement of
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methodological naturalism. But this restraint is outdated in a postmodern age, one in
which historians take interdisciplinary work seriously.
All historians are inevitably influenced by the social sciences, philosophy, and
even religious commitments. There is no such thing as the historical method apart from
the influence of presuppositions. In conclusion, we are of the opinion that Ehrman‘s case
against the resurrection is inadequate. The rationality of the resurrection should be
upheld over its rival (rational) hypotheses.
Let us turn to what I believe is the most powerful alternative to the resurrection
hypothesis, one that is put forth by Dale Allison.

Resurrection and the Paranormal
Undoubtedly parapsychology has become increasingly popular in recent times.
Consequently, many scholars have employed the term ―apparition‖ as a substitute for
understanding the nature of the appearances.499 Geza Vermes, for instance, repeatedly
described the appearances as ―apparitions‖ 500 in his book on the resurrection. Though
John Dominic Crossan has apparently changed his position on the historical credibility of
Christ‘s resurrection, he also characterized the appearances as ―apparitions.‖ 501
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Notwithstanding their uncritical references in their writings, Dale Allison has become the
most salient representative of the apparitions hypothesis in recent years, flaunting the
research in parapsychology with the purpose of defusing the argument in defense of
Jesus‘ resurrection.
However, a balanced comparison of apparitions and the evidence for the
appearances reveals that there are more differences than similarities. Because the earliest
Christians considered the appearances as unique irruptions of the divine in human
history, apparitional experiences cannot be extrapolated as the exclusive basis for
understanding the appearances. Let us first turn to the field of apparitions research.
Sometimes the field of parapsychology is considered a ―pseudo-science,‖ but this
prejudice seems to be receding in certain quarters of the scientific community. As
Harvey Irwin and Caroline Watt have explained: ―Historically speaking there has been a
clear progression in parapsychology from the collection of anecdotal material to the
experimental investigation of laboratory analogues of psi phenomena. Thus a major
element in parapsychologists‘ efforts to put their discipline on a scientific footing is the
recourse to scientific method.‖502
Most apparitional experiences are documented in anecdotal reports. Unlike
experimental evidence, which is controlled under laboratory conditions, anecdotal
apparitions. How you explain that is a separate issue; but it happened; they are not making it up; it‘s not
hallucinations. My statement is that the stories in the Gospels, as I‘ve argued, are primarily interested in
who‘s in charge and had an apparition. But that presumes, even as I claim, as I would, that Mark‘s tomb
story is made up. I think I‘m with you, apparitions happened. But I think, apparitions plus the experience
of ‗kingdom is already here‘; that‘s my explanation of those two things. With regard to the empty tomb,
honestly, I would say, plus or minus, it‘s not worth it. I don‘t mind. Historically, I‘m not sure because I
think Mark created it, but it‘s not something I would argue. I concede it.‖ Crossan confirms this idea
toward the end of the book (176): ―I do not for here and now debate either the historicity of either Jesus‘
burial or the empty tomb‘s discovery. Instead, for here and now (dato non concesso, to be sure) I take the
Gospel stories of the empty tomb’s discovery and of all those risen apparitions as historically factual in
their entirety.‖
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evidence is provided by eyewitnesses who pass on the information related to their
experience. Whether the experience can be explained by paranormal processes is hotly
debated in contemporary parapsychology. Sometimes these experiences are best
explained by naturalistic processes such as hallucinations.
Now, apparitions should be distinguished from mirages, illusions and, more
problematically, hallucinations (which usually stem from drug use and/or mental illness).
One of the criteria used to delineate apparitions from hallucinations or illusions is that
new information is gleaned from a veridical apparitional experience (perhaps the
percipient learns something from the encounter that could not have been ordinarily
known). A second criteria is that apparitions are sometimes seen by many people at
once, whereas hallucinations cannot be collectively shared.
Apparitional research has resulted in what might be called a taxonomy of
apparitional experiences. 503 The first type is usually called an experimental apparitional
experience. In these cases the living can somehow make themselves seen to someone
else in another location. Though very few examples are outlined and discussed in the
literature, these occurrences almost always happen to experients who are asleep or in a
trance-like state. Experimental apparitions have led some parapsychologists to maintain
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that at least some apparitions are not merely subjective. 504 However, almost two-thirds of
all apparitions reported are of the dead, not the living.505
A second type is commonly known as the crisis apparition. These meetings occur
when the person represented by the apparition is in some sort of crisis (such as an
accident or is near death). As a general rule of thumb, parapsychologists hold that these
experiences occur within twelve hours before or after the crisis begins. These apparitions
are very short lived, meaning they do not reoccur over an extended period of time. In
many cases the percipient does not expect or think about the person represented by the
phantasm.
The third type is known as the postmortem apparitional experience. Almost all of
these represent someone who has been dead for at least twelve hours. Based on the
famous Chaffin case (1927), the persons involved with these apparitions have been
known to exchange unknown information to the experient(s). Thus Irwin and Watt:
―Note also in this case the apparition had both a visual and an auditory component. As
with the other types of apparition, the figure is lifelike and appears suddenly and
unexpectedly.‖506 Sometimes these experiences appear in a dream; but in other cases the
apparition appears in ordinary circumstances. They are sometimes seen by a group of
people, although all experients may not see the phantasm. Most apparitions are
experienced visually, in about four-fifths of the reported cases.507
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The fourth category is known as the common ghost experience (otherwise known
as a ―haunt‖). In these cases a figure appears in the same locality over an extended
period of time. Given this description of hauntings, usually many different people have
the chance to see them. Ghosts do not show much awareness of the living. These
characteristics seem to evade the common depiction of ghosts in folklore. ―Additionally,
ghosts seem more somnambulistic in their movements. Some ghosts reportedly perform
the same actions in the same location on each occasion they are experienced.‖ 508 They
perform the same ―behavior‖ whether they are seen or not.
Now if we are going to use apparitions to explain the appearances, then we should
focus on the postmortem apparitional experience. Like many of the reports describing
the postmortem apparition, the resurrection appearances happened over a period of time,
not within twelve hours after Jesus‘ death. Thus, the other types of apparitional
experience do not resonate with the New Testament witnesses. As Andrew MacKenzie
and Jane Henry rightly observe: ―The hardest apparitions to explain by normal means are
crisis apparitions where information about the death of a person appears to have been
transmitted correctly by the apparition, and collective cases where more than one person
sees the same apparition‖ (emphasis mine). 509
So if a skeptic is going to focus on apparitions as a substitute for explaining the
appearances, then the responsible thing to do is cite the relevant case studies from
postmortem apparitions, not haphazardly cite studies from the other three types. Nor
does it seem responsible for critics to patch together unrelated cases of apparitional
experiences to explain the nature of the appearances (simply because the other three types
508

Irwin and Watt, An Introduction to Parapsychology, 197.
Andrew MacKenzie and Jane Henry, Parapsychology: Research and Exceptional Experiences
(New York: Routledge: 2004), 182.
509

187

do not resemble what has been concluded by the New Testament). Because the current
state of apparitions research is highly indecisive and uncertain in this regard, it is
exceedingly difficult to extrapolate individual cases of postmortem apparitional
experiences as the univocal basis for understanding the appearances.
Though many apparitions can be explained by the paranormal, other
parapsychologists are not as easily convinced. This observation seems to make matters
even more complicated for scholars wanting to emphasize similarities between
apparitions and the appearances. There is no general consensus in the scientific
community of parapsychologists heading in either direction about this problem. 510 As
MacKenzie and Henry observe: ―Apparitions can be thought of as nothing more than
hallucinations and the bulk of cases probably are just that.‖511 For every apparitional
case study that runs parallel to the appearances, another case study can be cited against it.
There is simply no end to this point-counterpoint contest.
Consider the following case: ―The apparition itself may appear solid and lifelike
or semitransparent. It may be seen and heard by all present; or some people may not see
it, even when their attention is drawn to the position where it is. It may appear and
disappear in locked rooms.‖ 512 Quite naturally, this report runs parallel to the
appearances. Further, we also have reports where the phantasm ate food and was
touched.513 Perhaps, then, Jesus ate the fish! But, as Green and McCreery point out, the
referent person usually appears within three meters of the experient(s) and is not
510
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previously known by them. 514 Obviously this report paints a picture that runs contrary to
the appearance to the disciples―and to those who knew of Jesus (such as the apostle
Paul).
Other examples could easily be cited. Postmortem apparitional experiences
almost always happen indoors. By contrast, the New Testament writers suggest that
Jesus appeared outside and inside. Or again, parapsychologist Alan Gauld says that
apparitions (of the four types, we are not told) cannot be used as evidence for life after
death.515 Irwin and Watt seem to agree: ―The spirit hypothesis of apparitional
experiences now is promoted by a minority of modern parapsychologists.‖516 Still others
maintain that apparitions provide evidence for the afterlife. 517 Of course, Catholic
theologians have always held that Jesus‘ resurrection serves as the exemplar and
forerunner of our own resurrections from the dead at the eschaton. Belief in Jesus‘
resurrection provides believers with necessary ingredient for upholding the eschatological
resurrection.
Or again, one of the basic features of the appearances is that they were missioninaugurating (cf. Matt. 28:18-20). But, in the majority of apparitional reports (again,
which of the four types we are not told!), there seems to be no life-changing mission that
accompanies the experience. As Brian Nisbet has mused: ―The genuine apparition . . . is
more likely to appear as a normally clothed figure, which is seen for a few brief moments
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and then vanishes or gradually fades away. Sometimes a reason for its appearance can be
suggested; but more often there is none.‖518
It should be kept in mind that most apparitional experiences do not resemble the
appearances. Only certain cases will characterize certain features that run parallel to the
appearances. Apparitions are not usually seen by groups (2-12 percent), let alone 500 at
one time.519 They are not usually seen by enemies (less than 1 percent of the deceased
appear to one of their former enemies). 520 The vast majority of them are unable to be
touched (only 2.7 percent can be touched). And less than 1 percent of the cases lead the
experient(s) to believe that the referent person had been raised bodily from the dead. Yet
all of these characteristics are featured at the origins of Easter faith.
So, it would be an exceptionally rare case that an apparition would be
characterized by all of these features in a series of different episodes over a period of
weeks (or much later on, as in the case of Paul). When each improbability is multiplied
by other improbabilities, we arrive at an staggeringly incomprehensible chance:
1:3,800,000.521 In effect the chance that any one apparition would be described by all
four of these characteristics makes the possibility of a constructive comparison between
apparitions and the appearances exceptionally implausible. Even worse for the chances
of comparison, it is highly uncertain how any of these cases could be neatly categorized
into any of the four apparition types (i.e., crisis, experimental, postmortem, or haunts).
While most parapsychologists confidently hold to the reality of parapsychological
experiences, they are highly divided as to whether paranormal factors account for them.
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Added to this problem is the lack of understanding individual apparition cases and how
the statistics pertaining to each of them might compare to the conclusions established
about the appearances. For every apparitional experience that is similar to the
appearances, another case can be cited to highlight the dissimilarities between them.
Although it is not logically impossible to patch together unrelated apparitional
experiences as a control belief to retranslate the original meanings assigned to the
appearances, an agnostic position seem to be more justified. We do not have enough
positive evidence for apparitions to make a constructive comparison between them and
the appearances.
Now, one New Testament historian who is sympathetic to using the research on
apparitions to understand the resurrection appearances is Dale Allison. Gerald O‘Collins
has responded to Allison‘s allusions to bereavement experiences (as mentioned earlier
on), but no scholar has interacted with his references to apparitions and how they might
be linked to the appearances and the much greater project of arguing for Jesus‘
resurrection.522 Because some apparitions resonate with the appearances, Allison claims,
Christian apologists cannot responsibly deduce the resurrection hypothesis as the best
explanation of the agreed-upon evidence.
For Allison, the apologist‘s inference would only make sense given the traditional
meaning of the appearances. Let us discuss Allison‘s positions and how they might
affect the inference to the resurrection over its competing casual explanations. Allison
grants that the disciples saw Jesus in a series of appearances in different times and places:
―These appear to be the facts, and they raise the question of how we should explain
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them.‖523 The emphasis is not exclusively placed on the disciples‘ experience. Jesus
also saw them.524 After experiencing the risen Lord (1 Cor. 15:8), Paul believed in a oneto-one correspondence between the earthly body and the transformed, resurrected body
that is to come: ―there is no good evidence for belief in a non-physical resurrection in
Paul, much less within the primitive Jerusalem community. . . . Even Paul, in 1 Cor. 15,
when defending the notion of a ‗spiritual body,‘ teaches―like 2 Bar. 51:10―the
transformation of corpses, not their abandonment.‖525 The earliest percipients were
convinced that Jesus had been raised bodily, not just spiritually, or immaterially. 526 Thus
the appearances are to be distinguished from later visual phenomena in the early
Christian communities. 527
Believing in the resurrection did not mean that the recently deceased was
naturally present to the living, but it included one‘s physical body coming back to life,
never to die again. In Wright‘s memorable words, the Jewish doctrine of the resurrection
meant ―life-after-life-after-death.‖ Commenting on the possibility of understanding the
resurrection as the natural presence of the deceased, Allison wrote: ―I know of no
evidence for this point of view.‖ 528 He also speaks of the widespread belief in the bodily
resurrection of Jesus.529
Anecdotal evidence for apparitions indicates cases where the referent person was
seen and heard; seen by many individuals at a time; seen by some but not all; offered
reassurance to the living; seen as real and/or solid; and seen less and less as time goes
523
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on.530 Notwithstanding these parallels to the appearances, Allison himself recognizes that
these cannot be used to retranslate the original meaning of the appearances: ―I eschew
explaining the appearances of Jesus in terms of typical appearances from the dead―an
unfeasible task anyway given our limited knowledge and understanding of apparitions in
general―but simply ask what light a wider human phenomenon might shed on some of
the issues surrounding the resurrection stories.‖ 531
Indeed, he goes on to say apparitional experiences ―cannot explain the specific
content of the words attributed to the risen Jesus.‖ And of the reported cases, none of
them led ―to the founding of a new religion.‖ 532 Because Jesus was a messianic figure,
the appearances took on a different kind of significance to the original percipients,
leading the first disciples to worship the Christ.533 Context begets meaning. An empty
tomb, to be sure, does not usually accompany an apparition either! Allison does claim
that apparitional experiences can be used as a heuristic tool for understanding what
happened to Paul and the other percipients. 534
Now, with these apparitional reports in hand, a skeptic might challenge (and, then,
presumably overturn) the apologist‘s inference to the resurrection hypothesis. According
to Allison:
A skeptic, however, would, with some justification readily respond that these defects of
apparition reports apply equally to the New Testament accounts. For example, can
anyone really come up with proof or even strong evidence that the stories in Luke and
John in which the risen Jesus eats and invites himself to be touched (Luke 24: 36-43;
John 20:24-29) comes ultimately from eyewitnesses? I freely grant that one cannot show
that they do not; but this is scarcely the same as showing that they do. So are not these
important gospel paragraphs, from an evidential point of view, ‗lacking‘ something? In
530
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other words, just like so many apparitional accounts, they are ‗questionable,‘ because
their origin cannot be established. Many scholars have no problem classifying Luke
24:36-43 and John 20:24-29 as later apologetic. Is this not a possibility?535

A disputable issue arises when Allison limits himself to possibilities instead of taking the
initiative to present a defensible position that can account for the New Testament
evidence. In effect Allison has explained everything and so has explained nothing: ―one
can draw any number of curves through a finite set of points to create a thousand
different pictures.‖536 The issue is not whether historians can construct viable hypotheses
that can compete with the resurrection hypothesis, but whether other hypotheses can
outstrip the latter through their use of defensible arguments.
Allison retorts: even if the resurrection happened, this does not mean that we can
show that it happened; and if the resurrection did not happen, this would not mean that
we can show that it did not happen.537 But no reputable apologist would seek to
demonstrate the resurrection. Rather, apologists usually argue that the resurrection
hypothesis is the best explanation of the data.538 Representative of this modest
epistemological inference is William Lane Craig:
I do not assert that belief in the resurrection of Jesus ‗is the only reasonable option, and
thus it would be irrational not to believe in it.‘ Rather, I argue that four established facts .
. . ‗provide adequate inductive grounds for inferring Jesus‘ resurrection,‘ and that ‗it‘s
very difficult to deny that the resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation.‘ of these four
facts. . . . These statements are carefully chosen and indicate that I am employing
inductive reasoning understood according to the model of inference to the best
explanation. This model holds that there may be a number of reasonable explanations for
a body of evidence, and that one is to choose from this pool of live options that
explanation which is the best, that is, which most successfully meets such criteria as
having explanatory power, explanatory scope, and not being ad hoc. . . Again, I did not
say that it is irrational to fail to believe in the resurrection.539
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So, the more appropriate alternative is to develop a defensible argument that might
persuade others when looking at the available evidence. Allison reflects on what might
count as evidence for the resurrection hypothesis, and he concludes that some facts are in
fact relevant. Why then does he refuse to propose an hypothesis that can account for
these facts? In other terms, Allison deduces what he thinks should count as evidence (by
garnering the relevant evidence to establish the appearances and the empty tomb), but he
balks at the opportunity to explain it. Instead he flaunts the mere possibility that the
appearances might have been apparitions in order to defuse the apologetic claim.
A paucity of evidence should drive historians down the path of epistemological
humility about retrieving the shape of the past. But in some cases humility can be
employed immoderately, fortifying an agnostic outlook that militates against the evidence
in favor of one position over the others. Such a problem is paramount in Allison‘s work.
Even if we have ―meager evidence‖ for a purported event, this would not mean that
historians should not attempt to explain the evidence at their disposal. Sometimes a lot of
evidence can sometimes make it more difficult to explain what happened. Thus
historians are not forced to disprove all competing hypotheses before they award
historicity to the most defensible explanation. If a single hypothesis seems to stand out
among the alternatives, then historians should accept that hypothesis as the best
explanation.
Allison agrees with the biblical evidence in support of the existence, distribution
and nature of the appearances. Correspondingly, he should not easily concede to other
possibilties. For every apparitional experience that is similar to the appearances, another
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case can be cited to highlight the dissimilarities between them. Thus agnosticism is the
proper stance to take with respect to apparitions research.
Positively speaking, the apologist has something meaningful to say about the
appearances. She assesses the New Testament writings not as the Word of God but as a
collection of reliable Greek documents coming down to us from the first century. Allison
himself agrees with the conclusions tentatively established by the critical historian.
Negatively speaking, there is not enough positive evidence to establish anything
significant about apparitions to make a constructive comparison between them and the
appearances. Again, Allison agrees with the latter point.
Furthermore, Allison is well aware that the appearance narratives are not
historical in every detail. And he knows that this circumstantial problem should not
preclude one from affirming the historicity of the appearances. Critical realism allows
the historian to arrive at this conclusion. Parapsychologists are equally critical when
analyzing the extraordinary experiences of many individuals but have not arrived at an
equally warranted positive conclusion. Rather, the established facts within the field of
apparitions research are practically nil. So it is disanalogous for Allison to compare the
―skepticism‖ of the New Testament scholar and the ―skepticism‖ that apologists might
have about apparitional experiences. Practitioners within each of these fields arrive at
two different conclusions with different degrees of certainty (or, uncertainty). Allison
concedes with the conclusions set by both camps.
By appealing to the pre-Easter predictions of Jesus, Allison‘s next argument is
that a skeptic could responsibly hold that the appearances were in reality apparitions but
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later retranslated into the language of the bodily resurrection. Jesus‘ predictions about
himself are
the sort of thing a skeptic would wholeheartedly welcome. Would not the evidence for
the resurrection be stronger if we could believe that Jesus did not forecast his
resurrection, so that the appearances were utterly surprising, totally unprepared for, and
so out of the blue? . . . I am unsure of the apologetical payoff. Keeping in mind that
religious movements tend to interpret events in terms of already established categories
and expectations, . . .could one not argue that the disciples, upon having apparitional
encounters with Jesus, interpreted them in terms of resurrection because resurrection was
the category that Jesus had antecedently given them?540

Notice that Allison once again refers to logical possibility of apparitions to explain the
appearances. This historiographical problem has already been addressed. Secondly, it
should be remembered that Allison himself affirms the reality of the appearances. And
he disputes the positive meaning that may be established (albeit tentatively) in the field of
apparitions research. Thus Allison might wish to play the role of the apologist when
facing the skeptical challenge that gives him anxiety about this problem.
If Jesus predicted his resurrection, then this would have added weight to the
religiously charged context that is not only needed to advance the argument for Jesus‘
resurrection, but would have been useful for understanding the nature of the appearances.
Nonetheless, Paul was unaware of these pre-Easter predictions. Presumably, at least
some of the 500 (1 Cor. 15:6) were unaware of them as well.
Allison responds that a skeptic‘s world-view might allow her to make the
apparitions inference. Perhaps she has had a firsthand experience of an apparition and,
consequently, strongly suspects that if the original percipients had the same
experience(s), then this would have driven them to affirm with unwavering constancy
that Jesus had been raised bodily:
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While there is not a sliver of evidence for such a fantastic state of affairs, it cannot be
dismissed as inconceivable, only wholly unlikely for utter lack of evidence. . . The
hypothetical scenario goes to show that proof of the Christian confession can never be
achieved because possible alternatives can always be imagined. It also raises the
question how Christians have come to the view that invoking space aliens beggars belief
whereas crediting God with a resurrection is sensible. Science fiction . . . has certainly
not hesitated to give aliens the power to raise human beings from the dead, so at least we
find the notion intelligible.541

Allison repeatedly conflates the historians‘ use of the best explanation and the notion of
proof. He needs to recognize that apologists usually cast their argument through the use
of the former, not the latter. Nevertheless, Allison needs to assess the arguments of
natural theology with the evidence for aliens in order for the analogy in support of the
apparition hypothesis to work.
One of the deepest and most perennial questions that people ask pertains to life
after death.542 These common questions stem from our natural inclinations. It makes
sense that God will concern himself with personal creatures to give them some answers to
help resolve the problem of death. If we take the questions about human destiny
seriously, then people must search for clues in history to get some answers about what
lies beyond the grave. In the words of Walter Kasper:
The question of man‘s purpose in life cannot be answered from within his own history
but only eschatologically. Implicitly, therefore, in all the fundamental processes of his
life, man is driven by the problem of life and its ultimate purpose. The answer will not be
found until the end of history. For the moment all man can do is to listen to and look at
history and try to find signs in which that end is portrayed or even anticipated. Those
signs will always be ambiguous within history; they will only become clear in the light of
faith‘s perceptions of that end of history, just as conversely that perception must
constantly make sure of its own validity in the light of history. Only if the problem is
seen in this comprehensive perspective can the testimonies of the early Church and of the
later church tradition be understood meaningfully. 543

In Christianity, life does not end at the grave, but continues on in a bodily life that is
glorious, incorruptible, and eternal.
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Allison seems to support the conciliar teaching about God‘s existence and the
importance of ramified natural theology: ―In like fashion, I understand why Richard
Swinburne, in his recent defense of the resurrection, commences by first seeking to
establish the existence of a certain sort of God and the likelihood of this God
communicating with and redeeming the human race.‖544 So, after showing some
openness to Swinburne‘s ramified natural theology, he refuses to consider it as an
underlying philosophical presupposition and settles for agnosticism about this natural
theology instead.545 He is inclined to accept a bare deism: ―I am reluctantly a cryptic
Deist. My tendency is to live my life as though God made the world and then went away.
It is hard for me to see the hand of providence either in history or in individual lives,
including my own.‖546 At times Allison brushes aside philosophy when it comes to
―doing history.‖ But philosophy, including the arguments of ramified natural theology,
deserve to influence historical thinking and argument, especially in a postmodern age
which stresses academic collaboration and interdisciplinarity (thus chapter one of the
dissertation). If historians follow philosophers in acknowledging good reasons to think
that God might reveal himself to us in a particular way, then that could rightly predispose
them to see God at work in the person of Jesus. 547
So Allison‘s reference to aliens as another historical possibility is disanalogous to
support for his case from apparitions as an undercutting defeater of the historical
argument for the resurrection. Unless he can refute Aquinas‘ proofs for the existence of
God and then provide convincing evidence for the existence of aliens and explain why
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they would have a likely interest to raise Jesus, the apologist seems to be amply justified
in holding to the resurrection hypothesis over its competing causal theories. It is possible
that a theistic God will make a personal entry into human history in order to provide
human beings with answers to their deepest questions about their final destiny. 548
Conclusion
In this chapter of the dissertation I have tried to highlight an evidential apologetic
approach to defending Christianity (for the evidential approach is one of a few models
broadly discussed in the conciliar documents). Because the Council Fathers
reemphasized the historical value of the New Testament writings for the purposes of
showing the credibility of Christianity, I have focused on the historical evidence for
Christ‘s resurrection. This concern resonates with the philosophical arguments
surrounding the natural knowledge of God in the chapter on scholastic apologetics. For
unless God exists, then there is no need to argue for the probability of a special divine act
that will ignite the Christian movement.
The broad consensus of scholarship in the postconciliar period indicates that there
are some generally established facts that critics must take into consideration when
weighing the resurrection hypothesis in comparison to other naturalistic explanations. I
have outlined the relevant facts (the burial, empty tomb, the appearances, and the origins
of Christian worship), and combed through the relevant literature in resurrection studies
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scholarship to pinpoint the major arguments that scholars have used to construct their
case. I am of the view that naturalistic explanations of the data do not make as much
sense as positing the bodily resurrection of Jesus as an event that occurs in history, a
special divine act of God that answers questions about human destiny. The most salient
rebuttal to the resurrection comes from Dale Allison and his apparitions hypothesis. I
also explained why I think his explanation is shortsighted, if not mistaken.
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A TEST CASE IN EXPERIENTIAL APOLOGETICS
From the time of the reformation until Vatican II, Catholic apologists sought to
demonstrate the truth of the existential truth of the Catholic Church by showing how it
alone epitomizes the four notes (i.e., oneness, holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity). As
a result of the Council, theologians now argue that the marks can be found in equal if not
greater measure—qualitatively speaking—in other churches and ecclesial communities.
Gone is the pre-conciliar approach which says that the Catholic Church is the one true
church. 549 This theological shift resulted in a decreased concern for apologetics.
Yet this decline does not mean the discipline of apologetics should be abandoned.
The ecumenical movement continues to grow out of the conviction that when Christians
are truly one, holy, catholic, and apostolic, the Gospel increases in credibility. 550
Apologetics needs to be modified in light of the Catholic Church‘s participation in the
ecumenical movement, taking on a more holistic approach than before. When Christians
recite in the creed that the church embodies the marks, they are still affirming the
fundamental features by which the true church is recognized.
Although the Council says that ecclesial elements, sanctification, and gifts of the
Holy Spirit can be found outside the influence of Catholicism, this does not nullify her
claim that she is the truest expression of the church.551 Hence, although other Christian
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groups might be true churches, they are not the truest Church. Ecclesiastical relativism is
not constitutive of conciliar teaching.
This chapter is formed under the theological vision of Vatican II in order to (1)
heighten an appreciation of post-conciliar apologetics by (2) utilizing the marks of the
church to (3) lend credibility to the Gospel. Prior to the Council, theologians sought to
establish the Catholic Church‘s distinctive doctrinal and moral claims over Protestant and
Orthodox Christianities on the basis of the marks. A post-conciliar apologist would
certainly be within his or her epistemic rights to show the superior expression of the
marks within Catholicism, 552 but that is not the intention of this essay. My aim is to
reach outsiders and even hesitant believers within the church community. Here the marks
are utilized to lend credibility to the Divine Founder, not to provide support for any
denomination over and against another.

Catholic Apologetics and the Ecclesial Attributes
In contrast to Pius XII‘s papal encyclical Mystici Corporis, which identified the
Church of Christ directly with the Catholic Church, the Fathers of Vatican II inaugurated
a remarkable shift by more broadly identifying the nature of the church. In Lumen
Gentium, for instance, the bishops declared that the church subsists in (and not simply is)
the Catholic Church.553 Given this more expansive view of the ecclesiastical landscape,
the bishops envision the church as a complex reality, not a ―perfect society‖ (as expressed
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in the manuals of pre-conciliar apologetics) or a single community holding to the four
properties exclusively. 554 Correspondingly, the church is recognized as an invisible and
visible reality, a mystical and hierarchical society, unable to be fully grasped. 555
Because the Catholic Church subsists in the Church of Christ, Catholics can no
longer hold to the older style of Catholic defense. Grace is not a quantitative thing,
limited to Catholics alone. Rather, it is qualitative, dynamically and efficaciously
working in the entire Church of Christ. Grace is the very life of God working in creation
and in human life. Avery Dulles rightly observed: ―Vatican II attributes the four
properties to the church of Christ, not directly to the Roman Catholic Church.‖556 As a
result of the conciliar teaching, many Catholic theologians think differently about the
marks today.557 Other churches are also said to be one, holy, catholic, and apostolic.
Extended further, holiness can also be found outside the boundaries of
institutional Christianity. The church rejects nothing that is true and holy in nonChristian religions.558
One consequence of this remarkable shift is that other believers who take
advantage of the gifts and callings they received can become more one, holy, catholic,
and apostolic than Catholics: all churches can in fact attain an equal if not higher degree
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of sanctity than Catholics alone. As Dulles concludes: ―Unity, holiness, catholicity, and
apostolicity are dynamic realities that depend on . . . the Holy Spirit. Evangelical
communities that excel in love for Jesus Christ and in obedience to the Holy Spirit may
be more unitive, holy, catholic and apostolic than highly sacramental and hierarchically
organized churches in which faith and charity have become cold.‖559
Thus the Council makes it difficult for apologists to demonstrate that Catholic
Christianity better embodies the ecclesial attributes than other religious communities.
The church of Christ is a mystery. And grace is not quantitative. As a human institution,
the Catholic Church may fail to live up to her divine calling. However, all other things
being equal, ecclesial vitality and institutional integrity can be found in greater measure
in the Catholic Church than in other churches. 560 According to Francis Sullivan: ―What
the Catholic apologist now has to justify is the claim of his church to have a certain
fullness of what it means to be a church, and a fullness of the essential properties, such
that it can rightly be said that the church of Christ subsists there in a way that is not found
in other churches‖ (emphasis mine).561
Although the ambitious argument of showing the superior quality of the marks
within Catholicism is occasionally pursued by apologists in the post-conciliar era, my
goal in this essay is to provide a defense of Christian faith in response to the secularist
allegation which says Christian faith does more harm than good in the world. 562 In the
pre-conciliar period, this argument was known as the via empirica. My argument is more
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attentive to a more broadly ecumenical era. Says Sullivan: ―there is reason to hope that
in the future a Catholic apologist will be able to base the via notarum on an
understanding of these properties that would represent at least a convergence, if not a full
convergence, that had been achieved through ecumenical study and dialogue.‖563
Unlike the strict use of the via notarum, which was used to argue for Catholic
Christianity, the argument of this paper will uphold and defend a contemporary version of
the via empirica―itself a form of the via notarum.564 Here credibility is given on behalf
of the Divine Founder, not to the doctrinal distinctives of any one church.
By definition grace manifests itself in persons and changes them for the better.
That is why this argument should always remain valid, even in a post-conciliar church.
As Joseph A. Komonchak observes,
The church‘s very existence is supposed to make the world different. It would be a
mistake, then, to imagine a tension, much less a dichotomy, between the texts of the
council that, to use a not entirely happy distinction made at the time, speak of the
Ecclesia ad intra and those that speak of the Ecclesia ad extra, to contrast a theological
to a sociological or historical approach to the Church, or to divide the theological notions
of the Church up between these two pretended oppositions. It is true, of course, that
some notions direct attention more clearly than others to one or another of these
dimensions, but it is a single dynamic historical agent that these dimensions constitute
and these notions describe. . . . The mystery of the Church is realized in the history of the
world.565

Each of the four marks logically implies the presence of the others. God‘s grace brings
people together (unity), and it enables them to reach their potential as human beings
(holiness). Part of what it means to be a human is to be inclusive towards others
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(catholicity). With this spiritual connection, there is historical continuity with other
believers, reaching backward into the past (apostolicity).
The notion that the church in its concrete existence can provide testimony to its
Divine Founder has never been absent in Christian thought.566 As the French Catholic
theologian René Latourelle once noted: ―The argument is a traditional one in the church.
From the first centuries, the Fathers, primarily Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, and
Augustine, appealed to it to defend Christianity, its miraculous spread, the constancy of
its martyrs, and the brilliance of its holiness.‖567 In modern theology the argument was
eventually taken up by Savonarola, Bossuet, Pascal, Lacordaire, Bautin, Dechamps,
Kleutgen, and Franzelin.
As a result of its widespread acceptance in the church, the argument was
dogmatically defined at the First Vatican Council (1869-1870). Vatican II (1962-1965)
followed the theology of Vatican I, but it did not call the church a ―moral miracle.‖
Instead it spoke of the church as a ―sign to the nations.‖568 In other places the Council
Fathers assert that Christianity helps change the world for the better. 569 Conversely, the
world‘s ominous doctrines, when construed apart from the values of true religion, will
gradually destroy the fabric of society. 570 Let us now turn to some philosophical and
theological arguments to understand how Christian belief is thought to make a moral
difference in the lives of its constituents.

The Inner-Rationale of Catholic Beliefs and the Difference it Makes
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Traditional Catholic theology holds that the strongest form of moral motivation
can only be discovered by receiving God‘s grace, culminating in a life that is lived in
relationship with him. God‘s special infusion of grace is the necessary ingredient to live
out the virtues in the way they are intended to be lived out. Healing the person, God‘s
grace brings the acquired virtues to fulfillment by elevating believers to perform
supernatural acts, securing them on the right path to their final end. These supernatural
acts cannot be performed unless one receives God‘s grace.
Rather than merely stating that grace makes believers more virtuous than they
would be without I (which would be an unapologetic way of putting it!), there are at least
four reasons that can be philosophically adduced to provide an inner-rationale of the
difference Christianity makes in the world. Only someone who has faith will recognize
the effects of receiving grace, but unbelievers can still apprehend the intrinsic connection
between Christian beliefs and the way in which they develop stronger forms of moral
motivation.
First, because human life does not end in death in a Christian universe, all persons
are held accountable for their actions during their earthly lives. In the end the scales of
justice will finally be balanced, and righteousness will prevail over evil. Every evil will
be transformed for the greater good. In turn every decision that is made by Christians in
this lifetime has eternal significance because there is something to hope for in the end.571
Christian believers can, therefore, make decisions that run strongly against temporal
pressures and embrace acts of extreme self-sacrifice for the greater good. As Linda
Zagzebski says: ―the moral life involves more than time and effort. At least some of the
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time it involves the sacrifice of self-interest. It is not rational, however, to give up a
known good unless it is probable that the sacrifice really is for a greater good.‖572
Second, belief in the Christian God provides moral resolution in a world which is
highly pluralistic and uncertain with respect to moral matters.573 Moral pluralism can
easily lead to moral skepticism and despair, making it easy, if not inevitable, to doubt the
moral efficacy of human beings altogether. The problem with atheism is that not only is
objective morality undermined, but so is rational thought.574 A world of total and
unmitigated ―chance‖ is not a world of reason, but of chaos. Rational beliefs may help us
in our struggle for survival, but the worldview of atheistic materialism does not build up
persons‘ confidence in helping them to know that their beliefs about the world are true.
Sometimes moral skepticism makes it seemingly irrational to sacrifice oneself for
another for their greater good because there is no guarantee that this is precisely what is
needed in certain ethical contexts. In this way, skepticism can lead to a deprivation of the
motivating force in building virtue. As Zagzebski asserts, moral skepticism ―does not
take away the natural desire to be moral, but it does take away the motivating force
because morality is intimately connected with feelings, commitments, sacrifices,
expectations, and hopes. The moral life involves risk; both because of the personal
sacrifices it requires and because of the emotional commitments it involves.‖575 In order
to transcend the impasse, something must provide moral guidance, to wit,—something
such as a divine revelation576 and providence.
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Third, if one embraces the moral point of view, then one needs the satisfaction of
knowing that they will have a reasonable chance of success at being moral. Atheists—
whether they are of the critical or practical variety—do not have the benefit of knowing
that they will have a good chance of success at being moral because there are so many
factors outside of their control that prevent them from reaching their full potential within
the limited amount of time they have to live. As Robert Adams observes: ―Having to
regard it as very likely that the history of the universe will not be good on the whole, no
matter what one does, seems apt to induce a cynical sense of futility about the moral life,
undermining one‘s moral resolve and one‘s interest in moral consequences.‖577
Belief in the living, revealed God, by contrast, enables one to overcome moral
weakness and inefficacy when facing the difficulties of moral living. The grace that
manifests itself in the infused virtues provides one with a greater chance of moral success
in facing the challenge of living the moral life.
Fourth, Catholic belief in the communion of saints helps believers to live a more
moral life by removing the feeling of cosmic loneliness, which can lead to despair. At
the heart of this doctrine is the belief that there is a communication of spiritual gifts
among the elect. This sharing includes those who have passed into the next life. With
this conception of spiritual communication in mind, believers become more conscious of
their obligation to contribute to the common good and also the extent to which they are
indebted to others for their own spiritual blessings. All believers, regardless of their
situation—no matter how dismal life might appear—can contribute to the betterment of
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the entire world through their lived example, prayer, and other spiritual sacrifices (even if
they are performed alone or in secret).578
Now these arguments are suggestive and not individually probative. Each piece
of evidence is presented to create a cumulative case argument. An accumulated amount
of evidence, while unable to be persuasive if one takes one piece at a time, becomes more
persuasive when combined together. By no means are these four points comprehensive
accounts of the inner-rationale of Catholic or Christian beliefs; other doctrines could
certainly be included. The point is that Christianity enables believers to embrace a
distinctive life view that seems incapable of being reached in worldviews antithetical to
Christianity. Ideas have consequences. Beliefs affect behavior. And doctrine helps to
determine devotion.
Given the inner-rationale of Christianity, we should expect empirical traces of the
influence it has left in those societies it has deeply permeated. Karl Rahner once drew
attention to this: ―God really has redeemed, he really has poured out his Spirit, he really
has done mighty things for sinners, he has let his light shine in the darkness. . . she
{meaning the church} must not declare this merely as a possibility provided by God. . . as
if one could merely ‗presume‘ that God has poured out his Spirit without giving any
evidence at all of his mighty wind and his tongues of fire.‖579
The church can count a large number of believers who have lived as heroic
exemplars of sanctity in every historical age and circumstance. So confident is the
church‘s belief in the effects of Christianity that she has declared that the church itself is
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a motive of credibility. 580 Exemplifying a type of sacrament, the church ―is not a force or
entity which exists in its own right. On the contrary, it points away from itself, and
beyond itself.‖581 The transformation of so many people in so many different cultures
across the ages is so impressive that it requires an explanation.

Prospects for Developing the Via Empirica
Observations from history strongly suggest that Christianity has contributed to an
improvement in the physical, scientific, artistic, social, and political lives of countless
individuals. 582 Observations also suggest that Christianity has contributed to violence,
but I will address this issue in the second half of the chapter. As for now, I will focus on
the positive apologetic issues involved with the via empirica. The church‘s beliefs and
practices are distinctive in the sense that they form the worldviews of individuals to
perceive reality in a certain way, inaugurating the Kingdom of God ―on earth as it is in
heaven.‖
Now, only someone who has faith will recognize the mystery of the four marks,
but reason can apprehend the change that Christianity has had on a civilization. The
Catechism of the Catholic Church remarks: ―Only faith can recognize that the Church
possesses these properties [i.e., the four marks] from her divine source. But their
historical manifestations are signs that also speak clearly to human reason. As the First
Vatican Council noted, the ‗Church herself, with her marvelous propagation, eminent
holiness, and inexhaustible fruitfulness in everything good, her catholic unity and
580
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invincible stability, is a great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefutable
witness of her divine mission‘.‖583
Some detractors might note that historical effects are usually accounted for by
multiple causes, not just one. Thus Christian beliefs cannot be exclusively responsible
for any particular historical effect. It is true that historical effects usually have more than
one cause, but this does not mean that historians cannot posit specifically Christian
beliefs that are widespread in the culture as a necessary cause for certain widespread
effects. Because various causes have different values and contribute to forming various
phenomena in history, historians rarely affirm that entire movements and institutions can
be accounted for by a single cause. Many necessary causes, however, might contribute to
the ongoing influence of historical effects. Christianity is thought to be a major
contributor to the positive differences made in different cultures.
The following areas of research are not usually written with apologetic intentions,
but they do happen to coincide with the apologists‘ use of the four marks. Beginning
with the assumption that Christian beliefs can make a difference for the greater good, it is
now time to briefly introduce the relevant evidence that seems to confirm the soundness
of the philosophical arguments in the last section. We now turn, then, to some prospects
for developing the via empirica. Readers are encouraged to consult the footnotes for
developing the argument in more specific ways.
From the beginning of the Christian movement, a tradition developed in which
believers encouraged the use of reason and celebrated the possibility of progress in light
of their eschatological outlook. Unlike many other religions, which are focused on law,
Christianity was a religion based on grace by which the fecundity of theological
583
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reasonings were made possible. Theological development is taken seriously in
Christianity. Reason itself is seen as a gift from God. While many other religions are
based on mystery, intuition, ―esoteric knowledge‖ (gnosis), or even belief in capricious,
humanlike deities, Christianity embraces reason and logic as God-given guides to
understand unchanging religious truth.
Christianity continued to spread rapidly throughout Europe into the middle ages.
Its unique emphasis on rational theology and eschatology continued to transform its
adherents and entire societies. Though some antiquated works of history claim that after
the Roman Empire collapsed Europe eventually entered the so-called ―Dark Ages,‖
contemporary scholars repeatedly call this contention into disrepute. Rapid intellectual
and material progress began as soon as the church escaped from Roman rule and Greek
idealism. Consequently, medieval Europe soon surpassed the rest of the world in science,
culture and technology. 584
Innovations in productive capability, including advanced military weaponry and
improved transportation, were all significant features of medieval Europe. In the words
of Rodney Stark: ―So much progress took place during the so-called Dark Ages that by
no later than the thirteenth century, Europe had forged far ahead of Rome and Greece,
and ahead of the rest of the world as well. Why? Primarily because Christianity taught
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that progress was ‗normal‘ and that ‗new inventions would always be forthcoming.‘ This
was the revolutionary idea.‖ 585
The novelty of Christian beliefs helps to explain why the new faith was able to
grow at such an astounding rate. Outsiders found the strict nature of Christian belief
attractive,586 including its exclusive stance with respect to other religions. 587 Christianity,
moreover, was unlike any other religion at the time. Unlike Judaism and many other
religions, it did not discriminate on the basis of gender and social class. Christians called
on everyone to repent and believe in the Gospel. 588
Christian worship was highly intense in the face of the mundane liturgies of
ancient Judaism. 589 To be sure, earliest worship practices featured the belief that God
was active in the midst of ritual action. 590 The attitude in worship was not passive, but
was one in which the believer could expect to be changed by the Spirit. The intense
charismatic experience of the early Christians was highly attractive to outsiders. 591
Gerald O‘Collins writes:
A number of ‗this-worldly‘ factors, which help explain the propagation of Buddhism,
Confucianism, and Islam by the Gautama, Confucius, and Muhammed, respectively, do
not apply to Christianity. . . In these three instances we can point to publicly verifiable
causes which furthered the spread, respectively, of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam:
the long careers of the founders, financial resources, and success in battle. In the case of
Christianity, the founder enjoyed none of these advantages: his public career was
extremely short, he lacked military and financial support, and his life ended in a
humiliating failure and a disgraceful death on a cross. After all this, the subsequent
propagation of the message of universal salvation in his name remains an enigmatic
puzzle unless we admit a cause . . . adequate to account for the effect. 592
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To be more precise, the rapid rise and success of Christianity in the face of contrary
pressure cries out for some sort of an explanation. Thus the Christians‘ refusal to
accommodate the substance of their worship in the face of alternative pressure, and the
rapid rise and success of worshipping a crucified Messiah in the face of secular
opposition should all be exploited. 593
Closely linked to the Christian concern for reason and innovative progress is the
endorsement of natural law principles. No matter one‘s race, religion, or gender, every
human being is created in the image of God. Different understandings of natural law can
certainly be found in Greco-Roman cultures before the rise of Christianity, but it was
Christian thinkers who held that God was the author of nature. This deeply held
conviction set the stage for the defense of human integrity and universal rights in later
centuries. 594 Reference to human dignity is used to defend labor and economic
freedom.595 It has also played a significant role in liberation movements. 596
Although it may seem obvious today that everyone is created equal under God,
the historical evidence points in the opposite direction. Without the influence of
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Christian faith, it is not at all evident that equality trumps inequality given the various
strengths, talents, and circumstances of so many different individuals. Because God
creates and loves each person infinitely, however, everyone has intrinsic value in
Christianity.
Christianity‘s revolutionary ideas about human beings eventually contributed to
opposition to slavery. 597 When we look at the relationship between Christianity and
slaveholding, it must be admitted that the church originated and later developed in a
world teeming with slavery. Because the institution of slavery was so widespread and
uncontested in so many parts of the world, it was rarely protested against. 598 Hence one
might argue that the history of humanity is a history of slavery. The church may have
been the only organized group that eventually ‗declared the diminution, if not the final
elimination, of slavery to be meritorious‘.‖599 Even though it may have taken centuries to
abolish this repugnant practice in many places, Christians can be credited for
overthrowing it at times.
Similar circumstances apply in the development of women‘s rights. While the
earliest churches did not immediately protest against patriarchy, it elevated the status of
women in the face of Greco-Roman pressures to the contrary. 600 So different were the
ways that Christians treated women in the ancient world that the Romans scorned the new
religious sect as being effeminate and soft, lacking strong male virtues such as justice.
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Another fascinating area of research should center on the impact of Christian
theology upon the elevation of sexual norms. 601 The new standard set by the early
Christians has had a monumental impact on civilization. Detractors of Christian
morality, on the other hand, have argued that Christians borrowed their ideas about sex
from Greek philosophies and religions. But this contention is not at all sustainable in the
face of contemporary scholarship. As Kathy L. Gaca concluded in her groundbreaking
study, The Making of Fornication, ―Foucault and others are therefore mistaken in
maintaining that ‗the codes in themselves did not change a great deal‘ between Greek and
Christian Greek sexual principles. Paul‘s unconditional imperative to flee fornication
was radically new to the Greeks and other Gentiles, and its aim was to supplant religious
sexual existence as they lived it, or, in the case of the philosophers, as they conceived it
should be lived.‖602
The impulse of reason in the service of faith also gave impetus to the weighing
and assessing of evidence to understand God and his relationship with the world. 603
Eventually the intellectual milieu of the medieval period culminated into the university
system.604 As one noteworthy commentator reports, the ―university was a Christian
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invention that evolved from cathedral schools established to train monks and priests.‖605
According to Rodney Stark:
. . . was not a monastery or place for meditation. Rather, as Marcia L. Colish put it, ‗The
scholastics who created this heady educational environment rapidly outpaced monastic
scholars as speculative thinkers.‘ The key word here is ‗speculative.‘ The medieval
universities were unlike Chinese academics for training Mandarins or a Zen master‘s
school. They were not primarily concerned with imparting the received wisdom. Rather,
just as is the case today, faculty gained fame and invitations to join faculties elsewhere by
innovation.
The results were entirely predictable: factions formed and reformed; new schools of
thought abounded; controversy became the dominant fact of scholarly life. In a world
over which One True Church claimed exclusive doctrinal authority, the spirit of free
inquiry cultivated in the universities made theology the revolutionary discipline. As
increasingly large numbers of learned scholars pored over scriptures in search of original
insights, inevitably they often reached contradictory conclusions, some of which
prompted serious religious conflict and dissent.606

The medieval university simply cannot be compared to the academy of Greece or
Rome. 607 Correlatively, the medieval church was the first organized institution in the
world that showed consistent interest in the cultivation and preservation of knowledge.
The lineage of modern universities can be traced back to medieval universities such as
Bologna, Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge, not Greece or Rome. 608
The emphasis on God and reason also helped spur the rise of modern science.
Historians now almost universally recognize that the modern scientific revolution would
have been manifestly impossible without deeply embedded Christian philosophical
presuppositions in those societies where science originated. 609 Though we might take
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science and the orderly nature of creation for granted today, belief in a transcendent,
personal Creator who endows creation with orderly laws eventually provided the fathers
of modern science with some of the necessary intellectual resources for a quantitative
analysis of the universe. At the time western Europe was deeply influenced by the
rational theology of the scholastics and the university‘s emphasis on speculative thinking.
In Christianity all of creation is seen to reflect the rationality of the Creator.
Science developed because of the belief that creation is a cosmos (being orderly), not
chaotic or animistic as in other religions and cultures. Scripture lent support to the
rationality of the universe in late antiquity, and this subsequently laid the foundations for
understanding the world in a certain way. Conversely, non-Christian cultures did not
have the intellectual resources needed for the development of science as traditionally
understood.
Stanley Jaki and many others have argued that these civilizations worked out of
conceptual frameworks that hindered the growth of science. Jaki extended his thesis to
several civilizations as test cases and demonstrated that in each of them science was
unable to develop as a result of non-Christian conceptions of reality: Arabic, Babylonian,
Chinese, Egyptian, Greek, Hindu, and Mayan. 610 Conversely, it seems that the decline of
Christianity in the West will only harm the advancement of science (especially the
biological, chemical, and physical sciences). As the British physicist Peter Hodgson
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recognizes: ―While there are many causes for the decline of science, the decline of
Christian belief must be among them.‖611
Belief in one God is one of the single most influential beliefs of western
civilization.612 Science seems to vindicate this conclusion. Over the last few years, a
cumulating amount of research has confirmed the notion that spirituality has a positive
influence on human well-being and longevity. Believers are happier, healthier, and live
longer than their unbelieving counterparts. Affirmed with consistency in the medical
community, researchers maintain that belief in God and human health grow in direct, not
in inverse proportion with one another.613 As W.R. Miller and C.E. Thoreson assert: ―It
is hardly news that spirituality and religion can have an important influence on human
health and behavior. Religious resources figure prominently among the methods that
people call on when coping with life stress and illness.‖614
The causal relationship between religion and health is occasionally challenged by
projection theorists and their nineteenth century forebears (i.e., Freud, Marx, and
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Feuerbach),615 but the thing to keep in mind is that these challenges do not square with
the prevailing clinical evidence. As Miller and Thoreson recognize:
In the spirit of two-tailed tests, clearly research on religion should examine both its
positive and its negative potential effects on health. Certainly misuses and abuses exist
within religion, as they do in any significant social institution. Apart from such
distortions of religion, however, it is entirely possible that certain religious beliefs or
practices are associated with adverse health effects. At present there is no substantial base
of empirical evidence regarding negative effects of religion on health (Thoresen et al., in
press). If research on health benefits of religion has been widely avoided within
mainstream psychology, well designed studies of its potential adverse effects appear to
have been even more shunned.616

The projection theory is not a scientific one, but a philosophical contention—and a highly
presuppositional one at that. Freud himself once said: ―Let us be quite clear on the point
that the views expressed in my book [i.e., The Future of an Illusion] form no part of
analytic theory. They are my personal views.‖617 Indeed, Freud had very little
acquaintance with patients who believed in God. Nor did he ever publish a report based
on hard evidence garnered from working with believers. 618
Yet another area of apologetic research should focus on the emergence of
charitable organizations, health care, and organized hospitals in the patristic and medieval
periods.619 Because Jesus taught the importance of unconditional love, countless forms
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of charitable organizations have formed since the patristic era. Part of the reason for the
emergence of monastic orders during the medieval period was to help the poor and help
the sick recover from disease.
Critics of this viewpoint have argued that early Christianity was ubiquitously
characterized by magical means of healing and other superstitious practices. But this
contention is not a convincing argument in light of more recent scholarship.
Contemporary scholars maintain that the churches relied on the best available naturalistic
sources of healing in the early medieval period. Moreover, the origin of the medieval
hospital was influenced by Christian ideals such as compassion for the patient, regardless
of past sins. As Gary Ferngren, an expert in the rise of medicine, explains:
Throughout the Hebrew scriptures one finds the popular view enunciated that illness and
disease are God‘s punishment for sin and wrongdoing. . . . Pagan culture [on the other
hand] discouraged all attempts to deal with the sick as a societal problem, in part, because
it assumed that the sick were suffering deservedly; in part, because of the pessimism that
regarded society as incapable of significant improvement; and, in part, because of a
quietism that rejected the desirability of attempting real change in society. The resulting
passivity accounts for the failure of state officials to undertake public relief during times
of plague and reflects the ease with which ancient societies accepted suffering without
undertaking efforts to ameliorate it. Underlying it as well was the belief that plague was
retributive, a punishment by the gods on society for some failure of an individual or
magistrate that could be removed only by their propitiation.
Unlike the classical world, Christianity rooted its attitude to philanthropy in
theology. The impulse behind Christian philanthropy was the encouragement of a selfgiving love of one‘s fellow human beings that reflected the love of God in the Incarnation
of Christ and his death for the redemption of the world. . . .The Incarnation of Christ had
changed and elevated the human body, including that of lepers. Their bodies transmitted
their holiness to those who had cared for them.620
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The church‘s interest in physical healing was intimately linked to its concern to fulfill the
Great Commission. Undoubtedly the rise of Christian faith helped spur the emergence of
health care and medicine.
On another front, believers have depicted the created world and the events of
salvation history in different forms of artistic expression across the ages.621 Since belief
in the incarnation is taken to mean, in part, that God has elevated the creation to a new
level, creation should be appreciated. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find an art
historian that denies the positive influence of Christian faith on art. Despite the repeated
attempts of iconoclasts, the Magisterium has consistently defended art as a form of
spiritual expression by referring to theological principles. 622 Inspired by the Scriptural
conviction that the world is orderly and capable of being pondered, for instance, Christian
artists seek to construct their work according to ―measure, number, and weight‖ (Wisdom
11:21).623
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Many examples immediately come to mind: the Sistine Chapel, Da Vinci‘s The
Last Supper, Michaelangelo‘s Pieta, and Rembrandt‘s Christ at Emmaus and Simeon in
the Temple. Veronese, Titian, and Tintoretto are responsible for painting some of the
most well- known murals in Europe. These can all be found in Venice. Who can ignore
Handel‘s Messiah, Mozart‘s Requiem, and the music of Johann Sebastian Bach? Not to
be overlooked, the centerpiece of medieval art is the gothic cathedral. As Paul Johnson
writes: ―The medieval cathedrals of Europe . . . are the greatest accomplishments of
humanity in the whole theatre of art.‖624
No impartial historian denies that some of the most memorable works of literature
have also come from Christians: Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton. The point here is not
to say that these artistic works were produced by Christians. Rather, the more forceful
(and interesting) claim is that Christian beliefs provided these geniuses of art with a
distinctive way of expressing themselves. This influence has been so monumental that
even critics of the church have, in many cases, borrowed from Christian themes to
convey the points that they do. Take Goethe‘s Faust as an example. In the story the
allegory of suffering is derived from Christian views on suffering.

Response to Objectors to the Via Empirica
A major criticism of this argument is that high levels of morality (and human
benefits) can be found outside the institutional church. 625 As the atheist sociologist Phil
Zuckerman recognizes, ―nations marked by high levels of organic atheism—such as
Sweden or the Netherlands—are among the healthiest, wealthiest, best educated, and
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freest societies on earth.‖626 Now, casting aside the difficult contention of having to
show that these societies have never been affected by Christian beliefs in either a direct
or indirect manner, the more important thing for Christians to remember is that Christian
beliefs and the concrete expression of the marks do not always go hand in hand. Vatican
II does not endorse the exclusivist viewpoint in the strict sense of the term. Catholic
theology does not hold that holiness can only be found in those cultures influenced by the
church. Because grace is not a quantitative thing, holiness can be found outside the
influence of institutional Catholicism.
So if the claim of the via empirica is that holiness can only be found in those
societies influenced by the Christian world-view, then of course Zuckerman‘s findings
gain some force. Unlike fundamentalist advocates of Christian faith, mainstream
theologians do not argue that holiness can only be found in Christian communities and/or
societies. Zuckerman repeatedly caricatures the Christian view as a strict exclusivism. 627
But the via empirica claims that, all things being equal, Christianity will make a moral
difference. Above I presented four philosophical arguments to elucidate that contention,
and it is confirmed by recent findings in social sciences. What is more, this evidence
itself is not all that controversial.
Vatican II affirms that human beings are the only creatures that God has willed
for their own sake.628 Hearing the Gospel is merely an outward sign that God is calling
its hearers to a greater relationship with himself, not that he loves those who hear and
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respond favorably to the message more than those who remain cognitively ignorant of it.
Nor does conciliar teaching hold that God is not working for the betterment of persons in
societies outside the influence of Christianity. As Eugene Hillman rightly said: ―if there
are degrees of holiness among Christians, then we would assume that these same degrees
may be actual also among those who, because of their historical situation and through no
fault of their own, cannot have explicit faith and historical belief in Jesus Christ. God
truly wills the salvation of every member of the human race, not just those who happen to
be born in the right time and place.‖629
What, then, is the benefit of the institutional church given the multifaceted nature
of God‘s grace? Given the nature of God‘s revelation, believers have the opportunity to
point to something tangible in history to substantiate God‘s love for the human race.
Christ confirms divine revelation and gives it a historical, concrete expression. 630
Therefore, God is working outside the formal influence of the church, but is explicitly
known and reinforced through the church‘s teachings. Maurice Boutin observes that
―God‘s grace is not bound to Christianity, but Christianity is bound to God‘s grace, which
is for Christian faith Christ‘s grace as well. As such, explicit Christianity is the full
realization of God‘s grace.‖631 Being a part of the institutional church enables one to
have the highest potential of living out the grace of God. By no means is this opportunity
always actualized by Catholics.
Thus we should expect to see positive contributions to societies in non-Christian
contexts without the outward sign of grace we call ―the church.‖ However, spiritual
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vitality and Christ oriented institutional integrity can only be found in the Catholic
Church. God‘s grace can be detected in places not influenced by institutional
Christianity. Grace is not limited to Christians, but is manifested in the world in different
times, locations, and degrees. By the grace of God, some ―non-Christian‖ cultures may
outshine ―Christian‖ ones. Grace can be indirectly felt in societies affected by the
church, but it is not limited to manifesting itself in Catholic (or Christian) circles alone.
This chapter has thus highlighted some of the unique ways that God has graced
the institutional church, and it seems to vindicate the idea that Christian belief can make a
moral difference in the lives of believers for the better. While it has not shown the
superior expression of the marks within Catholicism over other Christianities or even
other world religions, it was concerned with undercutting the challenge which says that
the Christian faith does more harm than good in the world.
When one thinks of the terrible incidents of church related persecution, including
the pettiness and inadequacies of so much daily church life, it becomes easy to doubt the
vital work of the Spirit. Who we are is more important than what we can say. Let us now
turn to the negative apologetic concerns with the via empirica.

Violence as a Defeater of the Via Empirica?
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the experiential approach is that Christianity has
led many of its adherents down the path of violence. Or, Christianity is associated with
violence. Indeed, one of the primary arguments in the recent spate of atheist literature is
that Christianity causes violence. Steven Pinker is representative of this viewpoint:
―religions have given us stonings, witch-burnings, crusades, inquisitions, jihads, fatwas,
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suicide bombers, and abortion clinic gunman.‖632 He says that humans once believed
God commanded them to ―massacre Midianites, stone prostitutes, execute homosexuals,
slay heretics and infidels, throw Protestants out of windows, withhold medicine from
dying children, and crash airplanes into skyscrapers.‖633 Let us be clear about the atheist
claim: the argument is not that violence results when religious groups engage in war
because the right conditions are in place for a defensive strategy to justify political ends
(as proponents of the just war have traditionally maintained), but that Christianity is one
of the primary reasons why violence breaks out in the first place.
Attributing violence to the fundamental teachings of Christianity―in either a
direct or indirect manner―is tantamount to affirming that God is a malevolent God who
works through his people to spread evil in the world. On this view, the Christian God is
nothing other than an evil god, not an omnibenevolent deity who is concerned with the
welfare of the human race. There might as well be no god at all. Steven Weinberg pulls
no punches: ―Good people will do good things, and bad people will do bad things. But
for good people to do bad things—that takes religion.‖634
As a Catholic theologian who is concerned with the atheist claims pronounced
against Christianity (and not so much against the claims of violence in other religions), I
will argue that the new atheists‘ claims are refutable. Christians are within their
intellectual rights to believe in Christ. Christians who have become violent in the name
of the Savior have either knowingly or unknowingly allowed reductive ideologies for
religious justification to control their thinking and choices. Christianity does not cause
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violence per se, but violence that is committed under the banner of Christianity is
actually a distortion of Christian faith. To clarify some potential confusion, I will discuss
the papal endorsement of the just war and show that it cannot be equated with
Christianity as a cause of violence.
This aspect of the via empirica must be interpreted as a piece in negative
apologetics; it is concerned with responding to atheistic claims pronounced against
Catholicism as a violent religion. Another task of negative apologetics is to expose the
weaknesses within those criticisms. On the other hand, a work in positive apologetics
would attempt to undercut the atheists‘ claims by overwhelming them with positive
evidences showing the beneficial impact Christianity has had upon the world.

The New Atheists and Christian Absolutes
Different proponents of the new atheists propose different types of arguments.
Sam Harris, for instance, claims that inter-religious warfare was much more prevalent in
the pre-modern world than it is today. Given the fact that Christianity thrived in the premodern period, its anachronistic religious tenets help to explain why religiously related
violence occurs today.635 Therefore it is likely that Christianity is responsible for
inaugurating violence in today‘s world.
Harris‘s assertion is vague and imprecise for a variety of reasons. When I use the
word ―vague,‖ I mean that it is extremely difficult to decide whether war is more of a
―pre-modern‖ phenomena than a modern one. How, exactly, does Harris determine this?
Does he compare the frequency of battles fought during these two time periods? Or does
he calculate the intensity of the fighting? Or body count? The reason why this is
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important is that there are other historians of warfare who argue for the exact opposite
conclusion. They contend that war is a peculiarly modern phenomena, not a pre-modern
one. As James Turner Johnson suggests, ―the ongoing civil strife in Northern Ireland
aside, the last time wars were fought for religion in the West was during the century after
the protestant Reformation.‖636 Certainly, from the time of the 16th century onward,
religion would only remain, in the words of David Martin, ―one marker of national
identity.‖637 Indeed, many anthropologists now recognize that the idea that pre-modern
religion is the cause of violence is often founded on unreliable, uncritical, or even
nonexistent positive evidence. 638
Harris also seems to beg the question with respect to the supernatural (i.e., he
assumes that pre-moderns were superstitious). But if supernaturalism can be shown to be
the superior worldview over naturalism, then Harris‘s claim is severely undercut. In
some respect, the modern worldview is no more ―enlightened‖ than the pre-modern
worldview. As Huston Smith has written, very few, if any, persons ascribe to either the
modern or pre-modern worldview at the expense of the other; they inevitably hold on to
elements from both.639 Modernists may know more about some things than pre-moderns
(e.g, modern science and technology), but in other cases we are less perceptive than they
were (e.g., pre-moderns had a healthier imagination than moderns); moderns may be
enlightened over them in different ways, but pre-moderns may have been more subtle and
perceptive in others. Thus, if God exists, then Harris‘s argument loses its force.
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Still others claim that part of the reason why Christianity has lasted well into
modernity is that it continues to meet the needs of humanity. 640 Harris can give reasons
for why he thinks Christianity is wrong, but he cannot deny that modern people continue
to be drawn to its message. Thus critics who are condescending about Christianity today
will have a negative estimation about understanding its past.
Closely related to Harris‘s objection is the idea that Christians believe in moral
and doctrinal absolutes. As Richard Dawkins wrote, absolute truth predisposes
Christians to engage in violence, and, to a more intense degree, war. When asked to
explain his contempt for religion, Dawkins responded that it is a sure spawning ground
for violence: ―Certainly [belief in God] can be positively harmful in many ways‘, he
replied, ‗obviously in causing wars, which has often enough in history . . . causing people
to do ill to one another because they are so convinced that they know what is right.
Because they feel it from inside—they‘ve been told from within what is right—anything
goes—you can kill people because you know that they‘re wrong.‖641
Dawkins has a significant point here (as I will explain later on, a rigid
understanding of absolute truth is a sure sign that Christianity is becoming corrupt).
What he seems to forget is that absolute truth is undeniable, regardless of one‘s
worldview. For example, he argues that Christian doctrines are, to paraphrase him,
false;642 and he also upholds the truth of atheism. But these are two absolute claims!
Thus, if he is right about the absolutism of Christianity, then he is wrong about the
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epistemic warrant of Christians who defend absolutes; and if he is wrong about absolutes,
then he is wrong about the absolutism of Christianity. To put this in other terms, if innerreligious clashes between Christians causes violence because of doctrinal and moral
differences, then wouldn‘t Dawkins‘ differences with Christians put him at risk in
becoming violent as an advocate of atheism?
Epistemologically speaking, the issue is not whether Christians are setting
themselves up to become violent in thinking they have the truth (metaphysics), but in
how rigid they perceive (epistemology) it. Because truth is one (metaphysical), unity
arises between people as they come to know (epistemology) it more clearly. Unity in the
truth, however, does not automatically entail uniformity in the truth. This rationalistic
view of absolutes can lead to intolerance and violence. But this is not how the Catholic
Church understands truth. There is supposed to be a legitimate pluralism within the
bounds of orthodox truth.643
Although Catholics can and must learn to be tolerant with what we think are
erroneous beliefs in other world and life-views, we must strive to respect everyone‘s right
to think and choose differently. This is completely in line with the ecumenical
movement. This conviction can and must be upheld, especially in light of the
fundamental Christian conviction that all people are created in the image of God. Indeed,
disagreement can and must co-exist with respect. When I say ―respect,‖ I mean that
Christians are in fact called to peacefully acknowledge that others can disagree with them
without resorting to force in the process. To put this in more positive terms, the fact that
we can agree to disagree about our fundamental beliefs can actually become an
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opportunity for us to keep our fundamental questions and interaction about God alive and
even renewed. Despite our differences in a pluralistic society, Christians can contribute
to promoting the common good with others who do not agree with them without
advancing violence at the same time.
Many Christian theologians have stressed that all people can apprehend the
absolute truth about God and humanity. 644 But Catholic theology is a little bit more
nuanced than this and holds that every person can see and articulate this absolute truth in
different ways. The metaphysical truth is the same for all (God‘s existence, with Christ
as the Savior), but the epistemological can be radically different for different individuals.
This does not lead to outright pluralism (where the epistemological is exploited, and the
metaphysical is abrogated to nothing), but to an inclusive faith that maintains the unique
role of Jesus Christ.
In many cases the atheistic charge of absolutes is closely linked to biblical
injunctions in the Old Testament. A widespread argument of the new atheists is that the
God of the Old Testament once commanded the extermination of certain groups. 645 For
them the God of the Old Testament is a God of war. As new atheist Victor Stenger one
put it, ―The Old Testament is filled with atrocities committed in the name of God. These
are rarely mentioned in Sunday school, but anyone can pick up a Bible and read them for
herself.‖646
Instead of arguing on a literalistic point-counterpoint basis with the atheists, one
must provide a more nuanced response. The Old Testament must be seen as a collection
of individual books from different cultural traditions, written at different times. All of
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these books shed light on how the nation of Israel perceived what they thought was God‘s
providence for them at the time. Since Revelation continues to develop as time goes on,
our understanding of it today should clarify the meaning of these older texts. Today
some Christians interpret the Old testament through the lens and prism of the life and
teaching of Jesus (cf. Matt. 5:17, 18). Christians have always used a variety of methods
of interpretation when viewing the Old Testament with that lens in focus. 647 This is very
important to keep in mind in responding to this atheistic argument. When the historicalcritical method of interpretation becomes the sole method of interpretation, it is easy to
infer that the God of the Old Testament is a violent God who has timelessly commanded
his people to kill those who would oppose him. 648
As such, a Catholic understanding of the Hebrew Scriptures should not only
include the literal sense of interpretation, but also the spiritual sense. As Pope John Paul
II declared, the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, in addressing biblical exegesis,
―rejects a split between the human and divine, between scientific research and respect
for the faith, between the literal sense and the spiritual sense.‖649 Later on in this
document, he writes, ―exegetes have to make use of the historical-critical method. They
cannot, however, accord to it a sole validity. . . . Exegetes should also explain the
Christological, canonical, and ecclesial meanings of the biblical texts.‖650 The Old
Testament books are also shaped by the community and historical and social contexts
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through which individuals engage, internalize, and act upon these text.651 In order to
understand them accurately today, one must interpret them within the community that
was responsible for originally writing them down, including those communities that
continue to pass them down today.
So although Catholics hold that all Scripture is inspired by God, this does not
mean that everything reported in Scripture should be taken at literal face value (which is
how a historical-critic will tend to view them).652 For it is widely recognized that the
books of the Old Testament are not mere historical reports, but are highly colored by
theological motifs. This is another reason why historical-critical exegesis cannot be the
sole means of interpretation. It will fail to do justice to the texts to understand them
correctly. When many methods are used through the lens of Christ‘s life, the picture of
God that emerges is not a God of war, but a merciful God who demands justice, urging
his people to remain faithful to the covenant.

The New Atheists as Doctors of Modernity
Harkening back to Karl Marx‘s view of religion, Christopher Hitchens complains
that belief in the afterlife predisposes believers to not care about what happens in this
lifetime. The more and more believers project their cares onto the next lifetime, they less
and less they will care about what happens in this lifetime. They will not care whether
they die, or whether they die in battle or in suicide attacks. In many cases belief in the
afterlife predisposes believers to become violent.
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Now this is an understandable conclusion for Hitchens and others (like John
Lennon, for instance, who sang ―Imagine there‘s no heaven‖ with a promise that this
would leave us with ―nothing to kill or die for‖) to make if they deny the continuity
between this lifetime and the next. It is also understandable if these atheists think that
Catholicism teaches that all people will go to heaven. But in the Catholic view, there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the person who dies and the person who rises.
Christian theology has always maintained that hell is a real state of final existence. 653
The individual fate of each individual person—whether it ends in the bliss of
heaven or the justice of hell—is ultimately determined by the way in which we shape our
characters in this lifetime. Because there is a heaven and hell, this invests every moral
decision in our lifetime with eternal significance. Life is filled with meaning because
good actions are worthy to perform in and of themselves. Immoral actions must always
be avoided.
Because human life does not end at the grave in a Christian universe, all persons
are held accountable for their actions during their earthly lives. In the end the scales of
justice will finally be balanced, and righteousness will prevail over evil. Every evil will
be transformed for the greater good. In turn every serious decision that is made by
Christians in this lifetime has eternal significance because there is something to hope for
in the end. 654 Christians can make decisions that run highly against contrarian pressures
in their lifetime and embrace acts of extreme self-sacrifice for the greater good. By no
means does the acknowledgement of God‘s existence entail heavenly reward and/or final
justice. Christian belief can afford one that type of motivation.
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Catapulted by the Paschal Mystery, the first Christians were led to care more
about earthly life, including the goodness of creation itself. 655 Belief in the incarnation
demanded this kind of attitude. Again, God entered into creation and became human.
Not caring about one‘s embodied life and the creation itself is therefore diametrically
opposed to the very meaning of believing in the incarnation itself. At most, Hitchens
argued against a false conception of what it means to be a Catholic/Christian. Like the
other arguments surveyed here, Hitchens‘ argument is completely unsuccessful.
Celestial escape from worldly affairs is brought to the fore by Dawkins in
Freudian terms. According to Richard Dawkins, Christianity is actually bad for people—
it is a ―kind of mental illness.‖656 In this view, belief in God is a kind of mental virus that
infects what is otherwise a healthy mind. The more and more people succumb to
religion, they more they become inclined to do things normal people would not do. This
includes include violent behaviors. 657
Dawkins‘ argument is basically a newer version of Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud‘s
projection theory against belief in God. In their view, God can be merely explained in
terms of sociological, psychological, and/or anthropological categories of the mind.
When individuals begin with this atheistic presupposition, the projection theorist has a
strong point in arguing that faith leads people down the path of self-destructive behavior.
But until good arguments are first given for atheism, the projection theorist simply begs
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the entire question. 658 Basically what the neo-atheist is saying is that because God does
not exist, how could there be such a thing as religion or religiously related violence? But
this starting point is the very thing that needs to be challenged. Arguments in favor of
theism are often seen as cogent in contemporary theology and philosophy—arguments
that are often unaddressed in the new atheist literature.
Similarly, the atheistic projection theorist seem to commit the genetic fallacy.
That is to say, they confuse how one comes to believe in God with whether the belief in
question is true.659 Certainly, the psychology of belief is not the same thing as the
rationality of belief; how one comes to believe in God may not have anything to do with
whether the belief in question is true.
Moreover, the idea that God is a projection of our minds to keep us safe from the
unrelenting forces of nature and society is somewhat idiosyncratic. To be sure, the God
of Christian tradition is merciful, but he is also seen as retributive. This kind of God
makes it difficult to understand why anyone would want to project him. This is a point
that even Dawkins concedes in his book on atheism. 660 Christians might ask the atheists
in response: is it really a bad thing to say that belief in God brings satisfaction and peace
of mind to those who need it? All people need to be comforted with a variety of things—
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food, shelter, friendship, and camaraderie. All of these are real human needs. Perhaps
there is a real human need for God.661
So, it should be remembered that there is nothing wrong with coming to God for
help in our time of need, but in Christian worship we also adore God for who he is. In
Catholic theology, salvation becomes more demanding for anyone exposed to the Savior,
not easier to attain. 662 In lieu of the last point, it must be admitted that believers do
sometimes project things about an incomprehensible God. But some false projections do
not entail that all beliefs about him are false. 663 Growing in discipleship and knowing
God is an ongoing, daunting process. Lastly, the atheists might also be confusing the
Christian call to a lead a simple lifestyle with psychological weakness.
On another front, the issue has very little to do with electro-chemical and
neurobiological processes in the brain. It is has everything to do with how the scientific
evidence is interpreted.664 Some will interpret the evidence and argue that belief in God
can be merely reduced to complex physical mechanisms. Others will argue that all
human experience has, in fact, a neurobiological component to it. Seen in this way, brain
processes are the proximate cause of how people experience God, but the ultimate cause
is due to the extra-mental reality of God himself. Until Dawkins can explain why a
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single layered explanation of the evidence should be preferred, this interpretation remains
a valid one.665
In addition, there is a growing amount of well-established scientific evidence that
indicates a direct causal link between religious commitment and well-being. 666 To my
knowledge, Dawkins is either completely unaware of these findings or chooses to ignore
them. Dennett, it may be added, who is an avid reductionist in the biological sciences
like Dawkins, admits that this conclusion about the relationship between religion and
health is sound.667 In fact, he says, one of the advantages of religion in the long struggle
of evolution was that it helped human beings to live in communities without fighting and
killing one another!668

Christianity, Atheism, and the Testimony of History
The testimony of history clearly reveals that Christians have committed many
heinous crimes. Whether it is the Crusades, the Inquisition, the fighting between
Catholics and Protestants, the justification of slavery, the slaughter of those who refused
to convert, or the fighting in Northern Ireland, history conclusively shows that
Christianity is a violent religion. All of these episodes, according to Regina Schwartz,
explain how ―monotheism‖ has brought a ―violent legacy‖ to the west.669
Now there is no question that many Christians have committed an incalculable
amount of hate crimes. But the thing to keep in mind is that this objection must show
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that Christianity causes violence, not that it is correlated with it. With this extreme
difficulty in mind, this ―argument from historical observation‖ does not demonstrate that
Christianity causes violence, but has more of a descriptive character to it, exposing the
very problem that needs to be addressed.
Even though historians can give many examples showing where the faith has been
correlated with violence, it is difficult to deny on those same grounds that Christianity
has been associated with a tremendous amount of good.670 As Michael Shermer has
admitted, ―for every one of these grand tragedies there are ten thousand acts of personal
kindness and social good that go unreported. . . . Religion, like all social institutions of
such historical depth and cultural impact, cannot be reduced to an unambiguous evil.‖671 I
have already discussed some of these positive changes above. All of the good and the
bad must be weighed and assessed together, not just the bad track record that is
associated with Christianity. But considering the bad over against the good is exactly
what the atheists have done.
These examples of Christian violence indicate that we are dealing with highly
ambiguous scenarios that are open to interpretation on a variety of levels. Given this
ambiguity, it becomes difficult to demonstrate that Christianity was directly responsible
for driving believers down the narrow path of committing such awful crimes. The causal
factors involved with war, for instance, are usually explained in terms of social, political,
and economic causes—not religious ones. 672
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To make matters even more complicated, the problem of identifying the true
causes of war and violence comes in the attempt to identify and explain what actually
counts as good and bad. For example, many persons all over the world viewed Mother
Theresa as doing much good for the destitute in the streets in India. Others saw her as
having a bad social effect on the Indian political system. They believe that her resources
could have been utilized for better reasons. So the problem of defining what is good and
evil (which must be distinguished from the very fact of good and evil, which is universal)
usually varies from one culture to the next. The point is that this often makes it difficult
for anyone to identify that Christianity causes violent acts.
To bring this point home, this generalized ―argument from historical observation‖
is no more effective than saying atheism causes violence. After all, some historians seem
to think that atheist politicians such as Lenin admitted to using ―protracted violence‖ to
eliminate religion off the face of the earth. 673 The same could be said with respect to
politics. In Latin America, millions of people ―disappeared‖ in the words of extreme
right wing politicians and their militias. In Cambodia, Pol Pot was responsible for killing
millions in the name of socialism. But surely it is safe to conclude that politics is not
evil. 674
The same could be said about science. Surely no atheist would claim that science
is evil simply because some scientists were responsible for creating weapons to torture
people—like napalm. 675 The main point is that every single human institution can be
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utilized for evil when it is abused. As Alister McGrath urges, ―All ideals—divine,
transcendent, human or invented—are capable of being abused. That‘s just the way
human nature is. And knowing this, we need to work out what to do about it rather than
lashing out uncritically at religion.‖676
Many of the examples that are often mentioned by atheists should be
contextualized to get a better idea about the causal factors involved. In many cases,
historians have shown that many traditional stereotypes about Christian violence is
simply not as bad as commonly thought (e.g., the amount of people killed in the Spanish
Inquisition or the amount of people killed in the witch hunts in Salem 677).
Further, slavery is not commanded in the New Testament. 678 Paul commanded
Christian slaves to obey their masters simply because all Christians are called to service
in whatever vocation they happen to be in. So, when Paul says ―slaves, obey your
masters‖ he is not commanding slavery, but that slaves must live out their calling within
the context in which they find themselves.

Reductivism as a Catalyst for Religious Violence
One of the strengths of the new atheism is that they expose a correlation between
Christianity and violence.679 No one should doubt the importance of exposing this
problem. This ought to drive Christians to identify the root cause(s) of the violence
performed in the name of Christ to correct these problems accordingly. We are still left
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with having to explain why Christians become violent in the name of Christ. In order to
accomplish this task, I will explain and describe the thought patterns and/or ideologies
that influence believers to engage in these acts. When one or more of these patterns of
thinking are in place, this can alert us of the seeds that can potentially sprout into
violence. At the same time, we can look back in history and see that when Christians
used force, these thought patterns were already operative and in place.
Well-meaning Christians who construe everything in terms of black and white
about reality may unknowingly feed attitudes and actions to justify violence that is
literally opposed to genuine Christian faith to begin with. The issue is not about
renouncing the notion of absolutes (a metaphysical reality), but about a specific
interpretation of them (a one-sided epistemology)—one in which truth demands uniform
consent from everyone. In this rigid view of truth it becomes easy to view non-Catholics
as outsiders, and, to a more extreme degree, as enemies who deserve punishment. 680 As
Charles Kimball writes: ―When particular understandings become rigidly fixed, and
uncritically appropriated as absolute truths, well-meaning people can and often do paint
themselves into a corner from which they must assume a defensive or even offensive
posture.‖681 The official Catholic position does not do away with absolutes, but allows
for a variety of interpretations along an orthodox spectrum. Truth should lead to a
symphony of voices in unity, not stagnant unison. Epistemological subjectivity is
certainly compatible with metaphysical objectivity.
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Historically speaking, the rigid view of truth probably led the crusaders to see
their Muslim opponents as disobedient to the gospel—simply because they were Muslims
and not Christians. This led them to slaughter the Muslims by the thousands.
Fundamentalist Christians in our own day have also fallen prey to this one-sided ideology
in murdering doctors who performed abortions (e.g. the reverend Paul Hill). They
claimed that their interpretation of the Bible was the only right one. According to Hill,
whoever opposed his interpretation deserved to die.
Second, when Christians limit the freedom and intellectual engagement of faith,
this can make them and others prone into taking directions that lead to violence in an
uncritical fashion. These individuals think that they know what God wants for them and
everyone else (put this together with epistemological absolutism, and the recipe for
violence increases exponentially).
For example, it is a known fact that David Koresh and Jim Jones ordered the
women in their groups to have sex with them. These women completely bypassed the
voice of common sense and conscience and, in blind faith, did what they were told—all
in the name of ―faith.‖ ―When people embrace this orientation, their brains often appear
to stop working properly; they no longer rely on their judgment and common sense.‖682
Catholic faith, on the other hand, affects the whole of human nature. It begins
with the conviction of the mind based on adequate evidence, and culminates in good
conduct. Despite what Dawkins asserts when he describes faith as ―blind trust, in the
absence of evidence, even in the teeth of evidence,‖683 faith is all about critical and
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responsible thinking. The Catholic view of faith is not a leap into the dark; it is a rational
step into the light, demanding responsible thinking (cf. Matt 10:16; Rom. 12:2; 1 Cor
14:20). Reasons can be given for faith. And no truth of reason will contradict a truth of
faith.
Third, reductive interpretations of the Bible can induce believers to become
violent. This violent approach usually occurs when the literalist method of historicalcritical interpretation is used at the expense of other methods when looking at certain
passages in the Bible that seem to suggest that God wants his people to fight and kill
others.684 Many Christians have fallen prey to this bible-based fallacy. Without
interpreting the Scriptures correctly, using a variety of methods, many Christians have
irresponsibly used prooftexts in support of slavery, discrimination against women, racial
minorities, homosexuals, and Jews. It has also led married couples to think that God was
going heal their children without using the necessary medicine (after all, they argued,
God works miracles for those who have ―enough faith‖). It has also been used by
Christians who sincerely believed that Mark‘s Gospel sanctions the use of snake
handling. Lopsided readings, therefore, can lead many uninformed interpreters into
thinking that certain behaviors are fine without recognizing at the same time that these
actions can lead to dire consequences.
Fourth, psychological debilitations make it easy to perceive one‘s situation as
bleak, catapulting them down the path of destructive behavior. When believers are in
need of psychological help, it becomes easy for them to say or do things in the name of
the Savior that they wouldn‘t ordinarily do. Likewise, when certain ends are heightened
further justification‘. Dawkins is correct to maintain that those Christians who are ‗blind in their
obedience‘ can lead to violence, but this is a human corruption of Christian faith.
684
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at the exclusion of others, this can lead Christians into becoming violent toward those
who get in the way of them being able to fulfill these obligations. 685 Kimball suggests:
In authentic, healthy religion the end and the means to that end are always connected.
But it is often easy for religious people to lose sight of the ultimate goal and focus instead
on one component of religion. When a key feature of religion is elevated and in effect
becomes an end, some people within the religion become consumed with protecting or
achieving that end. In such cases, that component of religion functions like an absolute
truth claim, and zealous believers become blind in their single minded defense of it. As
we will see, this corruption takes many forms, but the pattern is unmistakable. The end
goal of protecting or defending a key component of religion is often used to justify any
means necessary.686

Sometimes this mentality manifests itself in trying to defend sacred spaces, or in
maintaining religious life or a group identity. In history we see the concept of the end
justifying any means in Catholics who defended their group identity so intensely that they
ended up demonizing others in the process—against Jews, women, and other races and
classes. Another example is when certain bishops in the Catholic Church hid and shifted
priests from parish to parish who were pedophiles. Of course, the moral end of trying to
maintain the Church‘s reputation ended up superceding the moral end of simply being
honest. To conclude, when Christians consider certain goals sacrosanct and above all
else, it is easy for them to do whatever it takes to make sure these ends are met—even if
it takes violent action to do so.
Fifth, Christians have often used religious rhetoric to cover up their secular and/or
political purposes to engage in war.687 As Keith Ward rightly observes: ―It is when
religious institutions are blended with political institutions that religion can be enlisted in
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the use of force—and even then it is just one identifying marker among others.‖688 The
issue of political power was at least one of the markers in the case of the crusades. The
concern for spreading Christianity may have played some part in advancing these terrible
battles by stroking them with religious overtones, but the fundamental motivating factor
was the hunger for power and wealth. 689
The wars of religion (between Catholics and Protestants) are another perfect
example when political leaders used religious categories to advance their cause, but
actually their decisions were shaped more by geo-political and economic factors. As
James Turner Johnson argued, a common theme in Europe during the time of the thirty
years war was ―a link between the religious reformers and forces seeking more local
autonomy. The result was what we could today recognize as an ideological use of
religion to bolster claims essentially political and economic in nature.‖690
Here I have identified the various thought patterns that dispose Christians 691 to
engage in brutally violent acts. Reductionism pervades their mindset. By recognizing
these warning signs and remaining close to the true source of faith (i.e., the God of Jesus
Christ), Catholic Christians can begin to root out the causes of violence that is performed
in the name of faith before it actually happens.
Some critics will undoubtedly argue that Christians can be just as vicious as the
worst unbelievers. This would also tell against God‘s work in the Church (thus calling
the ecclesial attribute of holiness into serious question). But at most this would only
show how much worse true Christians would be without their faith. This allegation is not
688
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a definitive refutation of the holiness of the Church. For we should expect this holy
alteration from unbelief to belief to effect changes in habits of action. But we should not
expect these changes to be radical in new believers who already possess a significant
amount of virtue before embracing Christian faith (these individuals are not holy as such,
but are, more or less, more disposed to accepting Christ). The change is relative,
depending upon the person (and continues to be relative within the believing
community).
As such, sin is not a genuine effect of believing in Christ, but the result of having
a reductive understanding of believing in him (sometimes this reductionism is so extreme
that it can only be equated with unbelief692). The Church includes all that is holy, even
that which is holy in her sinful members. But she excludes whatever is impure—even
that which is unholy in her morally holy members. As Avery Dulles acknowledges:
―Sin, therefore, cannot be attributed to the church when considered in its formal
principles, but only when considered materially, in its guilty members. They exhibit not
the true nature but the ‗un-nature‘ of the church. Nevertheless it is true that, . . . In all its
historical forms the true nature of the Church is accompanied, like a dark shadow by its
‗un-nature;‘ the two are inseparable.‖693 Again, critics must be able to demonstrate that
Christianity is responsible for causing sin, not that violence is merely correlated with it.

When War is Justified in Christianity
Ever since the time of Augustine and Ambrose Christians have developed the
―just war theory.‖ Just war theorists recognize that if no one can figure out how to
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peacefully resolve a major dispute first, and that war must be waged to overcome
unjustifiable evil (like killing innocent civilians), then it can be fought. War can be
waged only to lessen an evil that would have been worse had the war not been fought at
all. Just war thinkers also contend that all means of peaceful resolution must be
exhausted before resorting to physical force. Thus there is a strong presumption against
going to war to begin with.
Just war theorists also recognize that when war is permitted, it is based on the sad
reality that even though the Kingdom of God has broken into our midst, this does not
mean it is completely here. We must wait for the coming of the fullness of the Kingdom.
Christians believe that all people are created in the image of God, and that we live in a
fallen world. With these two doctrines in mind, it is possible that a war can be fought.
The presumption of peace in just war thinking has also led its theorists to formulate
strategies to prevent war before it happens (interestingly, this presumption for the
peaceful means of resolution flows from the teachings of the New Testament, not the
criteria of the ius ad bellum which was later developed by Christian thinkers694). This has
flowed from later trajectories in just war thinking as well. 695 Just war theorists have also
formulated a standard ethical set of criteria that must be followed at all costs as the just
war is being fought. These criteria are known as the ius ad bello.
The important point to keep in mind is that the beginning point in Christian just
war thinking is nonviolent. Real Christian faith, which finds its source in a God-man
who would rather die at the hands of his adversaries rather than retaliate with force, can
allow for ―just wars‖ under certain circumstances. This does not mean that Christian
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faith has caused the war. Only when these attempts at nonviolent action have failed to
protect the innocent against injustice can legitimate political authorities use limited force
as a last resort as a means of self-defense to rescue the innocent in establishing justice.
―The Christian acceptance of warfare was always somewhat conditional,‖ observes James
Turner Johnson. ―The use of force was justified only if it was undertaken against evil,
and the soldier was enjoined to hate the sin against which he was fighting the sinner.‖696
This beginning point pervades an authentically Christian mindset.

Conclusion
What constitutes a Christian believer is the divine life that has been imparted to
her. The violence that believers commit is not due to the fundamental teachings of
Christ, but to sinful believers who are in continuous need of God‘s saving grace. Francis
Sullivan put it this way, ―to put it more acutely, the mystery is that the church is the
people of God which, as consisting of real people, is inevitably marked by sin, but, as
people of God, cannot fail to be holy.‖697
All Christians have either knowingly or unknowingly allowed certain ideologies
such as oppressive political, economic, and psychological forces to control their religious
thinking and/or choices. So long as Christ is followed by sinful persons, the faith
inspired by Christ will be ‗corrupted‘ to some extent. Believers are not the only ones to
share the burden of sin. But true believers will always partake against the struggle to
fight against sin. And this is precisely the reason why God took on flesh and came into
our world—to redeem us from violence (Luke 24:34). And this is precisely the reason
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why God continues to renew Christians in the Spirit who have yet to reach the fullness of
the Kingdom.
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REDEFINING APOLOGETICS
My proposal that a ―traditional apologetics‖ might find a place in a
postconciliar Catholicism will be welcomed by some and deplored by others. What are
some of the positive features of this dissertation? In the first half of this chapter I will
point out the positive contributions my dissertation makes; in the second half I will point
out some shortcomings and where further work needs to be done.

A Positive Evaluation of the Dissertation
There are at least ten positive aspects of this dissertation. Let me briefly
mention them here. Each of the following points will be discussed in more detail in this
section.
(1) Apologetics will always have a role to play in the church, no matter whether
the church is ―postconciliar‖ or not. There will always be objections and concerns that
prevent individuals from taking the claims of the church seriously. This fundamental
contention of the universal applicability of apologetics should be clear to all readers.
Whether one chooses to use the word ―apologetics‖ or not, the task of defending and
explaining the central truths of the faith will remain an ongoing struggle in the life of
faith. I have given my ―apologetic for apologetics‖ in the introductory chapter of this
dissertation. This dissertation also helps to fill in a gap left unaddressed by many
theological publications in the postconciliar period. High ranking officials of the Church
have been calling for projects like this. 698 Indeed, this dissertation is consistent with
Scripture, the history of Catholic thought, and Magisterial teaching.
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(2) The second positive feature of the dissertation is that it helps reintroduce the
task of probing some of the deepest questions that anyone can ask about Christianity.
Undoubtedly the contents of this dissertation will resonate with Christians and skeptics
who are able to think through the ramifications of Christianity as a religion that makes
truth claims (it will especially resonate with college age students and other intellectually
engaged laymen and women). There aren‘t too many theological works that address the
kinds of questions that I have written about in this dissertation.
As an example I addressed the existence of historical credibility of Jesus‘
resurrection from the dead from an evidential point of view. One of the most significant
challenges that Christians must face has to do with the miraculous origins of Christianity.
Is Jesus merely a great but dead person, or is he a risen living person and presence?
Christians claim that the crucified Jesus had been raised from the dead and remains
powerfully present in the world―a claim that deserves serious attention from any
thoughtful person. These kinds of questions are perennial ones.
(3) Third, unlike many older approaches to apologetics, which focused almost
exclusively on the deliverances of reason (scholastic apologetics), I have stressed the
importance of human experience (experiential apologetics), the meaning of doctrine
(theological apologetics), and the tentative nature of evidence (evidentialism). My
dissertation therefore emphasizes the apologetic enterprise without necessarily giving the
negative impression of ―combativeness‖ which typically characterized preconciliar
approaches to Catholic defense (approaches which focused almost exclusively on
reasoned approaches to defending Christianity). The models approach to apologetics is
therefore sensitive to the individual avenues through which people come to faith.

255

Older approaches were heavily concerned with gradually building a case for faith
(beginning with God, and then arguing for Christ and the Church, in that order). Thus
the dissertation recognizes the contextual nature of the different avenues of coming to
faith. My approach does not relegate apologetics to reasoned defenses alone. Instead this
dissertation is sensitive to the different contexts in which the arguments are made. One
might become convinced of the truth of Christianity because they analyzed the arguments
for God‘s existence before they sit down to look at the evidence for his divinity. In my
dissertation I acknowledge this approach (I realize that scholastic and evidential
apologetics are complementary, with the former having more foundational importance),
but also realize that other means of persuasion can be given in any order depending on
how the discussion between Catholics and their interlocutors proceeds.
Likewise, I recognize that apologetics cannot be relegated to the sphere of reason
before one comes to faith). Though I do not say it often in this dissertation, I recognize
that apologetics is not always needed in the dialogue before one comes to greater
experiences of faith. Hence I realize the limitations of traditional forms of apologetics in
a postconciliar church, but still believe in the validity of whatever was good in those
approaches.
(4) In the preconciliar manuals of apologetics, there was an emphasis on being
able to ―prove Christianity.‖699 Yet nowhere do I claim to prove Christianity in this
dissertation. At the very most I claim that aspects of the Christian faith are the most
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reasonable position to take given the evidence we have to work with. 700 As I said in the
chapter on postmodernism:
Christian doctrine can be seen as an explanatory hypothesis that accounts for a wide
variety of features, including history, the cosmos, and the nature of humanity. We would
still be within our epistemic rights to argue that the Catholic worldview can outstrip rival
hypotheses because of its explanatory power, comprehensiveness, plausibility, logical
consistency, livability, and whether competing hypotheses are ad hoc, and so forth.
Christian scholars are now beginning to utilize the newer approach to apologetics in
contrast to the evidentialist challenge. As a reaction to modernism, postmodernism
accords with the provisional nature of knowledge advanced by fallibilism. John
Polkinghorne holds that believers can retain their presuppositions when comparing and
contrasting their views with other competing claims. The final assessment is predicated
on whose Weltanschauung resonates and makes the most sense out of the agreed upon
evidence.

I still maintain the best features of the apologetic manuals, but add additional nuances to
them by addressing the concerns that theologians and apologists must work with in a
newer intellectual climate. Simply because the traditional apologetic approaches were
faulty does not mean that everything in them should be discarded in a postconciliar
church.
(5) Another salient problem with many preconciliar works of apologetics is that
they were based on older scholarship and evidential findings. In this way they were the
product of their time. My approach, however, uses the most up-to-date scholarship in
making a case for Christian faith. For instance in the chapter on the resurrection I said:
Undoubtedly the newest quest for the historical Jesus has ushered in a strong wave of
apologetic writings defending the historicity of Jesus‘ resurrection. The main evidence
considered usually consists of the post-mortem appearances, the empty tomb, and the
origin of the earliest disciples‘ belief in the Risen Christ, along with earliest Christians‘
worship practices despite their every predisposition to the contrary. Apologist Gary
Habermas has developed what is called the ―minimal facts approach‖ to defending the
resurrection. According to him there are twelve widely accepted facts that have been
furnished by the majority of New Testament scholars.

One will notice that in older, preconciliar approaches to apologetics that the historical
critical method of Scripture scholarship was literally absent. There was a lack of
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understanding the historical critical method and what could be deduced (or responsibly
inferred) about Christian origins. Yet in my approach the most up to date sociological
and historical works were appealed to in the case for the resurrection and the positive
influence of Christianity upon the world.
(6) The older style of apologetics seemed to rely on an overly propositional
understanding of doctrine. Here I emphasized that although God‘s revelation to
humanity is beyond propositions, this would not mean that we are to renounce the
propositional. In this way my approach is consistent with traditional Catholic apologetics
(which was almost exclusively propositional), but at least acknowledges that God‘s
revelation is beyond propositions. Gaillardetz says:
the Second Vatican Council presented divine revelation as nothing less than the selfcommunication of God. It taught that divine revelation takes its primary form not as
information, facts or even doctrines, but as a person, Jesus Christ. Vatican II taught that
revelation, in its primary mode, is not the transmission of information but the sharing of
divine life. God addresses us as friends and invites us into relationship (Dogmatic
Constitution on Divine Revelation, No. 2).701

My concern to maintain the propositional is due to the fact that apologetics is, in many
cases, concerned to reason with those who do not share our faith. The common ground
that is needed for effective dialogue must be situated within a context that believers and
unbelievers can both understand.
(7) Another weakness of the older style of apologetics is that it was triumphalistic.
Now my dissertation is somewhat continuous with the importance of recognizing that
truth is better than error (necessarily speaking, beliefs are true and others are false or
partially true), but recognizes the importance that each person in the dialogue is to be
equally respected no matter what one believes. I want to emphasize that truth is not
equated with error (thus the truth certainly does ―triumph‖ over error), but that love is to
701

Richard Gaillardetz, ―Do We Need a New(er) Apologetics?, online article in America.

258

be given to all. The more one loves, the more one is called to speak and defend what is
true. Though love is always emphasized, one must speak and explain Catholic truth
when the circumstances allow for it. Triumphalism is, therefore, to be distinguished from
the triumph of Truth (cf. John 16:30-33). My chapter on postmodernism and rational
apologetics exploits this distinction.
(8) Likewise, another weakness of many preconciliar apologetics works is that
they often treated Catholicism as if all doctrines and practices of the faith were equally
true. But, as Vatican II acknowledges, there is a legitimate hierarchy of truths. Because
of the highly nuanced situation in Catholic theology today, I have chosen to focus on
some of the foundational articles of the faith that nearly all Christians can agree with.
My dissertation is highly sensitive to a broadly ecumenical era. There is nothing in this
dissertation that specifically addresses why one should embrace Catholicism over
Protestantism, for example.
(9) Still another weakness of older works in Catholic apologetics is that they too
easily envisioned the Catholic faith as an unfailing entity that embodied the marks of
holiness without fail at all times and places. In this dissertation I somewhat continued
this tradition in the sense that I believe that the church should still be described as holy.
However, I also recognize that it is accompanied by sin. I specifically addressed this
issue in the last chapter on the via empirica. Not only did that chapter address the good
which Christianity has in fact brought to the world, but any adequate apologetic needs to
address the unholy features which have accompanied the church‘s existence in the world.
In this way my dissertation was positively and negatively apologetical.
(10) Another positive strength of my dissertation is that it is passionate about the
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subjects discussed. Any adequate apologetic work should be seriously concerned about
the subject at hand, and I hope that the readers will agree with me that my dissertation has
taken some of the most salient challenges to Christian faith seriously and with passion.
Challenges from the ―other side‖ are presented and addressed, not just positive arguments
in behalf of the Christian Catholic view.

A Negative Evaluation of the Dissertation
Here I want to point out some of my own concerns with the dissertation. These
are negative evaluations of the project. Each of the following points will be discussed in
paragraphs below.
(1) First, I began the dissertation by arguing that the Second Vatican
Council indicates that there are four distinct models of apologetics. Those four
models carve out space which needs to be filled in with examples of apologetic
challenges. Those test cases were arbitrarily chosen by me. But other examples
could have been used. The use of reason (scholastic), experience
(experientialism), evidence (evidentialism) and the meaning of doctrine
(theological apologetics), thus provide a framework that could have included
other test cases as well.
One could think of many other apologetic challenges that fall under the
broad outline of the models approach to conciliar apologetics, including debates
surrounding the celibacy of the priesthood and the sacraments, and other
challenges related to bioethics. One could also refer to liberation movements as
apologetical in their own right as well. Likewise, although I used categorized the
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issue of God‘s existence under a scholastic approach to God‘s existence, it could
have fallen under another apologetic model, such as experientialism. The point is
that some sort of test case had to fall under each model as pronounced by the
council.
(2) The second problem is that Catholicism can mean different things to
different people. As a result, how does the apologist know what to defend unless
we understand what Catholicism is, given the form it takes in different cultural
contexts? As I said in the chapter on postmodernism, the very fact of truth must
be distinguished from what is true. The very fact there is a truth is easier to
defend than knowing what should be considered true.
The apologist can convincingly argue for the fact of truth (to deny that
there is a truth is self-defeating and therefore impossible to evade). But when it
comes to defending what is true, we have no choice but to begin with the tenets of
faith. The problem becomes even difficult when one realizes that Catholicism
itself can look very different in different contexts.
Let me say from the outset that this problem is one of the reasons why I
have focused on some of the fundamental truths of the Catholic faith as test cases,
not on secondary doctrines in the hierarchy of truths (say, whether priests should
be celibate, whether Thomism constitutes the norm for Catholic theology, or
whether Catholics can vote for candidates who are not pro-life). The apologist‘s
reasons for defending one view against another in these debates are conditioned
by factors that are not easily discernible or decisive as the reasons for Thomistic
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proofs for the existence of God and the credibility of Christ‘ resurrection (in light
of the newest quest for the historical Jesus).
Therefore, I hope the reader will recognize that my dissertation is not
intended to be an exhaustive treatment of postconciliar apologetics (including all
the topics that might be covered), but is deliberately intended to lay out the
Council‘s vision of apologetics, using certain test cases which have been linked
together around a fundamental theme (basic Christian faith) for a certain kind of
reader (perhaps an atheist or an agonistic living in North America or Europe).
(3) This dissertation is heavily concerned with reason in matters of faith,
even if those reasons are shaped in different ways (philosophical reason, historical
reason, and sociological reasons). At one point I mentioned that the
phenomenological encounter with holiness is important for apologetic purposes,
but since it has already been discussed in another dissertation, which later became
a published book,702 I did need not feel the need to write about it.
Apologetics should be theoretical. Theoretical apologetics should be (A)
positive, providing positive reasons for faith; and (B) negative, deflecting reasons
against the faith, and showing where those alternative perspectives are
shortsighted or even mistaken. My dissertation admittedly concentrates on
theoretical apologetics, even though the reasons in question are shaped by
different disciplines (philosophy, history and sociology) for different audiences.
However, I do not want the reader to overlook the fact that praxis itself can serve
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as a motive of credibility. My dissertation gives ―lip service‖ this kind of
apologetic, and so it could be developed at length in another work.
Practical apologetics can be characterized in the following way. First of
all it is contextual. Here one is reminded of the different concerns of different
people. Admittedly, the proofs for the existence of God might not have much
resonance with people who don‘t think in philosophical terms, but are more
concerned about lived praxis. Christians who help the poor give an excellent
witness to the Christian faith. The second characteristic of practical apologetics is
that it must be humble. I maintain that the ultimate apologetic is how one lives
their Christian life in the face of unbelief.
(4) The fourth model of the Council might be called ―theological
apologetics.‖ Good theology is always necessary for the purposes of credibility.
A perfect example of this is when students reject Christian truth on the basis of
caricatures which simply cannot be sustained theologically. I immediately think
of the facetious objections some of my students have mentioned here at St.
Joseph‘s University. ―How about evolution vs. creation, Mr. S? We now know
that evolution is true; therefore Christianity has been proven false.‖ Well, that‘s a
false dichotomy to begin with! Another one is the longstanding belief that
Christianity is the one true religion. When this well established position of
Catholic theology is mentioned, many outsiders or skeptics think that this view
entails that Catholics must believe all ―outsiders‖ are going to hell. Good
theology has an apologetic effect in the sense that it undercuts objections before
skeptics can even present their challenges to him or her. Respectable Catholic
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theology recognizes that the opening chapters of Genesis are not to be taken as a
record of scientific facts, and that there is nothing wrong with positing Christian
uniqueness and outsider salvation at the same time. My dissertation has tried to
nuance certain theological beliefs in several ways, but the theological model of
apologetics is a unique model that needs to be developed.
Though many theologians do not consider themselves as apologists,
Catholic theologians are concerned about the importance of accurately describing
Catholic beliefs and practices. Here the theologian can help the apologist in
numerous ways, for why defend something if it‘s not even worth defending? In
other words, if what we believe is immune from the straw mean attacks of
skeptics, then there is nothing for the apologist to worry about.
(5) The fifth and final point is that a postconciliar apologetics needs to be defined
in comparison to other fields of theology. Defining what is meant by apologetics may
help readers to interpret apologetic texts more accurately. For instance, in the Catholic
Church we know there is tension between dialogue and proclamation. The principles
which govern dialogue and the principles which govern proclamation are very different.
On the one hand, the believer is within his or her rights to engage in evangelization and
apologetics when the circumstances allow for it. On the other hand, that same believer
can and must engage in interreligious dialogue and ecumenism when different
circumstances arise. Dialogue is never about converting one's dialogue partner. So, one
might conclude that dialogue (as expressed in interreligious dialogue and/or ecumenism)
and proclamation (as expressed by evangelization and apologetics) have an analogous
relationship in the life of an individual Catholic. These two paradigms (dialogue and
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proclamation) are not antagonistic to one another, but epitomize the analogical thinking
of a mature believer who knows when to engage in one and not the other.
The tension between proclamation and dialogue is fierce and is sometimes played
out between ―conservatives‖ and ―liberals‖ in a postconciliar Catholic Church.
Nonetheless, the distinctions between these two paradigms must be kept in delicate
balance and individually pursued when necessary. Thus the definition of apologetics
could be developed in the dissertation.
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CONCLUSION
This discussion of postconciliar apologetics rests upon the teaching of Vatican
II. There the bishops proclaimed the importance of a multifaceted approach to defending
Christianity. One must also be aware of the context to make the Gospel credible. This
apologetical approach is directed toward our fellow brethren, and to those individuals
who are formally outside the Church.
After outlining the conciliar vision of apologetics, I started the next chapter of
the dissertation by defending a primitive correspondence theory of truth. Christianity
cannot be considered true by anyone unless the very fact that there is a truth can be first
established. The importance of first principles (i.e., the law of non-contradiction, the law
of the excluded middle, etc.) cannot be naively brushed aside as merely historically
conditioned principles. The very statement that first principles are historically
conditioned confuses epistemology and metaphysics. How we understand
(epistemology) those principles is different from one person to the next. And the
statement itself assumes the permanency of first principles, excluding its contrary denial.
Moreover, the universally binding nature of first principles enables the project
of natural theology to get off the ground. So long as first principles are true, then we can
make sense of the bishops‘ claim that one can know that God exists apart from the
influence of special revelation. This rational approach to defending the faith is called
scholastic apologetics. In this part of the dissertation I briefly discussed the Church‘s
teaching about God‘s existence and highlighted the atheistic trends against the intellectus
essentiae argument for God and found all of them wanting.
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The success of this approach provides a philosophical framework enabling one
to make sense of historical or scientific evidence. Indeed, as presuppositionalists have
stressed to theologians, our background beliefs are necessary for understanding the nature
of evidence and ascertaining what explanation might best account for it. As I said in the
chapter on the historical credibility of the resurrection, ―if a naturalistic explanation does
not seem to account for the facts because the evidence is pulling in a direction which
strongly suggests that a miracle has happened, and if the context in which the event is
thought to have occurred is religiously charged, then it would be feasible for the historian
who [previously] believes in a personal God who will reveal himself in history to
conclude that a miracle has happened.‖ Indeed, without this presupposition, it would
become impossible to favorably interpret the evidence in support of the resurrection.
Given the truth of God‘s existence and the resurrection of Christ, one inevitably
wonders what difference these ―facts‖ in the past might have made upon the world. For it
is easy to ask: ―So what? Even if a personal God existed, and even if Christ was raised
from the dead, what bearing does this have on me?‖ This is precisely where the
experiential approach is necessary.
An experience with the true, good and the beautiful surely complements a rational
defense of the Christian faith. In the next chapter I did not focus much attention on the
phenomenological approach to human holiness as much as I concentrated on the
empirical traces left by those individuals who have been changed by their living
experience with Christ in the Church. Such an endeavor (i.e., a phenomenological one)
would have been futile, if not self-defeating (because I would have to give reasons
explaining the very nature and meaning of the encounter itself). So, it is true that without
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faith one cannot perceive the holiness of the Church, but reason can legitimately
apprehend the changes that Christians cultures have left upon those cultures it has
infiltrated.
Moreover, the phenomenological encounter with holiness is fideistic at heart and
is in need of the rational approach (evidentialism, scholasticism). As I said in this
dissertation: ―Experiences are never self-authenticating, and they must be interpreted
through some other philosophical means. Experiences are often unverifiable and must be
taken on faith alone by outsiders. In this way, the hardheaded skeptic is unlikely to be
persuaded by hearing the testimony of believers and how they came to believe in
Christianity. Many skeptics will quickly dismiss the warm experience of the Church by
dismissing them with naturalistic explanations. Lastly, radical proponents of
experientialism often overlook the primary sources of Christian theology (e.g., Scripture
and Tradition) for the sake of their unique experiences.‖
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